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Research on incubation models has indicated that business incubators and accelerators, 
among others, are crucial catalysts for the development of new ventures in numerous 
industries. To facilitate testing and validation of new financial technology (FinTech) 
providers, and protect financial markets against systemic risks, a new incubation model 
called the ‘regulatory sandbox’ has been established or announced by regulatory 
authorities in more than 50 countries. Sandboxes are virtual trial-and-error instruments 
that grant financial market participants temporary licensing relief and thus provide the 
opportunity to test novel solutions in a controlled, real-world environment and engage 
with regulators who offer guidance and supervision. Despite the potential benefits of 
sandboxes for innovation and financial market stability, the management literature on 
the phenomenon is scarce, limiting our understanding of how regulatory sandboxes 
operate, how they differ from other incubation models and how regulator-regulatee 
interactions enable innovation and regulation practices. This doctoral dissertation 
addresses these gaps. In addition to the empirical exploration of regulatory sandboxes, 
an ecosystem perspective to entrepreneurship is adopted to understand how interactions 
among ecosystem actors contribute to new ventures in the FinTech context that hosts 
sandboxes. Conceptually, this study also reviews the literature on innovation facilitators 
and offers a research agenda. Grounded in a critical realist paradigm, the key 
methodological choices feature a qualitative research design driven by an exploratory-
abductive approach and the Gioia methodology. With regard to data, 35 semi-structured 
interviews have been conducted, 39 archival documents from 5 leading regulatory 
sandboxes analysed and 46 research articles content analysed. The key contribution of 
this research is to the incubation literature by extending our knowledge of a unique 
incubation model and establishing a knowledge-based foundation for future research. 
Additionally, important contributions are made to the emerging fields of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems and FinTech research by conducting an empirical exploration and 
suggesting theoretical propositions to motivate future research. 
Keywords Incubation models; Regulatory sandboxes; FinTech; Entrepreneurial 
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Financial innovation ‘The act of creating and then popularizing new financial 
instruments, as well as new financial technologies, 




‘Technology-enabled innovation in financial services that 
could result in new business models, applications, processes 
or products with an associated material effect on the provision 
of financial services’ (FSB, 2017, p. 7). 
Innovation 
facilitators 
Initiatives that support FinTech innovation activities in terms 
of regulatory guidance, testing of financial solutions and 
collaboration with public and private financial institutions. 
Regulatory 
sandboxes 
‘Regulatory sandboxes grant licensing exemptions to 
participants so that they can test their solutions for a set period 
of time, subject to conditions imposed by regulators in each 
jurisdiction’ (Alaassar, Mention, & Aas, 2020, p. 2). 
Incubation model A support organisation that enables the survival and 
development of start-ups through provision of support 
services (Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, & Van Hove, 2016).  
Regulator-regulatee 
social interaction 
‘An enabling activity among regulators and sandbox 
participants that affects both groups and their practices’ 
(Alaassar et al., 2020, p. 4). 
Ecosystems in 
management 
Adopted from the ecology literature, the concept of 
ecosystems was first introduced to the management literature 




‘Institutional and organisational as well as other systemic 
factors that interact and influence identification and 
commercialisation of entrepreneurial opportunities’ 
(Audretsch & Belitski, 2017, p. 1031). 
Ecosystem 
dynamics 
Interactions that occur between entrepreneurs and ecosystem 
actors in EEs (Cao & Shi, 2020; Gartner, 1985). 
Abduction Abductive logic facilitates the creation of knowledge by 
combining a partly theory-driven and partly data-driven 





between the data, literature and theoretical framework 
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Peirce, 1992). 
Phenomenon-driven 
research 
‘Identifying, capturing, documenting, and conceptualizing a 
phenomenon of interest in order to facilitate knowledge 
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Enabling technologies like artificial intelligence, blockchain and big data analytics have 
revolutionised financial markets (Diaz-Rainey, Ibikunle, & Mention, 2015), allowing 
financial technology (FinTech) service providers to seize one-third of total global banking 
revenues (Accenture, 2018). Despite this growth, researchers have found evidence that 
regulatory challenges appear as innovation barriers for FinTech firms due to legal constraints, 
the high cost of compliance in acquiring financial licenses and a lack of regulatory knowledge 
(Appaya & Jenik, 2019; Arner, Barberis, & Buckley, 2015; Haddad & Hornuf, 2019;  
IOSCO, 2017; UNSGSA, MAS, & CCAF, 2019; Zilgalvis, 2014). As a result of these 
challenges, the rules of the game have changed, and regulators have come to understand the 
need for new approaches to enable innovation and regulate the increasing number of market 
participants to ensure financial market stability (Jenik & Lauer, 2017). A ‘test-and-learn’ 
approach or ‘regulatory sandbox’ has been the most common instrument adopted by 
regulators globally (Appaya & Jenik, 2019). A regulatory sandbox grants licensing 
exemptions to its participants, allowing them to test their solutions for a set period of time, 
subject to conditions enforced by the regulator in the designated jurisdiction (Arner, Barberis, 
& Buckley, 2016; Zetzsche, Buckley, Barberis, & Arner, 2017). While this freedom has 
clearly appealing features, there is a lack of the academic study of regulatory sandboxes in 
the management research field to understand whether these instruments deliver on their 
promise, a gap this doctoral research seeks to address. 
Given that regulatory sandboxes as support instruments share similar objectives with 
incubation models (e.g., business incubators and accelerators), such as promoting innovation 
and reducing the high failure rates associated with new venture creation through the use of 
support services (Aerts, Matthyssens, & Vandenbempt, 2007), one might assume that 
existing knowledge from the incubation literature could be transferable to the sandbox 
context. While this is true to some extent, a closer examination of the literature shows that 
incubation models provide a wider range of services to support firm creation and entry into 
different industries than regulatory sandboxes, which generally focus on financial markets 
and segments like banking, insurance and wealth management (ESA, 2019). In addition, 
regulatory sandboxes have certain distinctive characteristics, such as the prominent role of 
regulators, being led by public institutions, providing licensing exemptions and regulatory 
support services and allowing for novel innovations to be piloted in such a way that no 
systemic risks are faced, all of which distinguish them from other incubation models 





2019; Zetzsche et al., 2017). These differences raise the question of whether existing 
knowledge from the incubation literature could be transferred to the regulatory sandbox 
setting. Thus, it may be argued that, due to the unique peculiarities of regulatory sandboxes, 
it cannot be assumed that all knowledge from existing incubation literature necessarily 
applies to regulatory sandboxes, especially given the lack of research that explores these 
instruments from a management perspective. This is the fundamental argument motivating 
this doctoral dissertation. 
With the rapid growth of information and data availability and the need to connect and 
collaborate with a diverse set of network actors to create and sustain competitive advantage, 
the study of interactions among actors in the business environment has been undertaken to 
grasp its impact on the start-up lifecycle (e.g., Gartner, 1985). However, most studies have 
investigated the influence of a single type of actor, like support organisations (e.g., Grimaldi 
& Grandi, 2005; Pena, 2004), or a selected set of actors like the government, industry and 
university (e.g., Etzkowitz, 2002), while overlooking other factors and actors viewed from 
the perspective of entrepreneurs. In addressing this gap, the entrepreneurial ecosystems (EEs) 
literature has gained considerable attention of both scholars and practitioners because of the 
importance of hospitable external environments to entrepreneurial activity (Alvedalen & 
Boschma, 2017; Motoyama & Knowlton, 2017; Spigel, 2017). Empirical research has 
focused on investigating selected EEs in regard to the conditions in those ecosystems that 
create a conducive environment for entrepreneurs and what policymakers, investors and role 
models could do to improve these conditions (e.g., Scheidgen, 2020; Spigel, 2017). However, 
there is limited evidence on how interactions among ecosystem actors contribute to start-ups 
(Cao & Shi, 2020), and industry-specific EEs research is downplayed. The latter is 
particularly important for digitalised ecosystems (Autio, Nambisan, Thomas, & Wright, 
2018) like education technology (EdTech), clean technology (CleanTech) and FinTech that 
have rapidly emerged and challenged existing ecosystems in terms of regulations, support 
infrastructure and capital and labour needs, among other factors influencing 
entrepreneurship. This imbalance in the focus of existing research calls its generalisability 
into question. For instance, in financial markets, FinTech start-ups have grown so large that 
they can pose greater systemic risk burdens than traditional financial institutions (Magnuson, 
2018). Against this background, the present study seeks to explore the influence of 
interactions between different ecosystem actors on FinTech start-ups.  
The primary research objective of this PhD is to explore and explain ‘how participation 
in regulatory sandboxes and ecosystem dynamics affect financial innovation in FinTech start-





research paper. The dissertation begins by reviewing the emerging literature on innovation 
facilitators in financial markets (Paper A). Following this, FinTech EEs hosting regulatory 
sandboxes are explored to find out how interactions among ecosystem actors contribute to 
FinTech start-ups (Paper B). Thereafter, an exploration of the activities of regulatory 
sandboxes and how such activities are different in comparison to the activities of existing 
incubation models is achieved in Paper C. Finally, an empirical investigation of the social 
interactions within regulatory sandboxes is carried out (Paper D). The dissertation makes four 
contributions to research. First, it unifies the fragmented literature on innovation facilitators 
in financial markets, reviewing their characteristics and identifying avenues for future 
research. Second, it extends existing knowledge of EEs by empirically exploring the 
influence of ecosystem dynamics on start-ups and links those dynamics to the FinTech 
context, responding to numerous calls for empirical studies (Brown & Mason, 2017; Cao & 
Shi, 2020; Spigel, 2017). Third, it advances a novel debate on regulatory sandboxes as 
specialised incubation models (Gazel & Schwienbacher, 2020; Schwartz & Hornych, 2008); 
fourth, it contributes to the emerging FinTech literature, which remains inadequately 
theorised and understudied in management research by employing theoretical frameworks 
that help understand the social aspects of incubation and EEs.  
1.1 Positioning and Rationalisation 
This section presents how this dissertation is positioned across the relevant literature 
streams, offers a justification for each paper and demonstrates the theoretical relevance of the 
objectives selected. At the most basic level, the study is positioned at the intersection between 
the entrepreneurship and innovation literatures (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1: Positioning of this thesis and the four papers across literature streams. 
Paper A










Paper A is broadly positioned in several fields (management, business, economics and 
law) and the emerging FinTech stream. Here, a review of the growing literature is deemed 
necessary considering the perceived impact of regulatory sandboxes on supporting 
innovation in financial markets by regulators and policymakers and the fact that the impact 
has not been sufficiently demonstrated. There are also questions about other existing public 
and private initiatives and their roles in facilitating financial innovation in FinTech start-ups. 
A systematic review is needed to explore the innovation facilitators employed and synthesise 
the literature investigating their processes and consequences. 
In Paper B, an ecosystem view of entrepreneurship is adopted to capture the interplay 
between institutional factors at the macro level and individual actions at the micro level (Van 
de Ven, 1993). The EEs framework introduced by Brown and Mason (2017) is used to 
explore the influence of ecosystem actor interactions on FinTech start-ups, given the sparsity 
of research exploring the interplay among EEs actors (e.g., Ghio, Guerini, & Rossi-Lamastra, 
2019; Nicotra, Romano, Del Giudice, & Schillaci, 2018). FinTech is a distinctive – if not 
unique – context due to the rapid growth of market participants, the systemic risks and legal 
constraints associated with FinTech and the impact of digitalisation on the identification and 
acquisition of entrepreneurial opportunities (Autio et al., 2018), all of which challenge 
existing dynamics among ecosystem actors (Gazel & Schwienbacher, 2020; Hornuf, Klus, 
Lohwasser, & Schwienbacher, 2020) and therefore the generalisability of existing research.  
Paper C is positioned at the intersection between the incubation literature stream and 
emerging FinTech research to explore the organisational level encompassing incubation 
models’ internal mechanisms (Baraldi & Havenvid, 2016; Hackett & Dilts, 2004). The 
connection between regulatory sandboxes and incubation models like business incubators 
and accelerators is made because both instruments have the core objective of supporting 
newcomers. However, sandboxes have not been introduced as support organisations in the 
incubation literature and have mainly been studied from a legal perspective (e.g., Arner et al., 
2017; Zetzsche et al., 2017), with limited output in management research (exempt recent 
contributions e.g., Goo & Heo, 2020). That said, regulatory sandboxes do have certain 
differences, including the role of regulators as innovation facilitators, being led by public 
institutions and providing licensing exemptions and regulatory support services, all of which 
raise the question of whether existing knowledge can be readily transferred from the 
incubation literature stream. Exploring regulatory sandboxes in this area of research is also 
justified by the need for sector-specific incubators (Schwartz & Hornych, 2008), which has 





Also positioned at the intersection between the incubation literature and FinTech research 
stream, Paper D adopts a multi-level perspective capturing the organisational and tenant 
levels of analysis (Hackett & Dilts, 2004). Here, the theoretical lens of social capital theory 
(SCT) is employed to explore the influence of knowledge exchange on the practices of 
regulators and FinTech sandbox participants. SCT is used as an appropriate lens because 
social interactions are argued as enablers for knowledge transfer in the management literature 
(Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000), yet limited knowledge of the social 
aspects of incubation has been uncovered (e.g., Scillitoe & Chakrabarti, 2010; Tötterman & 
Sten, 2005).  
1.2 Research Questions 
The objectives of this doctoral dissertation are explored in four research papers, each 
addressing its own research question:  
Paper A. RQ1: What are the innovation facilitators established to support financial 
innovation activities in FinTechs? 
Paper B. RQ2: How are ecosystem dynamics accelerating or inhibiting new ventures in 
FinTech EEs? 
Paper C. RQ3: How are the activities of regulatory sandboxes different compared with the 
activities of business incubators and accelerators? 
Paper D. RQ4: How can regulator-regulatee social interactions influence the practices of 
regulators and regulatees? 
1.3 Structure of Doctoral Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into two main sections: the first serves as an introduction, while 






































2 Theoretical Background 
This section defines the empirical context of the study before presenting a brief synthesis 
of the main theories, concepts and constructs that serve as a foundation to guide this research. 
This doctoral dissertation extends existing conversations in two main literature streams: the 
incubation literature and EEs research, focusing on the FinTech context and the regulatory 
sandbox phenomenon.  
2.1 Financial Innovation in the FinTech Era 
Financial markets are crucial for the stability of economies (Mention & Torkkeli, 2012). 
This sector has been undergoing a transformation as a result of financial innovation and 
technological change (Frame & White, 2014). Financial innovation has been defined as ‘the 
act of creating and then popularizing new financial instruments, as well as new financial 
technologies, institutions, and markets’ (Lerner & Tufano, 2011, p. 6). Despite the 
introduction of vital financial innovations such as automated teller machines (ATMs) and 
internet banking systems, the degree of innovation in financial markets was generally 
considered low (Hornuf et al., 2020; Lerner, Speen, Baker, & Leamon, 2016). This, however, 
changed with the emergence of FinTech start-ups, which challenged the existing dynamics 
of collaboration and competition among start-ups and traditional banks and drove regulatory 
change (Lee & Shin, 2018; Zetzsche et al., 2017).  
In this research, FinTech is defined as ‘technology-enabled innovation in financial 
services that could result in new business models, applications, processes or products with 
an associated material effect on the provision of financial services’ (FSB, 2017, p. 7). The 
rise of FinTech market participants can be tracked to the period following the 2008–2009 
financial crisis; new ventures and technology firms began delivering a wide range of digitally 
enabled financial solutions, competing fiercely with traditional financial institutions 
operating decades-old legacy systems (Arner et al., 2017; Gozman, Liebenau, & Mangan, 
2018; Jenik & Lauer, 2017). However, it is worth noting that incumbents have other 
advantages such as established customer databases and extensive market data that give them 
the ability to project changes and take action (Philippon, 2016). The nascent FinTech 
literature can be synthesised using Gomber, Koch, and Siering's (2017) three-dimensional 
framework. The first dimension features business functions such as business-to-business 
(B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) models that provide different financial services; 
these can include digital payment solutions, fundraising (crowdfunding), lending, insurance, 
wealth management and capital markets (Lee & Shin, 2018). The second dimension is the 





delivery of financial services. The third dimension covers firm types: newcomers, technology 
firms and incumbents (Gomber et al., 2017). 
FinTech start-ups have continued growing at a tremendous rate in the last decade. 
Accenture (2018) reports that, since 2005, FinTech service providers have captured one-third 
of total global banking revenues, clearly demonstrating their growing impact on economies. 
For example, the FinTech start-up Revolut, a digital bank offering consumers all-in-one 
banking services, has grown exponentially since its founding in 2015, with 12 million users, 
US$916 million in capital raised, more than 1600 professionals employed and a valuation of 
US$1.7 billion just four years later (CB Insights, 2019). Recent figures indicate the global 
presence of nearly 21,000 FinTechs (Statista, 2020), while Crunchbase reports 90 FinTech 
unicorns worldwide, with an aggregate value of approximately US$500 billion, and a 
ninefold rise in global FinTech investment: US$43 billion was invested in 2019, up from 
US$5 billion in 2010 (Crunchbase, 2020). Despite this growth, there is ample evidence that 
regulatory challenges remain barriers for the development of new FinTech ventures (Arner 
et al., 2015; Haddad & Hornuf, 2019; UNSGSA et al., 2019), leading to higher business 
failure rates (Pai, 2017). 
2.1.1 Regulatory sandboxes 
Given that financial markets must be highly regulated to ensure financial stability 
(Magnuson, 2018), regulators have realised that new approaches are needed to effectively 
regulate the increasing number of market participants and support FinTech innovations, 
which can promote financial inclusion of unbanked citizens and foster economic growth 
(Arner et al., 2016; Jenik & Lauer, 2017). Among the commonly adopted approaches by 
regulatory authorities, regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs have gained the most 
attention (Appaya & Jenik, 2019; Arner et al., 2017; ESA, 2019). Regulatory sandboxes 
provide eligible participants with the opportunity to test and learn about their inventions 
within pre-determined parameters, while innovation hubs are engagement points for market 
participants to enquire about regulatory requirements from regulators (Allen, 2019). Only 
recently (since 2016), regulatory sandboxes have gained extensive attention among 
regulators and market participants due to their supportive role in incubating FinTech firms 
and transforming the ecosystem (Buckley, Arner, Veidt, & Zetzsche, 2020). However, 
because sandboxes are novel instruments led by regulators, much of the research into the 
sandbox phenomenon has investigated the legal rather than the management perspective 
(Arner et al., 2017; Zetzsche et al., 2017). Hence, scholarly knowledge of the operating and 
governance models, the stakeholders involved, performance measurements and the influence 





Regulatory sandboxes are novel types of customised support instruments made available 
for market participants in FinTech ecosystems. These organisations, operating at either the 
national or state level, grant eligible market participants licensing exemptions for a set period 
of time (Zetzsche et al., 2017). Regulatory sandboxes have grown rapidly since the first one 
was established in the United Kingdom in 2016; more than 50 regulatory authorities currently 
operate or have announced plans to operate a sandbox (see the overview in UNSGSA et al., 
2019). It is further estimated that 522 financial market participants have applied to regulatory 
sandboxes globally, with 200 being successful in those applications (Appaya & Jenik, 2019). 
Figure 2.1 provides a timeline of the regulatory sandboxes launched to date. These 
instruments are designed to benefit 1) financial markets in terms of reducing systemic and 
consumer risks and increasing competition, 2) regulators by achieving more effective ways 
to regulate market participants, reducing administrative costs for regulators and staying 
updated on technological developments and 3) sandbox participants by reducing operational 
risk and compliance costs, providing knowledge of regulatory systems and offering the 
opportunity to test and validate their business models (Arner et al., 2017; ESA, 2019; FCA, 
2017; Jenik & Lauer, 2017; UNSGSA et al., 2019; Zetzsche et al., 2017). Despite the 
increasing importance of these instruments from the perspective of both regulators and 
practitioners, this phenomenon has been largely ignored by scholars, particularly in 
management research. 
2.2 Incubation Models 
An incubation model is a support institution that enables the survival and development of 
new ventures through the provision of support services (Pauwels et al., 2016). The incubation 
literature is comprehensive as to different instruments like business incubators, accelerators, 
science parks and innovation centres (see the overview in Hackett & Dilts, 2004; Hausberg 
& Korreck, 2018). In a generic sense, incubators provide business support services, access to 
physical facilities and networking opportunities (Mian, Lamine, & Fayolle, 2016). That said, 
a single classification for incubators is problematic because business incubators traditionally 
have the objective of supporting new businesses in the early stages of development, whereas 
science parks target mature businesses (Hausberg & Korreck, 2018). Notwithstanding these 
differences, this study focuses on business incubators and accelerators as they both target 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Given that this study is industry-specific, it is important to link it with conversations 
promoting incubator specialisation that provide tailored support services to new ventures 
operating in various industries, including sector-specific know-how and networks (e.g., 
Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005; Schwartz & Hornych, 2008). Although there is some evidence of 
generic business incubators and accelerators operating in the financial sector (e.g., Pauwels 
et al., 2016), research exploring FinTech-specialised incubation models remains scarce 
(Gazel & Schwienbacher, 2020). With this in mind, regulatory sandboxes have not yet been 
introduced as support organisations in the incubation literature despite having the objective 
of supporting FinTech newcomers. While it may be argued that knowledge from incubation 
studies can be generalised to the FinTech context, certain key differences – including the 
non-traditional role of regulators providing legal support services and licensing exemptions 
– raise questions about how readily existing knowledge can be applied to the FinTech 
context. Grounded against these gaps, the activities of regulatory sandboxes are explored in 
the present study in comparison to generic and specialised incubation models. The internal 
activities of regulatory sandboxes are purposefully explored as a first step to understand novel 
models prior to future investigations, following seminal studies that explored business 
incubators (Bergek & Norrman, 2008; Campbell, Kendrick, & Samuelson, 1985) and 
accelerators (Pauwels et al., 2016). 
2.2.1 Exploring the activities of regulatory sandboxes 
The activity system framework proposed by Zott and Amit (2010) is employed to guide 
the identification of regulatory sandbox incubation activities in Paper C. Pauwels et al. (2016) 
also use the activity system framework to investigate how accelerators function. This 
framework features two design categories: first, design elements describe value creation 
activities in terms of what activities create value (content), how such activities are linked 
(structure) and who executes them (governance). Second, design themes represent the key 
drivers of value creation in the activity model and consist of specific characteristics like 
novelty, lock-in, complementarity and efficiency (Zott & Amit, 2010). Table 2.1 outlines the 
activity system framework. 
Table 2.1: Activity system design framework, adapted from Zott and Amit (2010). 
Design Elements  
Content What activities should be performed? 
Structure How should they be linked and sequenced? 
Governance Who should perform them, and where? 
Design Themes  
Novelty Adopt innovative content, structure or governance. 
Lock-in Build in elements to retain stakeholders like sandbox participants. 
Complementarities Bundle activities to generate more value. 





2.2.2 Exploring social interactions in regulatory sandboxes 
The incubation literature stresses the importance of interaction in successful incubation 
(Rice, 2002). For example, Díez-Vial and Montoro-Sánchez (2016) explored how 
knowledge links with academic institutions enable innovation in science parks and found that 
firms in such parks can enhance their innovative capacity through knowledge exchange. The 
authors highlight interactions between firms and universities as a medium to create a trust-
based environment in which alliances are developed to facilitate knowledge exchange. In 
another study, Scillitoe and Chakrabarti (2010) examined how interactions among incubator 
managers and tenant firms enable support services, finding statistical support for the 
influence of networking and counselling interactions on learning buyer preferences and 
technological know-how. There is also research in this literature stream that explores the 
influence of incubator-incubatee interactions on knowledge sharing, indicating that such 
interactions may increase incubatees’ knowledge of technology and markets (Rubin, Aas, & 
Stead, 2015). Finally, D. Patton (2014) examined interactions among incubator tenants and 
incubator staff to evaluate how they enable tenants’ absorptive capacity. The findings 
indicate that incubator-incubatee interactions improve experiential and exploitative learning 
capacity, which subsequently enables knowledge growth (D. Patton, 2014).  
The above observations support claims from studies (e.g., Zetzsche et al., 2017) that report 
sandboxes as instruments that promote bi-directional knowledge exchange between 
regulators and market participants. Accordingly, it is through interactions with innovators 
that regulatory frameworks become more resilient and better informed about financial market 
dynamics (Bromberg, Godwin, & Ramsay, 2017). In a report published by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), the ability to conduct testing in a sandbox was stated to have 
provided participating firms with a competitive advantage because solutions were validated 
without having to invest the time and resources needed to acquire licenses (FCA, 2017). 
From the regulator perspective, sandboxes provide the opportunity to test and learn how 
different regulatory practices can influence sandbox participants (Arner et al., 2017). From 
the participants’ outlook, innovators gain a better ‘understanding of regulatory and 
supervisory expectations’ (ESA, 2019, p. 5). That said, the lack of previous literature on 
regulatory sandboxes means that an exploratory approach is needed to investigate the social 
interactions that occur within these instruments and their influence on the practices of both 
regulators and sandbox participants in order to make scientifically sound contributions.  
Using SCT as a theoretical lens in Paper D, the role and influence of knowledge transfer 
among regulators and sandbox participants is explored to understand the potential influence 





as a set of relationships for a network actor, ‘plays a critical role in the transfer and exchange 
of network knowledge’ (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005, p. 154). Empirical evidence suggests that 
social interactions facilitate knowledge transfer (e.g., Zahra et al., 2000) and identifies social 
capital as a crucial intangible asset that provides access to knowledge sources; still, 
knowledge of the social aspects of incubation remains limited (Scillitoe & Chakrabarti, 2010; 
Tötterman & Sten, 2005). SCT assumes that network connections provide access to resources 
through three main dimensions: structural, relational and cognitive (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; 
Lee, 2009; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The structural dimension focuses on the position of 
a member in a network characterised by interaction and configuration of ties, connectivity, 
frequency of contact, density and hierarchy. The relational dimension represents established 
behaviours such as trust, norms, obligations and expectations that guide the relations of 
network connections and, as a result, can influence collaboration and knowledge exchange. 
The cognitive dimension refers to communication aspects including shared goals, culture, 
language and codes (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Lee, 2009; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Figure 
2.2 presents the framework employed in visual form. 
 
Figure 2.2: Analytical framework (Alaassar et al., 2020). 
2.3 Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
Considering the complexity and multi-dimensionality inherent in entrepreneurial 
activities, several authors (e.g., Audretsch & Kayalar-Erdem, 2005; Shane, 2003) have 
expressed concern over the scarcity of studies that adopt a holistic approach to 
entrepreneurship. In this setting, such a holistic approach to entrepreneurship suggests 
examining entrepreneurial activities that take place within a local context rather than in 
isolation (Audretsch & Belitski, 2017). To address the lack of a holistic perspective, scholars 
have borrowed the concept of ecosystems from ecology research and applied it to 
management scholarship to explore organisations’ external environment (Moore, 1993). 
More recently, the ecosystem approach has been used to investigate additional ecosystems, 
particularly innovation, entrepreneurial and knowledge ecosystems (Scaringella & 





The concept of EEs is used as a framework to explain social interactions among actors in 
the entrepreneurship process and local environment (Spigel & Harrison, 2018). Audretsch & 
Belitski, (2017) define EEs as ‘institutional and organisational as well as other systemic 
factors that interact and influence identification and commercialisation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities’ (p. 1031). EEs are characterised by the presence of educational institutions, 
supportive policies and infrastructure, industry players, support organisations, a supportive 
entrepreneurial culture and capital power, all of which impact the creation of local start-ups 
by facilitating knowledge transfer and resource access (Colombelli, Paolucci, & Ughetto, 
2019; Neck, Meyer, Cohen, & Corbett, 2004; Spigel, 2017). Much current EEs research 
investigates the dynamics between ecosystem actors rather than simply identifying 
ecosystem elements (Audretsch, Mason, Miles, & O’Connor, 2018; Cao & Shi, 2020; Di 
Fatta, Caputo, & Dominici, 2018; Ghio et al., 2019). Ecosystem dynamics are conceptualised 
as interactions that occur between entrepreneurs and ecosystem actors within EEs, often in 
regard to resource exploration and exploitation. 
Although limited empirical research on EEs exists, the bulk of qualitative studies focus on 
specific geographic locations, overlooking potential industry-specific conditions that may 
influence entrepreneurial activities (e.g., Scheidgen, 2020; Spigel, 2017). Thus, evidence-
based knowledge from empirical investigations cannot necessarily be transferred to emerging 
digitalised industries like FinTech, EdTech and CleanTech. For example, the rapid growth 
of market participants in FinTech, the associated systemic risks and legal constraints that 
emerge, the changing support landscape and the impact of digitalisation on the identification 
and acquisition of entrepreneurial opportunities are all factors that challenge scholarly 
understanding of traditional dynamics among ecosystem actors and hinder the 
generalisability of existing research; this gap is addressed in Paper B. 
2.3.1 An EE framework for FinTech ecosystem dynamics 
  Brown and Mason's (2017) EE taxonomy is employed in Paper B to investigate four 
ecosystem categories: 1) entrepreneurial actors, implying that entrepreneurs are focal actors 
and that relational factors mediate entrepreneurship; 2) resource providers, who are actors 
that facilitate the transfer of various types of resources (financial, industry knowledge, 
business development); 3) connectors, the mediators supporting access to resources; and 4) 
entrepreneurial culture, which represents normative aspects. Other prominent EE 
frameworks (Isenberg, 2011; Spigel, 2017) have also included these actors; however, they 
have focused either on an ecosystem’s composition (Isenberg, 2011) or the relationship 





of EEs attempts to capture the full complexity of an ecosystem with regard to interactions 
among its actors at an individual level. Figure 2.3 outlines the framework employed. 
 




How do interactions occur? 
How are resources accessed 
and exchanged? 
How do intermediaries help 


























3 Philosophy and Methodology  
‘The way we think the world is (ontology) influences: what we think can be known about 
it (epistemology); how we think it can be investigated (methodology and research 
techniques); the kinds of theories we think can be constructed about it’ (Fleetwood, 2005, p. 
197). This section presents the selected paradigm, which is a belief system based on 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), 
followed by a description of its application to the research conducted.   
3.1 Philosophical Position 
When considering the philosophical position that is aligned with the researcher’s 
worldview, a careful evaluation of the belief systems was sought from the philosophical 
continuum, stretching from naive realism at one extreme to relativism at the other (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994), with critical realism (CR) positioned in the middle (Järvensivu & Törnroos, 
2010). This paradigm-seeking journey resulted in the selection of CR as the belief system 
that best coincides with the researcher’s philosophical stance. Table 3.1 presents a brief 
comparison of the central philosophical views. 
Table 3.1: Comparison of philosophical views, adapted from Järvensivu and Törnroos (2010). 
 Naive realism Critical realism Relativism 
Ontology Only one true reality exists; 
universal truth claims apply. 
There is a reality; specific local, 
contingent truth claims apply. 
There is no reality beyond 
subjects. 
Epistemology It is possible to know exactly 
what this reality is through 
objective, empirical 
observations. 
It is possible to move closer to 
local truths through empirical 
observation, bounded by 
community-based critique and 
consensus. 
It is possible to form an 
understanding of a subjective 
reality through analysis of the 
subject’s account of 
knowledge. 
Methodology Direct empirical observation. Empirical observations bounded 
by subjectivity and community-
based critique and consensus. 
Analysis of knowledge 




Deductive; theory testing. Abductive; theory generating and 
testing. 
Inductive; theory generating. 
3.2 The CR Philosophical Paradigm 
CR as a philosophical position originated in the early works of Rom Harré and then Roy 
Bhaskar in the 1980s as a novel alternative to the realist law-seeking model rooted in natural 
science and the relativist interpretation-based reductions of social science, challenging the 
nature of causation; in CR, causation is not established by collecting data of the occurrences 
of events (Sayer, 2000). Instead, the objective of CR is to provide empirically verified 
statements of causation by asking how and why a given phenomenon has occurred (Wynn Jr 





Ontologically, CR is based on several assumptions about the nature of reality, with 
‘stratified ontology’ being the most distinctive. Unlike other philosophical positions that 
adopt flat ontologies occupied by either the actual or the empirical, CR proposes a layered 
reality that differentiates between the real, the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, 1975). The 
‘real’ level represents the structures, objects and causal powers that exist in the natural or 
social world, independent of their being empirical objects and us having sufficient 
understanding of their nature. More importantly, such structures, objects and causal 
mechanisms have properties that make them susceptible to specific kinds of changes. At the 
‘actual’ level, events and activities occur as a result of causal powers being activated, 
regardless of those powers can be detected by humans. The ‘empirical’ level refers to the 
human perceptions and experiences of the events that occur in the actual level (Sayer, 2000). 
Using these levels, critical realists can understand the causal mechanisms of social 
phenomena and their effects. Another noteworthy feature of CR is the use of an open-system 
perspective to view the complex nature of social reality (Wynn, Jr. & Williams, 2012). 
Epistemologically, critical realists derive knowledge claims by using certain 
epistemological assumptions, of which ‘mediated knowledge’ and ‘explanation’ are the most 
prominent (Wynn, Jr. & Williams, 2012). In CR, scientific knowledge is assumed to have 
both transitive and intransitive features. The former dimension refers to holders’ observations 
and theories created from scientific inquiry, underscoring that a mismatch between theory 
and reality is likely to exist, while the latter captures the independent reality that we attempt 
to explain. Taken together, knowledge is assumed to be mediated by the surrounding social 
structures and mechanisms; thus, knowledge is ‘formed in conjunction with existing social 
interaction and beliefs along with our own sensory and conceptual interpretations’ (Wynn, 
Jr. & Williams, 2012, p. 793). Explaining the causal powers that are responsible for the 
generation of an event is the central objective in CR, while depicting that we are prevented 
from identifying all antecedents of a given outcome by the complexity inherent in open 
systems. As such, theory generation in the CR paradigm is limited to offering a certain 
amount of contextual reasoning for the occurrence of a phenomenon embedded in a social 
reality (Bhaskar, 1975; Wynn, Jr. & Williams, 2012). 
Unlike positivism and interpretivism, CR offers a broad range of methods suitable for the 
research process, conditional on making methodological choices that account for the nature 
of the study object and the investigation’s desired goal. CR denies ‘cookbook prescriptions 
of method which allow one to imagine that one can do research by simply applying them 
without having a scholarly knowledge of the object of study in question’ (Sayer, 2000, p. 19). 





CR by combining a partly theory-driven and partly data-driven approach (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002; Järvensivu & Törnroos, 2010; Peirce, 1992).  
3.2.1 CR considerations in the present study 
The literature on regulatory sandboxes in specific and social aspects of incubation and 
EEs in a broader sense is scarce, with a limited academic understanding of how and why the 
regulatory sandbox phenomenon contributes to financial innovation in FinTech start-ups. For 
this reason, an exploratory qualitative approach was considered a necessary foundation for 
building explanations of the causal mechanisms of this phenomenon and its associated effects 
on the practices of innovators and regulators; this approach involved suggesting a set of 
theoretical propositions. While it may be argued that CR is limited to an explanatory 
approach to research, there are exploratory accounts in empirical works of prominent CR 
scholars like Margaret Archer (2003). Thus, this research builds on these contributions by 
seeking both exploration and explanation. Another important consideration was to ensure the 
consistent adoption of abduction, a feature that is distinctive of the CR paradigm (Järvensivu 
& Törnroos, 2010). For this purpose, a thorough adaptation of the Gioia methodology applied 
was necessary to allow for the alternation between theory, analytical framework, empirical 
reality and case analysis. A detailed explanation of this adaptation is provided in subsection 
3.3.3. That said, even if one were to overlook the philosophical position of the researcher, it 
is reasonable to argue that other philosophical positions, including positivism and 
interpretivism, still would not have been appropriate for the research presented here due to 
the limited literature on regulatory sandboxes and ecosystem dynamics, single case studies, 
non-longitudinal access to data and the variance-based nature of this study. 
3.3 Methodological Choices 
The following sections discuss the methodological choices made throughout the research 
process. For papers B, C and D, a qualitative research design using an exploratory-abductive 
logic was used to develop explanations in the form of theoretical propositions (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002), an approach deemed appropriate in the FinTech context (e.g., Mention, 2020). 
Whilst an abductive approach is typically used in an exploratory manner in case study 
research, it is used to facilitate the process of alternating between different sources of data, 
the frameworks employed and existing knowledge to explain the phenomenon under 





Table 3.2: Outline of research design. 
 Paper A Paper B Paper C Paper D 
Research 
Objective 
Review and synthesis 
of the literature on 
innovation facilitators 
in financial markets  
Explore the influence 
of ecosystem 
dynamics on FinTech 
start-ups 







influence of social 




Research design Conceptual Qualitative design 
Research strategy Not applicable Abductive reasoning  






Criterion sampling  Purposive and 
criterion sampling 
Data collection 41 papers from Web 
of Science and 5 
papers from Scopus 
and Google Scholar. 
Primary data from 19 
semi-structured 
interviews with 
ecosystem actors in 
Singapore 
Global sample of 39 
archival documents 
from 5 leading 
regulatory sandbox 
web pages 
Primary data from 
16 semi-structured 
interviews with 
global sample of 
regulators and 
regulatees 
Data analysis Content analysis Modified Gioia method, facilitated with NVivo Pro 12 
3.3.1 Sampling strategy 
Paper A employed keyword-based and external-article search strategies, followed by a 
review of the titles, abstracts and keywords of the identified articles to ensure relevance to 
the research question. Following this, 46 research papers were prepared for analysis, as 
outlined in Table 3.3. Paper B followed purposive, criterion and snowball sampling strategies 
to ensure a purposeful selection of participants in Singapore’s FinTech EE (M. Q. Patton, 
1990). To limit the sample size of recruited participants, the following criteria were applied: 
ongoing engagement in the financial market of Singapore as an entrepreneurial actor, 
entrepreneurial resource provider or entrepreneurial connector. As for snowball sampling, 
this was employed on an ongoing basis after the commencement of interviews and brought 
the total of interviews to 19. The social media platform, LinkedIn, played a major role in the 
recruitment of participants for Papers B and D. Singapore was carefully chosen for its 
distinctive FinTech context, which is ranked third globally behind the United Kingdom and 
the United States (Findexable, 2020). Singapore features the dual role of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS), which functions as both a regulator and innovation catalyst 
with several initiatives including the Singapore FinTech festival (the world’s largest), the 
API Exchange (APIX) that enables collaboration among FinTechs and incumbents and 











Table 3.3: Search and selection, Paper A. 
# Search Strings in Web of Science Search Selection 
1 (incubat* OR accelerat* OR instrument* OR mechanism* OR initiativ* OR hub* OR 
framework*) AND ‘financial innovat*’  
335 28 
2 (incubat* OR accelerat* OR instrument* OR mechanism* OR initiativ* OR hub* OR 
framework*) AND (fintech OR ‘financial technology’) 
185 16 
Total 520 44 
Total accessible 41 
Additional contributions (reputable authors sourced from Scopus/Google Scholar) 5 
Total # of papers for analysis 46 
As for Paper C, a criterion sampling logic was employed from the different strategies for 
purposefully choosing cases, ensuring case selection based on predefined criteria (M. Q. 
Patton, 1990). The criteria were 1) public-led regulatory sandboxes, 2) regulatory sandboxes 
operating by 2016 and 3) the availability of adequate documentation online. Only five 
regulatory sandboxes worldwide fulfilled these selection criteria at the time of sampling; 39 
archival documents were retrieved, and data analysis commenced thereafter. Finally, Paper 
D both followed purposive and criterion sampling strategies to recruit participants for 
primary data collection (M. Q. Patton, 1990). A global sample of regulators and sandbox 
participants (regulatees) was recruited, and a sampling criterion strategy was employed to 
facilitate selection; regulators were selected based on their current operation of a regulatory 
sandbox with a minimum of one participant, while regulatees were chosen based on their 
participation status, either current or within the preceding three years. In total, 15 regulatory 
sandboxes and 87 sandbox participants met the selection criteria, which led to 16 successful 
interviews (see the overview in Alaassar et al., 2020).  
3.3.2 Data collection 
For Paper A, 41 research papers were retrieved from Web of Science (WoS), and five 
more were selected as important contributions that were only identifiable from Google 
Scholar and Scopus. In addition, 39 archival documents comprising 459 pages were collected 
from 5 leading regulatory sandboxes around the globe for Paper C. Table 3.4 provides 
descriptive data of the selected cases. The documents included regulatory guides, 
consultation papers, information sheets and press releases published on the web pages of the 
sandboxes included in the sample. Once retrieved, all documents were uploaded to the NVivo 






Table 3.4: Descriptive data of certain regulatory sandboxes (Alaassar, Mention, & Aas, Paper C). 








Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) 
12/2016 Rolling basis 6 12 months 9 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) 




Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) 









24 months 12 





3-6 months 6 
For Papers B and D, data collection was achieved through semi-structured interviews 
featuring pre-defined, open-ended questions with an emphasis on capturing interviewees’ 
experiences through examples. This approach, coupled with the use of theoretical 
frameworks, facilitated data collection and the discovery of variability in participants’ 
experiences. The interviews were all conducted remotely in English and lasted an average of 
50 minutes each; interviews were audio taped and transcribed in preparation for further 
analysis in NVivo. The data analysis procedure for all papers is briefly described below. 
Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 provide an overview of the interview participants. 
Table 3.5: Description of actors retrieved from Alaassar, Mention, and Aas (Paper B). 
Participant Codea Role 
Age of start-up/ 
Organisation 
Firm type/classification 
Ent-1 Founder and Educator 3 years Blockchain/Crypto 
Ent-2 Founder 5 years Cross-Border Payments 
Ent-3 Founder 3 years Blockchain/Crypto 
Ent-4 Co-founder 6 years Capital Markets 
Ent-5 
Serial Entrepreneur, Educator, 
Advisor 
1-4 years Asset Management 
Ent-6 
Founder, General Secretary 
(Association) 
2 years Insurance 
Ent-7 
Former Entrepreneur, Head of 
Partnerships, Advisor 
6 years Payments 
Ent-8 Serial Entrepreneur, Advisor 1-4 years Blockchain/Crypto 
Ent-9 Co-founder, Advisor 1 year Payments 
EC-10 Director of Accelerator 5 years Corporate Accelerator 
EC-11 
Managing Partner and Serial 
Entrepreneur 
2 years Accelerator 
EC-12 Program Manager 5 years 
Corporate Incubator and 
Accelerator 
EC-13 Manager and Co-Founder, Advisor 5 years Accelerator 
RP-14 Co-Founder, Partner 2 years Investor – VC 
RP-15 Founder, Consultant <1 year Consultancy 
RP-16 CEO, Founder 2 years Investor – VC 
RP-17 Co-Founder, Partner 4 years Investor – VC 
RP-18 Executive Manager 4 years Support Association 
RP-19 Regulator N/A Government Agency 






Table 3.6: Description of regulators (R) and sandbox participants (SP), retrieved from Alaassar, Mention, and Aas (2020, 
Paper D). 
 Role of Informant Participant Code Regulatory Jurisdiction 
1 Financial Specialist R-1 North America 
2 Regulator R-2 North America 
3 Senior Regulator R-3 Europe 
4 Senior Regulator R-4 Oceania 
5 Executive Director R-5 Europe 
6 Senior Manager R-6 MENA 
7 FinTech Specialist R-7 MENA 
8 Founder and Policy Manager SP-1 Europe 
9 CEO and Co-founder SP-2 Europe 
10 Executive Manager SP-3 MENA 
11 CEO and Founder SP-4 Europe 
12 CEO and Founder SP-5 Asia 
13 Director of Regulatory and Policy SP-6 Europe 
14 CEO SP-7 Europe 
15 Head of Compliance SP-8 Asia 
16 Vice President Operations SP-9 North America 
3.3.3 Data analysis 
For Paper A, the academic studies were analysed using content analysis following a 
deductive and inductive coding approach (Belderbos, Grabowska, Leten, Kelchtermans, & 
Ugur, 2017; Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003). In this setting, a coding scheme was 
prepared with high-level categories such as descriptive data, innovation facilitation 
approaches (what and how) and implications; new categories were created during analysis. 
To facilitate data analysis in Papers B, C and D, the Gioia methodology was used to achieve 
qualitative rigour (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). While unquestionably helpful for 
qualitative research, the Gioia methodology follows an inductive, data-driven logic to theory 
building rather than an abductive one. It was thus necessary to adapt it to an abductive logic; 
using a theoretical framework (prior to analysis as opposed to inductively grounded theory 
research) to assist with data collection and data analysis. Even Gioia et al. (2013, p. 21) state 
the following: ‘Upon consulting the literature, the research process might be viewed as 
transitioning from “inductive” to a form of “abductive” research’. The researcher shares 
Langley’s perspective on induction versus deduction: ‘We overemphasize the idea of 
induction, that we are completely theory free. I actually think that what we are doing is 
abduction rather than induction. Induction for me implies that you are generalizing from 
empirical observation, and that there is not really any a priori theory there, which is illusory. 
I think that to develop a richer understanding of the world, we do need to connect to prior 
theory’ (cited in Gehman et al., 2018, p. 297). Thus, abduction, as perceived by the 
researcher, has the purpose of discovering new relationships or variables and is closer to 





this might indicate a closer fit with to the Gioia methodology, the abductive approach adopted 
here has also links with Eisenhardt’s method, for instance by obtaining parsimony (Gehman 
et al., 2018). Overall, this doctoral dissertation is distinct from both Gioia’s theory-
development and Eisenhardt’s theory-generation approaches to qualitative research. 
One may then ask, bearing in mind the exploratory, non-longitudinal and variance-based 
nature of papers B, C and D, which approach is most appropriate to follow to qualitatively 
develop theory if one is not adhering to Eisenhardt, Gioia or Langley. This question is 
answered using the abductive, ‘systematic combining’ approach pioneered by Dubois and 
Gadde (2002). Systematic combining, a non-linear, non-positivistic approach, requires the 
researcher to shift back and forth (conceptualised as ‘matching’) between the analytical 
framework, existing theory, the empirical world and the analysis to develop new explanations 
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002). That said, while the contribution of Dubois and Gadde (2002) 
provides an alternative approach to develop theory, it lacks clarity when it comes to analysing 
data and presenting findings, which is addressed by adapting the Gioia methodology to an 
abductive logic before and after data collection. Prior to data collection, this adaptation 
features the use of theoretical frameworks (Table 2.1, Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3) as a general 
starting point to guide collection of empirical data. After data is acquired, the Gioia 
methodology is adapted in two ways: 1) employing a preliminary coding scheme based on 
the theoretical frameworks in papers B and C to guide the categorisation process and 2) 
inverting it to begin analysis with the structural, relational and cognitive dimensions from 
SCT (in Paper D). In the former approach, additional categories that emerged inductively 
were also captured and employed, whilst the latter approach discarded categories that had no 
relation to the employed theoretical lens. While anecdotal, it is cautiously claimed that this 
adaptation provides an alternative approach to the positivist and interpretivist schools by 
enhancing qualitative rigour in CR studies that employ abductive logic. 
3.4 Research Quality 
Thirty-five years ago, two seminal qualitative scholars (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) posed the 
question: ‘How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences that the research findings of an 
inquiry are worth paying attention to?’ (p. 290). The merits of qualitative work has been 
debated both within the broader qualitative community and among scholars of different 
paradigms who offer a wide range of evaluative criteria. Tracy (2010) seeks to address this 
gap by providing a set of eight universal quality criteria applicable across all belief systems, 
which is what this research applies as a guiding framework while acknowledging the existing 





2013). Table 3.7 presents the quality criteria with selected means, practices and methods 
which enabled achieving each criterion, along with a rationale for how this has been obtained 
in this research (Tracy, 2010).  
Table 3.7: Evaluation of quality criteria, following Tracy (2010). 








The phenomenon of regulatory sandboxes is worthy of study as there is little 
empirical evidence of how it will achieve its goals in a context characterised by 
increasing market participants, digitalisation and potential risks to consumers, 
business operations and overall financial stability. This study also questions 
assumptions about the transferability of knowledge from different contexts by 
building on reputable contributions that explore new incubation models like 
accelerators (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2016) or promote incubator specialisation 
(Schwartz & Hornych, 2008). An ecosystem approach is employed to inform EE 
research about the influence of ecosystem dynamics on FinTech start-ups 
(Alvedalen & Boschma, 2017). As a whole, this study explores a novel support 
instrument and provides explanations of significance to different stakeholders.  
Rich rigour Theoretical 
constructs; 




Data collection and 
analysis processes 
Rigour was achieved by devoting substantial time and effort to become familiar 
with the theories, revisiting the literature multiple times before, during and after 
data collection and analysis – or even months later during review processes – thus 
ensuring a continuous effort to capture theoretical nuances. Similar efforts were 
allocated to data collection and analysis; though the former was constrained by 
sample size, new, rare and even unique data was collected from appropriate 
participants. Transcript accuracy was ensured by recording interviews and 
applying a two-step transcription procedure. As for data analysis, the Gioia 
method was employed to achieve qualitative rigour in analysis; data structures 
were developed illustrating the most important data aggregation steps undertaken 
during the analytical process, and frequent use of participant quotes was 
purposefully made to ensure transparency. 
Sincerity Transparency of 
methods  
Transparency is also a mean to sincerity (Tracy, 2010); this was achieved by 
providing authentic data trails through documented analysis and reporting of 
findings. The level of participation in the context is one possible consideration of 
transparency; at an early stage of the research, the researcher participated in 
FinTech-related events and had six formal pilot interviews with FinTech scholars 
and experts to gain a better understanding of the context. 
Credibility Thick descriptions; 
Triangulation;  
Contextualised explanations are provided through showing rather than telling 
when reporting the findings to illustrate the depth of the data. In contrast to other 
paradigms, opposing and unique views are not discarded but rather worth 
consideration, as they can provide in-depth understanding and consequently 
richer explanations of causal forces in CR (Wynn, Jr. & Williams, 2012). Data 
triangulation (Downward & Mearman, 2007) was employed to collect empirical 
data from various sources. In Paper B, different perspectives were captured using 
a heterogenous sample of ecosystem actors located in Singapore, with 
entrepreneurs representing the largest number of participants, given their 
important role as focal actors in the EEs literature. In Paper C, this was achieved 
by retrieving archival data from five regulatory sandboxes, whereas Paper D 
captured two perspectives: regulators and sandbox participants.  
Resonance Transferability of 
findings 
Consistent with the above descriptions, transferability is achieved by providing 










Theoretically, the significance of this research lies primarily in 1) synthesising the 
literature on innovation facilitators and proposing promising areas for future 
research (Paper A), 2) clarifying the scholarly understanding of the FinTech 
context and its link to the EEs literature (Paper B), 3) advancing a novel debate 
on regulatory sandboxes as incubation models in the incubation literature (Paper 
C) and 4) extending the scholarly understanding of the influence of knowledge 
exchange on the practices of regulators and sandbox participants at the 
organisational and tenant levels of analysis (Paper D). Contributions from all four 
papers are translated into concise theoretical propositions that lay the foundation 
for future research. Methodologically, the main contribution lies in the application 
of the Gioia method to CR abductive research. Practically, this study primarily 
informs financial market entrepreneurs, regulators and policymakers about the 
causal forces and related effects associated with regulatory sandboxes and 
FinTech contexts, which could contribute to improving the conduciveness of 
environments for entrepreneurial activity and the financial stability of markets. 
Ethical Procedural ethics 
 
This research has been subject to strict ethical evaluation and governing processes 
imposed by one of the affiliated institutions (RMIT University) where data 
collection was conducted; an ethics application was filed and approved to conduct 
the empirical studies (see appendix A for ethics approval). Moreover, prior to and 
during recruiting and interviewing participants, participant information sheets and 
consent forms were distributed (see appendix B), and a carefully crafted ethical 
procedure was followed. Additionally, transcriptions were shared with 
participants after the data collection process requesting approval prior to analysis, 
giving participants an opportunity to amend and approve their statements. 
Distribution of executive summaries after submitting Papers B and D to journals 
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and discussion  
The research is aligned with a CR paradigm that consistently applies an 
exploratory abductive logic across empirical studies, ensuring interconnectedness 
among all its sections by moving back and forth between the literature, theoretical 
framework, analysis and context; purposeful actions such as modifying the data 
analysis approach support the efforts to achieve coherence. Similarly, 
explanations of causal mechanisms and associated effects are formalised in 
theoretical propositions, derived from discussions motivated with ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions. Thus, following a CR approach has provided important 
guidelines to facilitate data collection and analysis and refine the explanation of 
the findings. 
Paper B, C and D have all undergone double-blind peer review processes in ABS level 3-
ranked journals prior to publication; review processes function as a control measure of quality 
and validate the academic and practical relevance of manuscripts. As for Paper A, it is 
currently being prepared for submission to an academic journal. The following sections 
provide an overview of the key findings from the research papers followed by a discussion 





4 Research Output: Review and Synthesis of the Findings 
This section presents the key findings from each paper and discusses emergent 
commonalities. Paper A, ‘Facilitating innovation in FinTech: A review and research agenda’, 
synthesises contemporary literature on innovation facilitators in financial markets, looking at 
both publicly and privately led initiatives established to promote financial innovation in 
FinTechs. The results from the analysed studies in the sample reveal that regulatory 
initiatives, especially regulatory sandboxes, are the most common topic in the literature. 
Sandboxes are found to have positive implications on FinTech participants by increasing 
their credibility and access to capital. The scope of regulatory responses, meanwhile, 
indicates a change from a risk-based to opportunity-based outlook on regulation. In addition, 
innovator-led and incumbent-led initiatives were identified as relevant in this setting. For 
innovators, this appeared in assisting with fundraising (e.g., peer-to-peer lending platforms) 
and regulatory arbitrage. As for incumbents, incubator programs and collaboration strategies 
were deployed.  
Paper B, ‘Ecosystem dynamics: exploring the interplay within fintech entrepreneurial 
ecosystems’, adopts an ecosystem view of entrepreneurship to explore the influence of 
interactions among ecosystem actors on FinTech start-ups. The findings revealed four 
categories representing the relational perspective, which features interaction and 
intermediation dynamics, and the cultural perspective, which encompasses ecosystem 
development and regulatory dynamics. From these findings, five theoretical propositions 
were derived to explain how and why opportunity identification and resource exploitation 
are accelerated or inhibited for start-ups in FinTech EEs. First, it is deduced that the presence 
of institutional voids in ecosystems like regulators’ reluctance to accept cryptocurrencies 
motivates first-comers to pave the way for later arrivals by establishing supportive 
mechanisms. Second, with entrepreneurs playing a central role in co-creating regulations 
through their interactions with regulators (e.g., the Payment Service Act), it is plausible to 
suggest the presence of relational governance practices within FinTech EEs. Third, in the 
context of bridging incumbents and FinTechs, regulatory authorities were found to govern 
collaboration initiatives (e.g., APIX), thus demonstrating hierarchical governance. Fourth, 
FinTech start-ups’ access to non-local ecosystems was positively affected by enhanced 
connectivity through digitalisation and the intermediary role of venture capitalists (VCs) and 
support organisations. Fifth, the co-location of VCs in incubator programs and collaboration 
with university researchers were among the strategies employed to compensate for the 
identified lack of industry and technical knowledge. Additionally, ecosystem actors were 





when acquiring regulatory clarification or seeking access to regulatory initiatives like 
sandboxes. The implications of these obstacles impact VCs’ willingness to invest. As a result, 
entrepreneurs were found to resort to pragmatic approaches like avoiding regulators, 
practicing regulatory arbitrage and raising capital through ICO sales or crowdfunding 
platforms. Talent retention and presence of scammers were also among the barriers 
identified. 
Some of the above findings from Paper B either confirm or extend the existing scholarly 
understanding of the results identified in Paper A. In terms of regulator-led initiatives, using 
Singapore as the case provided insights into several regulatory initiatives employed to 
facilitate innovation, including the regulatory sandbox. In addition to finding evidence 
confirming that sandboxes do indeed provide a ‘stamp of quality’, the financial benefit of 
postponing licensing fees was reported as an advantage for sandbox participants. As for 
innovator-led approaches, ICOs or crowd-investing and regulatory arbitrage were both found 
to be frequently employed practices. As an example of bypassing local regulatory 
requirements, innovators in the cryptocurrency sphere may apply for a financial license in 
foreign jurisdictions to save time and capital. Finally, with regard to incubator programs by 
incumbents, it is noteworthy that the findings from Paper B indicate the role of government 
in financing innovation labs established in banks. 
Paper C, ‘Exploring a new incubation model for FinTechs: regulatory sandboxes’, 
explored the incubation model of the regulatory sandbox and how it differs from other 
incubation models at the organisational level. An activity model was generated from the 
findings, encompassing three design elements that reveal how value-adding activities are 
conducted – achieving membership, participating and detaching – and one design theme in 
the form key sources of value creation – improving connectedness. Six theoretical 
propositions were developed when discussing the activities characterising regulatory 
sandboxes and comparing these activities with generic and specialised business incubators 
and accelerators. The first involves design elements; the findings indicate the use of a 
dynamic tailoring approach to establish boundary conditions when achieving membership. 
Such powers allow regulators to alter testing conditions during the participation of FinTechs 
should unprecedented consequences emerge. As such, sandboxes can proactively protect 
both consumers and FinTech participants. Second, during participation, the activities of 
supporting and supervising promoted the transfer of knowledge between regulators and 
participants, thus increasing regulators’ understanding of the application of novel 
technologies and participants’ knowledge of regulation and enabling them to create 





termination and extension policies indicated the dominance of a risk-based rather than an 
opportunity-based approach. Fourth, in terms of the identified design theme of improving 
connectedness, the sources of value creation were found to be associated with themes 
including novelty (sandbox models evolve with new activities like the Sandbox Express), 
complementarity (cross-border collaboration among regulators provides FinTechs easier 
access to international jurisdictions) and efficiency (as a result of enhancing sandbox 
operations, transaction costs are reduced). These themes improve connectedness among 
regulators, local regulators and FinTechs, and international regulators and local sandbox 
participants. Further, the comparison of activities indicated that regulatory sandboxes differ 
from generic incubators and accelerators by providing regulatory support and mediating 
access to regulators in both local and foreign jurisdictions. Similar activities were identified 
when comparing sandboxes to specialised incubation models, while emphasising that 
regulators provide contemporary FinTech-specific regulatory knowledge due to their 
frequent interactions and active roles in this landscape. 
The findings from Paper C primarily extend the academic understanding of how 
regulatory sandboxes operate and evolve, confirming the proactive role of regulators in 
stimulating FinTech innovation. That said, there is a tendency for risk orientations to emerge, 
which may inhibit testing activities; regulators in Paper C appeared to be more cautious about 
adopting an opportunity-based outlook than they did in Paper A. Moreover, regulatory 
initiatives like the Global Sandbox indicate the hierarchical role of authorities in mediating 
collaboration between regulators and local sandbox participants, extending the opportunities 
for co-location and access to non-local ecosystems, beyond the ones presented in Paper B. 
Another notable aspect found in Paper C was the Singapore’s Sandbox Express model, which 
may reduce the time obstacle reported by entrepreneurs in Paper B with regard to swift access 
to sandboxes. Additionally, Paper C points out supervising and supporting activities during 
participation as enablers for knowledge exchange, as depicted in the existing literature 
presented in paper A. This initial explanation of sandboxes as conducive environments for 
knowledge exchange motivated the subsequent study. 
That last article, Paper D, is called ‘Exploring how social interactions influence regulators 
and innovators: the case of regulatory sandboxes’ and explored social interactions between 
regulators and sandbox participants and their impact on their practices. Ten theoretical 
propositions were derived to contribute to the scholarly understanding of knowledge 
exchange in the context of regulatory sandboxes at the organisational and tenant levels of 
analysis. Starting with the impact of social interactions on sandbox participants, the study 





among investors and consumers, enabling them to raise capital and undertake testing. 
Further, higher interaction frequency was found to affect participants’ knowledge of 
regulations and compliance capabilities. Similarly, social interactions had a positive effect on 
participants’ risk management capabilities due to the transferred knowledge on compliance 
and operational pitfalls. As a result, sandbox participants were able to build more sustainable 
and compliant solutions. As for the impact of social interactions on regulators, the study 
reinforces the vital role of FinTechs in educating regulators about technology-enabled 
solutions and providing early access to solutions that will meet with compliance standards. 
Although the intensity of interaction varied during participation, frequent interaction enabled 
regulators to understand FinTechs’ support needs. Instead of legally oriented discussions, 
regulators were found to have more technical conversations, which facilitated knowledge 
sharing. Moreover, the study identified a few negative implications. First, in cases where the 
nature of interaction among regulators and innovators was dominated by one-way 
communication in terms of reporting testing performance to regulators, sandbox participants 
gradually become reluctant to share novel insights. Second, inconsistency in expectations 
inhibited knowledge exchange among both regulators and sandbox participants. This may 
include achieving underlying key performance indicators for regulators and financial savings 
for innovators. Finally, the findings indicated regulators’ resistance to amend regulations, 
which negatively affected innovators’ testing practices. 
The findings from Paper D complement the contribution of previous studies by capturing 
the implications of sandboxes on FinTech innovation from the perspective of sandbox 
participants, which has scarcely been previously explored. Compared to those studies that 
have been conducted, sandboxes were found to provide FinTechs additional advantages 
beyond the ones identified previously (e.g., improving acceptance by investors and access to 
cross-border testing) like improving their compliance and risk management capabilities and 
being able to communicate with regulators using a common (technical) language. That said, 
disparities in sandbox participants’ experiences were also identified, indicating in some cases 
fewer benefits from participation. In consensus with previous studies, FinTechs operating in 
blockchain and cryptocurrency segments were found to benefit the least from participating 
in sandboxes or interacting with regulators. This is mainly due to the lack of regulation and 
the underlying motive of regulators to monitor the activities of these start-ups. The findings 
in Paper D illuminate additional inconsistencies in regulatory incentives, revealing that some 
regulators are not genuinely incentivised to promote novel FinTech solutions. This is 
evidenced in regulators’ unwillingness to amend existing regulations or establish new 





these findings must be cautiously interpreted given the limited sample size and the presence 
of several contingencies (e.g., regulatory mandates, compliance experience of sandbox 
entrants, participation in early cohorts), it is reasonable to conclude that some jurisdictions 
deploy sandboxes with the implicit objective of monitoring testing participants’ ability to 
develop compliant solutions. In such cases, sandboxes may not foster FinTech innovation in 

























5 Implications for Research and Practice 
This section presents the overarching contributions made to theory, methodology and 
practice from this doctoral dissertation; extended contributions for each paper can be read in 
part II. 
5.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the conceptualisation of the regulatory sandbox 
phenomenon in the incubation literature and the construct of ecosystem dynamics in the EEs 
literature by providing explanations in the form of theoretical propositions. Financial markets 
with the presence of sandboxes and FinTech start-ups constitute the context of this 
contribution. Hence, this theorisation is made at multiple levels of analysis: the tenant 
(sandbox participant), the organisation (regulatory sandbox) and the ecosystem (FinTech 
EEs). Fundamentally, this dissertation challenges the assumption that existing incubation 
theory can be transferred to the study of regulatory sandboxes because of the peculiarities of 
this underexplored context. While the findings certainly do reveal how FinTech incubation 
occurs as to the activities of regulatory sandboxes and the impact of knowledge transfer on 
the practices of sandbox participants, other important lessons at the ecosystem level extend 
the scholarly understanding of factors affecting financial innovation in FinTech start-ups. 
Examples include the presence of institutional voids precipitating entrepreneurial actors to 
create a support ecosystem for novel or unendorsed segments, the dual mandate of the 
regulator (i.e., regulation and market development) providing a rich variety of innovation 
initiatives and the role of digitalisation and intermediaries in reducing spatial contingencies. 
Despite the deduced positive impact of these factors on FinTech start-ups, several obstacles 
emerged in the form of regulatory shortcomings that led entrepreneurs to adopt pragmatic, 
non-regulatory approaches to innovation. These findings bridge the incubation and EEs 
research streams while emphasising that the incubation of FinTech start-ups is contingent on 
regulatory responses to sustain the safe operation and dissemination of financial innovations 
within spatial jurisdictions.  
Moreover, the key theoretical contributions in the individual papers are synthesised. The 
studies conducted advance a novel debate on regulatory sandboxes as incubation models, 
contributing directly to studies that explore how new models function in the incubation 
literature, as when Campbell et al. (1985) and Bergek and Norrman (2008) explored 
incubators or Pauwels et al. (2016) explored accelerators. Future research can also benefit 
from this study to track the emergence of regulatory sandbox models. In acknowledging the 





contributions are made to this stream by comparing the activities of specialised business 
incubators and accelerators to regulatory sandboxes. Moreover, the studies extend the 
academic understanding of the influence of knowledge exchange on the practices of 
regulators and sandbox participants, contributing to the social aspects of incubation in the 
incubation literature at the organisational and tenant levels of analysis (Scillitoe & 
Chakrabarti, 2010). At the ecosystem level, contributions are made to the EEs literature by 
exploring the influence of ecosystem dynamics on entrepreneurial ventures’ access to and 
exploitation of resources in FinTech EEs (Alvedalen & Boschma, 2017; Cao & Shi, 2020). 
Specific to the FinTech stream of studies, this research clarifies the theoretical relevance of 
FinTech, bridging this novel area to encompass two literature streams: the incubation and 
EEs literatures. Relatedly, it contributes to the atheoretical FinTech literature by employing 
theoretical based approaches (i.e. the EE framework, activity system framework and SCT) 
to guide the empirical exploration and data analysis (Gazel & Schwienbacher, 2020). 
Broadly, the explanations deduced from this PhD study also contribute to investigations on 
financial innovation in FinTech start-ups (Anagnostopoulos, 2018).  
5.2 Methodological Contribution 
This study relies on abduction as a mode of theorising instead of deductive and inductive 
accounts (Makadok, Burton, & Barney, 2018). Here, an important methodological 
contribution is made by modifying the constructivist-inductive Gioia method to fit with a an 
abductive CR design, allowing the use of a theoretical framework to guide the empirical 
studies; a detailed explanation of this adaptation is provided in subsection 3.3.3. Without 
overlooking methodological contributions to CR employing either a data-driven approach 
using grounded theory (Hoddy, 2019; Maxwell, 2012) or a theory-driven deductive approach 
(e.g., Fletcher, 2017), the abductive logic employed in this study paves the way for future 
research to establish a streamlined data collection and analysis procedure to achieve 
qualitative rigour when following a CR paradigm.  
5.3 Contribution to Practice 
The output of conducted studies also has important implications for several stakeholders 
including regulators, policymakers, FinTech entrepreneurs and other ecosystem actors in 
search of scientific knowledge on the social aspects of incubation and EEs in the FinTech 
context. The main implications are synthesised below. 
Regulators operating sandboxes can benefit from the theoretical propositions in Paper D 
by understanding how knowledge transferred prior to, during and after sandbox participation 





regulators a starting point when making future operational or strategic changes and may 
result in significant impact on the performance of the sandbox. Regulators looking to 
establish a regulatory sandbox may find the propositions suggested in Paper C helpful for 
understanding the activities inherent in regulatory sandboxes as best practices when setting 
up their own activities for both protecting financial markets and promoting financial 
innovation. 
While the findings from the studies conducted here do not quantitatively measure the 
impact of regulatory sandboxes, they provide rich explanations of the role of regulatory 
sandboxes as support instruments and the role of regulators in governing and supporting 
market participants. From these findings in Papers C and D, policymakers can become more 
informed about the observed pitfalls related to either regulatory sandboxes or existing 
regulatory frameworks with a countereffect on the practices of FinTech participants in order 
to improve financial market regulatory policies. As for Paper B, policymakers can gain a 
better understanding of the conditions that inhibit FinTech activity to amend existing or 
establish new economic policies that contribute positively to the conduciveness of 
entrepreneurial environments. Since the findings from Paper C are specific to Singapore, 
policymakers located in other ecosystems should be attentive to variations in local conditions 
if changes or new approaches are to be considered. 
Lastly, FinTech market participants needing business support or regulatory support, an 
investment buffer or a safe testing environment in local or non-local ecosystems will benefit 
from the findings of all four studies; enlightening them about the available support initiatives 
in EEs and highlighting regulatory sandboxes, along with the opportunities and challenges 
associated with entering that milieu, will allow FinTech entrepreneurs to make better 
informed decisions when approaching regulators or other ecosystem actors in search of 
opportunities to exploit. For example, novice FinTech entrepreneurs with limited knowledge 
of regulatory requirements and financial resources may think they are dependent on 
collaborating with established financial institutions so that they can use their financial 
license(s). Eventually, this would weaken the competitive advantage of a FinTech and make 
it more vulnerable to early acquisition. As an alternative, regulatory sandboxes provide the 
benefit of testing and validation of novel financial solutions without the need to acquire a 
financial license, which buys these FinTechs critical time to demonstrate proof of concept 
and raise funds from investors before applying for a financial license of their own. The Global 
Sandbox, meanwhile, allows cross-border experimentation to occur in two regulatory 

























6 Limitations and Future Research 
All research has limitations that can also provide promising future research opportunities. 
As this is primarily an exploratory qualitative study of a novel phenomenon operating in the 
understudied FinTech context, the findings provide a preliminary understanding in the form 
of theoretical propositions. In total, 21 propositions are offered as steppingstones for future 
research to further explore, explain and confirm or refine the findings presented here. Given 
the limitations of the research design adopted, future investigations ought to quantitively 
examine the impact of regulatory sandboxes on FinTech participants to validate how 
effective these instruments are and whether they are delivering on their promise of reducing 
systemic risks and supporting innovation in financial markets, especially given that 
considerable resources already being allocated to sandbox operations and that their numbers 
are growing worldwide. Broadly, one important takeaway is to study the supply-demand side 
of incubation in technology-enabled industries like EdTech and CleanTech. In the case of 
FinTech, external challenges such as complex regulatory requirements that are often 
incompatible with enabling technologies and the high compliance costs of acquiring financial 
licenses have been among the main drivers for the creation of regulatory sandboxes to enable 
innovation, as initially reported in the literature. Despite the presence of sandboxes and their 
degree of success, according to the empirical reality as entrepreneurs see it, other issues 
persist, like the cumbersome nature of regulation, which is inconsistent with the desired speed 
of innovators battling their way to seize first-mover advantages while requiring swift 
regulatory clarification. In other words, there is inconsistency between the supply (regulatory 
sandbox) and demand (sandbox participants) sides; is it caused by the regulation-innovation 
lag, a lack of resources or regulators’ desire to monitor participants’ testing activities while 
learning about the implications of enabling technologies? Thus, understanding the links 
between the drivers, activities and objectives of the supply-demand side of incubation in 
digitalised contexts would provide novel knowledge to improve incubation models and help 
align participants’ expectations. Moreover, future EEs research could benefit from exploring 
the approaches entrepreneurs adopt to overcome the obstacles they face and explore how EEs 
precipitate entrepreneurs to improve opportunity identification and resource exploitation.  
There are also limitations in the individual papers. In Paper A, a systematic literature 
review approach would commonly be appropriate when the relevant literature is accessible 
through high-quality databases, but this may not be the case in the study of innovation 
facilitators in financial markets. Future research should extend the search scope to encompass 
a wider range of databases and sources that could include non-academic papers. As for Paper 





with regulatory jurisdictions and mandates that differ from Singapore’s would be helpful in 
understanding the role of the regulator in promoting start-ups. Additionally, given that the 
findings of this study reveal different ecosystem dynamics specific to unendorsed and novel 
FinTech segments like blockchain and cryptocurrencies, future investigations could target 
these segments. Other limitations include the limited number of regulatory sandbox cases 
studied in Paper C; at the time the study was undertaken, only a few regulatory sandboxes 
had been in operation, the contemporary state is different with more cases that qualify for 
investigation. In fact, different regulatory sandbox variants, also called thematic sandboxes, 
have recently emerged, including the Global Sandbox and Sandbox Express. The former 
provides a promising avenue for research because it involves cross-border testing of market 
participants, allowing researchers to explore multiple contexts in a single investigation, while 
the latter is designed to fast-track participants to the testing stage. Many regulatory sandboxes 
are being established in developing economies with the purpose of promoting financial 
inclusion of unbanked individuals; these sandboxes are often co-created or facilitated with 
the engagement of an international regulator or observer organisation. Thus, future studies 
could conduct a comparative study unveiling regulatory sandboxes in both developed and 
developing economies. Drawing on the exploration conducted in Paper D and the findings it 
yielded, future research could explore knowledge transfer in thematic sandboxes such as the 
Global Sandbox. Broadly, the research presented in this dissertation did not adopt an 
evolutionary approach but rather explored the activities of regulatory sandboxes and the 
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Facilitating Innovation in FinTech: A Review and Research Agenda 
Ahmad Alaassar, Anne-Laure Mention, Tor Helge Aas 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to carry out content analyses on the existing literature to 
investigate the knowledge state of innovation facilitators adopted to promote FinTech start-
ups in financial markets. In total, 46 papers were analysed in the NVivo software package. 
Three categories of innovation facilitators emerged from the literature capturing the 
perspective of regulators, innovators and incumbents. Each of the identified initiatives is 
defined and its processes and implications described. Most initiatives were led by regulators, 
revealing a regulatory strategy change from risk-based to opportunity-based regulation, with 
regulatory sandboxes being the most commonly adopted instrument. Based on our results, 
we discuss several important observations and propose avenues for future research. This 
paper contributes to the financial innovation and FinTech research literature streams. 
Keywords: Financial innovation, FinTech, Innovation facilitators, Systematic literature 











Published in Small Business Economics 
Ecosystem Dynamics: exploring the interplay within fintech entrepreneurial 
ecosystems  
Ahmad Alaassar, Anne-Laure Mention, Tor Helge Aas 
Abstract Scholars and practitioners continue to recognize the crucial role of entrepreneurial 
ecosystems (EEs) in creating a conducive environment for productive entrepreneurship. 
Although EEs are fundamentally interaction systems of hierarchically independent yet 
mutually dependent actors, few studies have investigated how interactions among ecosystem 
actors drive the entrepreneurial process. Seeking to address this gap, this paper explores how 
ecosystem actor interactions influence new ventures in the financial technology (fintech) EE 
of Singapore. Guided by an EE framework and the use of an exploratory-abductive approach, 
empirical data from semi-structured interviews is collected and analyzed. The findings reveal 
four categories representing both the relational perspective, which features interaction and 
intermediation dynamics, and the cultural perspective, which encompasses ecosystem 
development and regulatory dynamics. These categories help explain how and why 
opportunity identification and resource exploitation are accelerated or inhibited for 
entrepreneurs in fintech EEs. The present study provides valuable contributions to scholars 
and practitioners interested in EEs and contributes to the academic understanding of the 
emerging fintech phenomenon. 
Keywords Entrepreneurial ecosystems; Ecosystem dynamics; Fintech; Network approach 
JEL Classification G2 L26 L53 M13 O3 
1 Introduction 
The concept of entrepreneurial ecosystems (EEs) has gained extensive attention in recent 
years (Malecki 2018; Roundy 2016; Spigel and Harrison 2018) due to its explanatory power, 
which combines social, institutional, and relational aspects (Brown and Mason 2017). 
However, the growing focus on EEs has caused many unexplored and underexplored areas 
to emerge, so scholars have called for theoretical and empirical studies to help fill gaps in the 
literature (Audretsch et al. 2018; Brown and Mason 2017; Spigel 2017; Stam 2015). For 
example, scholars have stressed the need to explore ecosystem dynamics, conceptualized as 
interactions that occur among entrepreneurs and ecosystem actors, by adopting a network 





Knowlton 2017). Existing studies focus on the causal relations between individual ecosystem 
actors or EEs as a whole and entrepreneurial output but remain relatively silent on how 
interactions between different ecosystem actors contribute to new venture creation 
(Alvedalen and Boschma 2017; Stam 2015). In response, the present study employs Brown 
and Mason’s (2017) taxonomy to investigate four ecosystem categories: entrepreneurial 
actors, resource providers, connectors, and entrepreneurial culture. Other prominent EE 
frameworks (e.g., Isenberg 2011; Spigel 2017) have included these elements; however, they 
have focused either on an ecosystem’s composition (Isenberg 2011) or relationships between 
ecosystem attributes (Spigel 2017). Conversely, Brown and Mason’s (2017) 
conceptualization attempts to capture the full complexity of EEs through their underlying 
dynamics. 
Traditionally, empirical investigations (e.g., Audretsch and Belitski 2017; Liguori et al. 
2019; Neck et al. 2004; Spigel 2017) have primarily viewed EEs from the entrepreneur’s 
perspective. At the same time, scholars have argued that entrepreneurship is not an 
independent act but one that takes place in a society of interrelated actors (Stam 2015) who 
might not be directly related to entrepreneurial ventures. This may include established firms, 
universities, public institutions, and capital providers (Isenberg 2010). As such, EEs are 
interaction systems that consist of hierarchically independent yet mutually dependent 
ecosystem actors (Autio 2016). It is further argued that the role of these actors is downplayed 
in EE studies; for instance, Brown and Mason (2017) state that established organizations play 
a vital role in ecosystems because they attract human resources, incubate startups, and usually 
serve as first customers. For these reasons, scholars have called for studies to explore the 
interplay among other actors in the external environment (Cavallo et al. 2018; Ghio et al. 
2019; Nicotra et al. 2018). In addition, recent studies (e.g., Motoyama and Knowlton 2017, 
Neumeyer et al. 2019) have begun exploring multiple perspectives, empirically investigating 
stakeholders like investors, government actors, incubator managers, and academics. Building 
on these efforts, we investigate the dynamics between entrepreneurs and ecosystem actors in 
EEs. Thus, we go beyond typical empirical investigations in the EE literature to explore the 
experiences of a diverse set of ecosystem actors with profound influence on the success—or 
failure—of entrepreneurship. 
Not all context-specific knowledge can be readily transferred to other contexts due to its 
distinctive characteristics; hence, we may assume that ecosystem dynamics in certain 
industry-specific EEs are different compared to other contexts (Autio et al. 2014). Building 
on this argument, we focus our empirical investigation on the financial industry, which has 





(fintech1) phenomenon. In addition to the effect of digitalization on the identification and 
acquisition of entrepreneurial opportunities (Autio et al. 2018), fintech is characterized by the 
proliferation of newcomers, financial stability risks (Anagnostopoulos 2018; Li et al. 2020; 
Magnuson 2018), and changes in the regulatory environment (Arner et al. 2015). These 
characteristics challenge and reshape the existing dynamics among ecosystem actors (Gazel 
and Schwienbacher 2020; Haddad and Hornuf 2019; Hornuf et al. 2020).  
The present exploratory study addresses the following research question (RQ): How are 
ecosystem dynamics accelerating or inhibiting new ventures in fintech EEs? We answer this 
RQ through an empirical investigation of the fintech EE2 of Singapore, which has recently 
emerged as a leading fintech hub and is now ranked third globally behind the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Findexable 2020). The Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) reported the presence of 1100 fintech firms in 2019, compared to fewer than 100 in 
2016 (MAS 2020b). Additionally, 2019 saw the value of investment deals more than double 
to US$861 million, with 40% of the capital raised by digital payment fintechs (Accenture 
2020). These achievements are no accident, as Singapore has cultivated a favorable climate 
for fintech, with MAS functioning as both regulator and innovation catalyst, giving it a first 
mover advantage in Asia and around the world. Despite this growth, little academic attention 
has been paid to Singapore, unlike other fintech EEs such as the United Kingdom and China 
(Lin 2019).  
Methodologically, we answer the RQ through a qualitative research design employing an 
exploratory-abductive approach (Dubois and Gadde 2002) as a steppingstone to propose 
theoretical propositions. In-depth semi-structured interviews are conducted with a diverse set 
of fintech ecosystem actors in Singapore. For data analysis, the Gioia method (Gioia et al. 
2013) is coupled with systematic combining (Dubois and Gadde 2002), following a non-
linear, non-positivistic approach to theory generation. 
Through this study, we extend the existing knowledge of EEs by offering a set of 
theoretical propositions on the dynamics of fintech ecosystems, thus responding to numerous 
calls for empirical studies (e.g., Audretsch et al. 2018; Spigel 2017). We also extend the 
scholarly understanding of how the fintech context is linked to the EE literature stream (Lee 
and Shin 2018). Additionally, by employing Brown and Mason’s (2017) EE framework, the 
 
1 While some studies have investigated selected fintech innovations like equity-based crowdfunding and its related regulatory environment 
(Vismara 2016) or ecosystem (Cummings et al. 2020), we explore fintech as a collective phenomenon encompassing different financial 
innovations (Gazel and Schwienbacher 2020; Haddad and Hornuf 2019; Hornuf et al. 2020). 
2 While acknowledging that EEs are characterized as nested geographies hosting smaller ecosystems inside larger ones (e.g., Brown and 
Mason, 2017), we elect to conceptualize the EE as a single ecosystem, following similar investigations of the fintech ecosystem (e.g., Lee 





present study contributes to the emerging fintech phenomenon, which remains 
underexamined and anecdotal in management research (Puschmann 2017). Last, this study 
contributes to practice by informing entrepreneurs about opportunities to access networks 
and exploit resources; practical implications for policymakers are also identified. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we briefly introduce the concept 
of EEs and establish fintech as an industry-specific ecosystem. We then review the theoretical 
approach adopted and the EE framework that guides the empirical investigation. A case 
description is accompanied by an explanation of the research process before the empirical 
findings are presented. The discussion section suggests theoretical propositions, discusses the 
obstacles within the fintech EE and describes the implications of this study for both theory 
and practice; a brief conclusion follows.  
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Entrepreneurial ecosystems 
Acs et al. (2017), among others, position the EE concept within the strategy literature, 
linking it directly to ecosystem concepts that first included business ecosystems (Moore 
1993). The EE concept differs from prior literature (e.g., national and regional innovation 
systems) by its emphasis on entrepreneurs as focal actors and on the social, institutional, and 
relational aspects of ecosystem actors (Brown and Mason 2017; Nicotra et al. 2018; Stam 
2015). It is used as a framework to explain social interactions among actors in the 
entrepreneurship process and local environment (Spigel and Harrison 2018). Audretsch and 
Belitski (2017) define EEs as “institutional and organizational as well as other systemic 
factors that interact and influence identification and commercialization of entrepreneurial 
opportunities” (p. 1031). The authors refer to EEs as geographically bounded cities like 
Boston, characterized by the presence of supportive academic institutions, policies and 
infrastructure, industry actors, support organizations, entrepreneurial culture, and investment 
power (Audretsch and Belitski 2017). All these elements influence the creation of local 
ventures by facilitating knowledge sharing and access to resources (Colombelli et al. 2019; 
Neck et al. 2004; Spigel 2017). EE scholars are currently investigating the dynamics among 
ecosystem actors rather than simply identifying the role played by ecosystem elements in 
entrepreneurial activity (Audretsch et al. 2018; Di Fatta et al. 2018; Ghio et al. 2019). 
Qualitative investigations of EEs have examined geographical locations rather than 
specific industries (McAdam et al. 2019; Scheidgen 2020; Spigel 2017). For instance, Spigel 
(2017) explores new ventures operating in various industries in the ecosystems of Calgary 





knowledge of EEs, their findings are not industry specific. That said, it is not a given that all 
knowledge from empirical investigations of EEs can be generalized across industries because 
of differences in the characteristics of each sector. Hence, we may assume that the role of 
ecosystem actors in certain industry-specific EEs differs in other contexts like digitalized 
industries (Autio et al. 2018). Digitalization in this setting reduces “the dependency of new 
ventures on cluster-specific spatial affordances for entrepreneurial opportunities, while also 
alleviating some of the spatial constraints of opportunity pursuit and enabling new ventures 
to experiment with and discover business models that exploit opportunities external to the 
cluster” (Autio et al. 2018, p. 80). On this basis, we narrow our investigation to the financial 
sector due to the proliferation of market participants, associated risks to financial stability, 
changes in the regulatory environment, and other contextual conditions such as access to 
infrastructure, talent, and capital. Taken together, these factors challenge the existing 
dynamics among key ecosystem actors and consequently the creation and growth of new 
fintech ventures (Gazel and Schwienbacher 2020; Hornuf et al. 2020; Svensson et al. 2019). 
The next section describes the complex fintech landscape. 
2.1.1 Fintech EEs 
According to Autio et al. (2018), digitalization affects both the type of entrepreneurial 
opportunities being formed and how such opportunities are sought by founders. Hence, the 
digital economy provides numerous opportunities for newcomers to innovate and potentially 
challenge established institutions in the targeted sectors (Gazel and Schwienbacher 2020). 
The financial sector offers a good example of how digitalization has enabled fintech 
newcomers to aggressively penetrate the market, forcing traditional financial institutions 
(FIs) to become more open to market engagement through strategic alliances or incubation 
programs (Hornuf et al. 2020). According to PwC, 88% of incumbents are concerned about 
losing revenue to fintech entrants, whereas 82% expect an increase in partnerships with 
fintechs in the next 3 to 5 years (PwC 2017). Changes in financial market dynamics are 
considerably recent to this context which has traditionally been characterized by low 
innovation levels (Beck et al. 2016), creating a void between research and practice due to the 
lack of empirical data exploring the fintech phenomenon (Anagnostopoulos 2018). This is 
not to overlook academic contributions on niche fintech segments such as initial coin 
offerings (ICOs) or crowdfunding (e.g., Adhami et al. 2018; Vismara 2016). Rather, there is 
a need for more studies that explore fintech as a phenomenon capturing a broader range of 
technology-powered financial service providers (e.g., Gazel and Schwienbacher 2020; 
Haddad and Hornuf 2019; Hornuf et al. 2020). This is particularly important when fintech 





in ways like raising capital. While fintech is about not only new ventures but also traditional 
FIs and technology firms, this study focuses on startups due to their economic impact and 
disruptive innovations (Palmié et al. 2019). Hence, we use the term “fintech EEs” to represent 
new ventures and entrepreneurs as focal actors in the financial industry endeavoring to 
deliver “new business models, applications, processes or products” (Financial Stability 
Board 2017, p. 7). 
It is important to study the fintech phenomenon, given the increasing numbers of market 
participants across diverse segments like digital payments, wealth management, 
crowdfunding, lending, capital market, and insurance (Lee and Shin 2018). Accenture has 
reported that, since 2005, fintech providers have captured a third of total global banking 
revenues (Accenture 2018). A more recent report enumerates the presence of 90 fintech 
unicorns3 globally by early 2020 with an aggregated value of approximately US$500 billion 
(Crunchbase 2020). Over the past decade, global investment in fintech grew roughly 
ninefold, with US$43 billion invested in 2019 compared to US$5 billion in 2010 
(Crunchbase 2020). Financial regulation scholarship has commonly depicted traditional FIs 
as the primary drivers of instability and systemic risk to economies (Magnuson 2018). This 
argument may no longer be the only valid explanation in light of the increased market 
penetration of fintech newcomers that decentralize and automate financial services in new 
ways that lead to three main challenges (Anagnostopoulos 2018; Li et al. 2020; Magnuson 
2018). First, fintechs are more vulnerable to external market shocks, either because adequate 
stress-testing may have not been carried out in drastic situations (Anagnostopoulos 2018) or 
due to a lack of industry experience and understanding of financial regulations (Philippon 
2016). Second, regulators can scarcely monitor the activities of fintech firms due to their 
exponential developmental pace. Alibaba’s Yu’E Bao (a fund management fintech) 
illustrates how rapidly fintech firms can grow, surpassing JP Morgan’s US fund to become, 
in a mere nine months, the world’s largest market fund. In this scenario, the Chinese 
regulator’s passive approach would have been inadequate to identify and interfere in the 
event of systemic threats (Anagnostopoulos 2018). Aside from the need to keep up with 
fintechs, regulators must also acquire critical expertise to sustain quality supervision (Boot et 
al. 2021). Third, fintechs are incentivized to adopt non-cooperative behaviors, partly due to 
ambition to become a frontrunner and achieve short-term gains, but also because most fintech 
investors are venture capitalists who demand accelerated growth (Magnuson 2018). 
Additionally, such hastiness can raise questions about the integrity of fintechs; Thakor (2020) 
presented instances of overlending and scandals from P2P lending platforms that lead to 
 





investors departing as well as negative effects on market stability. Taken together, these 
challenges may mean that fintech firms pose greater systemic risk concerns than established 
FIs (see Magnuson 2018 for an overview). Not only this, a recent empirical investigation 
showed that risk spillovers from fintechs to established FIs are positively correlated with the 
systemic risk of FIs (Li et al. 2020). 
In addition to the above characteristics that distinguish the fintech context from others, the 
role of regulators has been subject to extensive discussions due to regulation’s double-edged 
sword: regulatory intervention can either impede or support innovation (Alaassar et al. 2020; 
Cumming and Schwienbacher 2018; Haddad and Hornuf 2019). For example, regulations 
may not support the different and unbundled way fintechs operate in; lenders and borrowers 
are instantly matched in crowdfunding platforms powered by Big Data analytics, in contrast 
to bank loans based on long-term relationships (Navaretti et al. 2017). Adding to this complex 
scenario, fintech newcomers may lack crucial knowledge of regulatory frameworks to 
navigate through this space (Arner et al. 2015). Furthermore, enabling technologies allow the 
delivery of financial services to underserved users and unbanked individuals, which affects 
existing value networks and may pressure FIs to down-scale or relocate due to lower demand 
(Anagnostopoulos 2018). 
Based on the above, we may argue that rules of the game in financial markets have 
changed; new fintech players have emerged alongside a supportive ecosystem in the external 
environment (Block et al. 2018). For example, academic institutions have begun to establish 
educational programs to upskill talent (Kursh and Gold 2016). Support organizations are 
creating accelerator programs and co-working spaces (Arner et al. 2015; Block et al. 2018). 
Financial market regulators have introduced new initiatives like regulatory sandboxes4 and 
innovation hubs (Jenik and Lauer 2017; Zetzsche et al. 2017). Whereas, capital providers 
have ensured the availability of funds (Haddad and Hornuf 2019). Other fintech ecosystem 
actors include technology firms, government institutions, and traditional FIs (Lee and Shin 
2018). While comparing fintech EEs to other ecosystems is beyond the scope of this study, 
we acknowledge that financial markets share similarities with other industries like the energy 
sector or pharmaceuticals in terms of stringent regulations and use of enabling technologies. 
However, we argue that industry-specific characteristics like the increase of market 
participants coupled with the ability to scale rapidly, large amounts of raised capital, and 
impact on financial stability, make the fintech context relevant for dedicated research. Within 
this vibrant environment, ecosystem actors interact to access resources and exploit 
 
4 “Regulatory sandboxes grant licensing exemptions to participants so that they can test their solutions for a set period of time, subject to 





opportunities, thereby transforming the status quo of the ecosystem dynamics in financial 
markets. That said, given that the fintech literature remains in its nascency (Gazel and 
Schwienbacher 2020), there remains a lack of evidence-based research that explores the 
dynamics of fintech EEs, a gap that the present study seeks to fill. Figure 1 visualizes the 
salient features of fintech EEs within broader EEs.  
2.2 Conceptualizing ecosystem dynamics 
Entrepreneurial dynamics commonly refers to the lifecycle of startups: creation, growth, 
and stability or exit (Kazanjian 1988). The existing entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Gartner 
1985) argues that interaction among actors in the external context may impact entrepreneurial 
dynamics. For instance, Grimaldi and Grandi (2005) investigated the influence of interaction 
among incubators and incubatees on entrepreneurial creation dynamics, while Pena (2004) 
examined the growth dynamics resulting from such interactions. More recently, Alaassar et 
al. (2020) explored the impact of interactions on the practices of fintech startups and 
regulators in the context of regulatory sandboxes. However, none of these studies use an 
ecosystem perspective to capture the role of other actors (Cavallo et al. 2018). Neck et al. 
(2004) conducted one of the first studies to investigate the interactions of founders with 
multiple actors in entrepreneurial systems; they conclude that regional entrepreneurial 
activity is influenced by the collective effort of ecosystem actors. In this literature stream, 
Spigel (2017) argues that successful EEs should not necessarily be determined based on high 
rates of entrepreneurship but rather by how interactions among ecosystem actors foster 
entrepreneurial activity. That said, existing research has largely focused on identifying what 
defines ecosystems in terms of actors and factors that impact entrepreneurial activity while 
overlooking relational factors that explain how ecosystem elements interact (Alvedalen and 
Boschma 2017; Ghio et al. 2019; Stam 2015). On one hand, the literature assumes that 
interactions among entrepreneurs can inspire newcomers to start a business with exemplary 
role models and provide direct business support through mentorship (Brown and Mason 
2017). On the other, interactions among ecosystem actors have been highlighted as crucial 
to fostering collaboration with local entrepreneurs and providing them access to resources 
(Feld 2012). An empirical investigation of EEs in St. Louis, Missouri, supports this finding, 
indicating that “the way in which entrepreneurs interact and form relationships, leading to 
support, learning, and growth, was substantially influenced by the way support organizations 
interacted and by the way the support that they offered was structured” (Motoyama and 
Knowlton 2017, p. 27). It can thus be argued that entrepreneurial dynamics is at the core of 





entrepreneurship (Stam 2015). On this basis, following Cao and Shi (2020), we conceptualize 
ecosystem dynamics as interactions that occur among entrepreneurs and ecosystem actors. 
 
Fig. 4 The distinctive features of fintech EEs; outer circle adapted from Isenberg (2011) and Spigel (2017). 
2.3 Theoretical approach 
A network approach is employed to guide the empirical investigation in this research, 
emphasizing the importance of the relational view to entrepreneurship to enable founders to 
access resources in the external environment (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). This approach is 
characterized by the relations among network actors, which can be in the form of 
communicating information, exchanging services, or, in a normative sense, expectations and 
obligations (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). Given the qualitative nature of this work, a 
metaphorical analysis is conducted to explore the relationships between ecosystem actors 
rather than an analytical assessment that quantitatively measures network structures, a 
distinction introduced by Bergenholtz and Waldstrøm (2011). Metaphorical studies imply 
the presence of diverse social interactions among network actors (e.g., Santoro and 
Chakrabarti 2002), while analytical studies approach networks in a more formal manner, 
examining particular social structures through, for instance, social network analysis (e.g., 
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2.3.1 EE framework 
Most cited EE frameworks include Isenberg (2011) and Spigel (2017). Isenberg (2011) 
reports that successful ecosystems are influenced by six domains: a supportive culture, 
enabling policies, access to sufficient capital, availability of a talent pool, accessible markets, 
and a diversified set of support organizations and infrastructure. Spigel (2017) develops and 
empirically investigates a framework comprised of three main attributes that play key roles 
in the early development of new ventures. These attributes consist of cultural (common 
norms and values), social (networks to ensure resource acquisition and knowledge flow), and 
material (tangible elements including policy and governance). While both frameworks 
involve similar domains, they differ in their emphasis on the composition of ecosystems 
(Isenberg 2011) or the relationships among an ecosystem’s attributes (Spigel 2017). Using 
these frameworks as a starting point, the present study adopts the conceptualization offered 
by Brown and Mason (2017) because it attempts to capture the full complexity of ecosystems 
by investigating the underlying dynamics of four coordinative categories. These include 
entrepreneurial actors, resource providers, connectors, and entrepreneurial culture. In this 
study, we use this conceptualization to assist with data collection and data analysis, guiding 
the exploration of variance that emerges empirically in each category. Each category is 
described below, and Figure 2 presents the research model.  
Entrepreneurial actors are widely considered by scholars to be focal actors in EE 
frameworks (Isenberg 2011; Spigel 2017; Stam 2015). While the concept of EEs may imply 
that relational factors mediate entrepreneurial activity in the local context, Brown and Mason 
(2017) argue that recognition needs to be given to non-local interactions that occur between 
founders and external actors. The role of entrepreneurial actors is crucial for the growth of 
ecosystems because interactions among entrepreneurs positively impact the perceptions of 
individuals toward entrepreneurship through spillover effects like the transfer of knowledge, 
startup spirit, and other resources. This process is referred to as entrepreneurial recycling and 
can involve entrepreneurial actors who function as serial entrepreneurs, intermediaries, 
advisors, mentors, and board members. Relatedly, this process may foster investment in local 
EEs as entrepreneurs re-invest in newcomers following successful exits (Brown and Mason 
2017). That said, the availability of knowledgeable entrepreneurs in an ecosystem is also 
linked to the presence and quality of universities and research institutions, which can raise 
the level of competence for entrepreneurial actors (Neck et al. 2004; Nicotra et al. 2018). 
Additionally, the generation of academic spin-offs is increasingly cited as a key role of local 





Entrepreneurial resource providers facilitate the transfer of resources into growing firms 
by providing sources of financing, support structures, and public sector services (Brown and 
Mason 2017). Specifically, financial capital providers may include traditional banks, VCs, 
business angels, and alternative funding sources like microfinance, crowdfunding, and P2P 
lending (Bruton et al. 2015). As for support structures, these commonly take the form of 
incubation models such as business incubators and accelerators (Mian et al. 2016) that enable 
startups through mentoring, co-working spaces, access to networks, capital, knowledge and 
so on (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 2005). Lastly, public sector intervention in ecosystems is an 
important measure to combat market entry barriers such as regulation and access to capital. 
The creation of regional venture capital funds that facilitate business angel networks and 
indirect support of incubation models is a commonly employed solution (Mason 2009). 
Additionally, policymakers may enable entrepreneurs’ practices by eliminating inhibiting 
policies or easing regulations (Nicotra et al. 2018). 
Entrepreneurial connectors support EEs by mediating relationships, connecting 
entrepreneurs to ecosystem actors like investors, industry partners, and mentors. Thus, 
founders overcome the resource deficiencies that inhibit their access to financial and 
knowledge capital; accordingly, new venture creation is facilitated (Brown and Mason 2017; 
Sullivan and Ford 2014). Entrepreneurial connectors can also be former founders and serial 
entrepreneurs or organizations and programs funded by industry or the state (Brown and 
Mason 2017). 
Entrepreneurial culture is conceptualized as norms, attitudes, and contributions regarding 
entrepreneurship at the societal level (Brown and Mason 2017; Isenberg 2011). The literature 
stresses the importance of a positive entrepreneurial culture in supporting social capital in 
EEs because it fosters the relationships between entrepreneurs and other ecosystem actors 
(Nicotra et al. 2018). These relationships attract ambitious entrepreneurs and thus lead to a 
higher number of startups scaling into larger firms that are either acquired or undertake an 
initial public offering (Brown and Mason 2017; Saxenian 1996). However, EEs can also have 
a culture that inhibits entrepreneurs simply because entrepreneurship is not valued or is 






Fig. 2 Exploring ecosystem dynamics; adapted from Brown and Mason (2017) 
3 Method 
We rely on a qualitative research design using an exploratory-abductive approach (Dubois 
and Gadde 2002) to develop new explanations in the form of theoretical propositions. This 
approach is well suited to studying a new phenomenon with limited knowledge and to 
facilitate “theory development rather than theory generation” (Dubois and Gadde 2002, p. 
559). An exploratory approach using in-depth interviews with multiple stakeholders has also 
been deemed necessary in the fintech context (e.g., Mention 2020). 
3.1 Case description 
We deliberately selected Singapore as our empirical case to investigate ecosystem 
dynamics. Singapore is a high-income, entirely urban country of more than 5.6 million 
people with high internet connectivity (82.1%) and per capita cell phone (1.5) rates (Medici 
2019). It ranks second in the world for ease of doing business and fourth for starting a 
business (World Bank Group 2020) and is well-recognized as a global hub where east meets 
west, fostering a unique business culture (Suseno and Standing 2018). Singapore’s financial 
market is the world’s fifth most competitive financial center, according to the Global 
Financial Centre Index (Morris et al. 2020), and second globally in digital competitiveness 
in the IMD Digital Competitiveness Ranking (Bris and Cabolis 2020). Specific to fintech 
EEs, the Findexable Global Fintech Index ranked Singapore as third behind the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Findexable 2020). We further extend our case description 
to discuss how Singapore enjoys a commanding lead in the fintech race, creates a conducive 
environment for fintechs, and fosters international collaboration.  
Ecosystem 
Dynamics
How do interactions occur? 
How are resources accessed 
and exchanged? 
How do intermediaries help 






Singapore has recently emerged as a leading fintech hub, having pioneered several 
initiatives. First, the API Exchange (APIX) is an open-architecture platform to help FIs 
discover fintechs and allow FIs and fintechs to collaboratively design and run experiments. 
Second, the Singapore FinTech Festival (SFF), the world’s largest fintech event, fosters 
connection and collaboration, with 60,000 attendees in 2019. Third, Sandbox Express, a 
support instrument to fast-track testing activities (unlike the mainstream regulatory sandbox 
with longer approval times; MAS 2020b). These initiatives are in addition to publicly funded 
grants to support business development at the national and international levels, the creation 
of innovation labs, and the adoption of enabling technologies (Lin 2019; MAS 2020a). On 
the regulatory front, MAS has also made key legislative changes to enable fintech 
innovations, including the Payment Services Act, which regulates payment systems and 
service providers like digital payment tokens (MAS 2020d).  
Singapore sustains a fintech-conducive EE in two main ways. The first is creating 
platforms to connect fintechs to local and non-local ecosystems, each serving a specific 
objective. The ASEAN Financial Innovation Network is a regional initiative to help FIs and 
fintechs through platforms like APIX. Business sans Borders is a transnational innovation 
platform for small- and medium-sized enterprises. The Singapore FinTech Association is a 
non-profit organization that facilitates collaboration among stakeholders in the fintech 
ecosystem. Moreover, the FinTech Research Platform is an investment and partnership space 
that connects investors and FIs to fintechs (Lin 2019; MAS 2020b). The second way 
Singapore provides a fintech-friendly EE is by fostering cooperation with international 
counterparts. As of Q2 2020, MAS had signed 33 agreements to promote innovation in 
financial markets through information sharing, referrals and joint projects (MAS 2020c).  
3.2 Sampling 
This study used purposive and snowball sampling procedures to recruit interviewees and 
achieved triangulation by investigating the perspectives of different ecosystem actors (Patton 
1990). Our selection criteria consisted of (1) being currently engaged as an entrepreneurial 
actor (e.g., founder, role model, serial entrepreneur), resource provider (e.g., investor, 
advisor, regulator, researcher), or connector (e.g., incubator manager, former founder) in the 
financial market industry with respect to any fintech segment, and (2) being based in 
Singapore. Using these criteria, a list of the best-funded fintech startups was established using 
CrunchBase. Support organizations, VCs, and other relevant ecosystem actors were 
identified through online searches, including an online talent portal available through the 





LinkedIn; further interactions occurred with 38 participants. Ongoing interviews were then 
conducted upon participant agreement, and snowball sampling was used to recruit additional 
interviewees. Using this approach, a total of 19 interviews were conducted. The participants 
comprised of nine entrepreneurs, six support organization managers, three VCs, and one 
regulator. Most participants had multiple roles in fintech EEs (both local and non-local), 
including mentor, investor, and educator. Table 1 provides an overview of the participants.  










Ent-1 Founder and Educator 3 years Blockchain/Crypto 
Builds business solutions powered by 
blockchain. 
Ent-2 Founder 5 years 
Cross-Border 
Payments 
International remittance to more than 60 
countries. 
Ent-3 Founder 3 years Blockchain/Crypto 
Develops blockchain-powered devices for 
transactions. 
Ent-4 Co-founder 6 years Capital Markets 
Cloud-based independent 




1–4 years Asset Management 
Platform provider to issue, manage, and 




2 years Insurance 




Head of Partnerships, 
Advisor 




1–4 years Blockchain/Crypto A cryptocurrency exchange platform. 
Ent-9 Co-founder, Advisor 1 year Payments 
Cross-border consumer know your 
customer. 
EC-10 Director of Accelerator 5 years 
Corporate 
Accelerator 
Accelerator for fintechs. 
EC-11 
Managing Partner and 
Serial Entrepreneur 
2 years Accelerator Accelerator for blockchain fintechs. 
EC-12 Program Manager 5 years 
Corporate Incubator 
and Accelerator 




5 years Accelerator Technology accelerator. 
RP-14 Co-Founder, Partner 2 years Investor – VC 
Invests in early-stage, technology-centric 
startups. 
RP-15 Founder, Consultant <1 year Consultancy Business support services for tech firms. 
RP-16 CEO, Founder 2 years Investor – VC Cybersecurity venture capital manager. 
RP-17 Co-Founder, Partner 4 years Investor – VC Investment in Deep Tech and AI startups. 
RP-18 Executive Manager 4 years 
Support 
Association 
Supports development of the fintech 
industry. 




a Ent: entrepreneurial actor; EC: entrepreneurial connector; RP: resource provider 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
The interviews, which lasted an average of 50 minutes, were conducted remotely through 
Skype (8 of 19 were video calls) between January and March 2020 and followed a semi-
structured format. Recorded calls were transcribed and prepared for analysis. Since different 
ecosystem actors participated, the interview guide was adapted to explore each participant 
perspective. Open-ended questions that focused on exploring participants’ current and 





EE looked to them, which ecosystem actors they interact(ed) with, and how they access(ed) 
networks and exploit(ed) resources (Figure 1). Additionally, the interviews explored the 
relationships among ecosystem actors and their influence on practices like networking, 
financing, supporting, and connecting. 
For data analysis, we combined the Gioia method, which provides a two-step process to 
achieve systematic data reduction (Gioia et al. 2013), with an abductive approach that keeps 
prior research in the frame and enables an analytical framework to guide the analysis and 
confront theory (Dubois and Gadde 2002). As such, a process of systematic alternation 
between the framework, the literature, empirical data, and the case analysis was carried out 
(Dubois and Gadde 2002). For the first round of coding, which resulted in 1st order concepts, 
we started with the preconceptions of the EE framework (Brown and Mason 2017). Thus, 
we began coding with a preliminary scheme to explore categories that describe the role of 
each actor’s perspective with respect to his or her interactions with other ecosystem actors, 
access to networks and resources, and perceived attitudes and norms. As we progressed, 
additional categories emerged inductively; more patterns were then identified, and categories 
were distilled as presented. Hence, this round of analysis resembles a combination of data-
driven and theory-driven approaches. For the second round of coding, abstract themes that 
describe ecosystem dynamics were created, which required shifting back and forth between 
the literature and analysis (Dubois and Gadde 2002). Once relationships were established 
and relevant concepts connected, we considered the possibility of further distilling the 2nd 
order themes into aggregated dimensions (Gioia et al. 2013). The NVivo 12 software package 
was used to facilitate the analytical procedure (Gaur and Kumar 2018).  
4 Findings 
In this section, we report the findings that emerged from the analysis of interview data to 
explore the influence of ecosystem dynamics on startups in Singapore. The findings reflect 
the perspective of entrepreneurial actors, resource providers, and connectors. Figure 3 
outlines how the data was processed into aggregated dimensions that capture the relational 





   
Fig. 3 Data structure, compiled by the authors 
4.1 Relational perspective 
4.1.1 Interaction dynamics 
Our analysis of the perspectives of entrepreneurial actors captured two categories in which 
social interactions occur and create value in Singapore’s fintech EE: (1) co-creation with 
fintech startups and (2) resource recycling.5 From the perspective of all ecosystem actors, 
two categories captured the role of (3) governmental actions and (4) financial and knowledge 
capital transfer in enabling (or impeding) interaction dynamics. Additionally, an interaction 
pattern of (5) horizontal networks was common to all perspectives that emerged from the 
data. 
In terms of fintech startup co-creation, the data suggests that fintechs work together 
through formal or informal agreements to access market data or integrate solutions from other 
players to provide a holistic solution. For example, one interviewee said, “they [a Hong 
 
5 This is similar to entrepreneurial recycling that involves reusing of resources by entrepreneurs (Brown and Mason 2017), yet different 
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Kong-based bank] wanted to build a digital bank. They selected us to be the core banking 
technology. Over the last two years, 43 different vendors and partners have contributed 
towards delivering the end product. We had to work with a payment processor provider [a 
UK-based fintech startup] to deliver the end state’s architecture. We now have a partnership 
credential with that provider that we use when approaching other banks” (Ent-7). Our 
findings also reveal that established startups leverage other channels like local accelerators 
to connect with early-stage fintechs for assistance with technology utilization or development 
of proof of concept (PoC). Notably, the founders we interviewed had multiple roles in the 
ecosystem, such as mentorship in support associations or platforms. Through these 
engagements, entrepreneurs can benefit in different ways, including potential partnerships 
and access to data. Our findings revealed that fintech startups are willing to work with 
emerging fintechs that provide niche solutions to unregulated segments of financial markets 
that are growing rapidly but lack the support of resource providers and the endorsement of 
regulators. For example, one entrepreneur said, “we have two clients that are fintech firms 
setting up as private exchanges, competing with actors like the SG [Singapore] Exchange 
and the London Stock Exchange to facilitate active trade in unlisted startups on an exchange. 
Through our network of analysts, we help by providing research on unlisted companies, 
which also isn’t easy to come across” (Ent-4). 
For the second category, resource recycling, we found that fintech startups can play a 
central role in circulating resources within financial markets; this view surfaced with respect 
to banks and FIs that either integrate fintech solutions or use their efficient infrastructures. A 
startup interviewee reported that “one of our partnering banks uses our remittance 
infrastructure to improve remittance service for their bank customers” (Ent-2). Another 
fintech startup operating in the capital market space to provide a platform for independent 
research analysts shared its important ecosystem role of increasing the visibility of corporates 
to investors: “Through our partnership with the SG Exchange, we provide the corporates 
with the ability to access the platform, their listed corporates, be discovered by analysts, and 
get invested in by the investors. Again, there’s a shared interest. And we have a commercial 
relationship with the SG Exchange, which recently became a small investor in us” (Ent-4). 
Another and even more interesting perspective emerging from the data describes the 
contribution of entrepreneurial actors to the regulatory change process: “What you read there 
[on MAS] is basically what our community is telling MAS as to how they should tackle 
emergent fintech issues. For example, over an 18-month period, we had discussions with 
MAS through workshops where we were teaching them what bitcoin and crypto are and 





Services Act” (Ent-8). In terms of talent, we also found evidence indicating that smaller 
fintech startups face difficulty in retaining talent. One interviewee said, “when banks want to 
get their latest payments app built, they engage consulting firms like Accenture that will then 
go to win that contract by telling the bank that they’ve got many people with FinTech 
experience; they get those people by tearing out developers working in a fintech. The fintech 
sector is relatively young; that makes the ecosystem less capable of retaining [talent]” (Ent-
4). 
Further, our analysis revealed the role of governmental actions in supporting fintech 
innovators. A common view among interviewees was the leading role played by MAS in 
providing this support through active engagement with the fintech community. One 
entrepreneur said, “I discussed with MAS the possibility of running a thought leadership 
series on moving core banking onto the cloud, and they’re willing to facilitate a roundtable 
to have participants from the industry come together to discuss this” (Ent-7). Looking more 
closely at these engagements, another interviewee expressed the time-intensive nature of 
pursuing regulatory clarification: “The senior executives at MAS are very interested in what 
we’re doing, looking to push us forward and drive new ideas, but the reality of dealing with 
the regulators has been somewhat more step by step in nature, meeting different teams and 
departments within the regulatory authority” (Ent-6). We also found that regulators leverage 
other channels to engage with fintech startups; one of the interviewed incubator managers 
said that “MAS would connect with startups through incubators like ours; during the program 
phase, they would organize and attend different sessions, providing information on the 
offered infrastructure solutions or covering aspects like how to access regulatory sandboxes” 
(EC-12). Our findings also revealed the role of other governmental authorities in addition to 
MAS, as one interviewee noted: “A year after inception we started exploring development 
grants. We connected with Enterprise Singapore and received a grant from them for 
innovation and R&D. The agency also connected us with potential clients” (Ent-1). 
 For the fourth category, financial and knowledge capital transfer, the data provides 
insights into the role of VCs, business angels, and mentors. Some of the startups we 
interviewed shared their experiences in fundraising before fintech gained the attention of 
VCs. One entrepreneur said, “as we were trying to run a new kind of network in the capital 
market space in 2014, there wasn’t a lot of early-stage formalized VCs; business angels were 
the only ones present to back us with some equity funding. Then, within a year, we were able 
to start to tap into those early-stage VCs, and that ecosystem started to kick off. It’s firms like 
Wavemaker and Jungle Ventures who have backed us” (Ent-4). Another recurring view 





to be very convinced about the startup itself before we take it in or connect it to our own 
network in terms of funding possibilities. If we take the startup to a selected VC, they expect 
us to have done the required due diligence, that we’re convinced the startup has all the 
ingredients for possible success” (EC-13). A similar perspective was shared by one of the 
interviewed VCs, illuminating the interaction dynamics at the evaluation stage: “The due 
diligence process takes a bit longer because we want to ensure that we feel comfortable with 
the people establishing the startups; we want to spend some time to see how they behave, to 
know what their values are, and to learn whether their values are aligned with ours. How 
emotionally resilient are they? Do we think they’ve got the skills to be a successful CEO? 
And so on” (RP-16). From a mentoring perspective, many interviewees felt that VCs play a 
major role in providing active non-financial support by giving startups access effectively for 
free to their in-house expertise. At a strategic level, it was reported that VCs provide industry-
specific knowledge, assist with go-to-market strategies, and help startups identify potential 
pitfalls in their value propositions. That said, startups may also access knowledge capital 
through traditional mentors that are commonly provided as part of an incubation model 
program or through support associations and platforms. One incubator manager said, 
“mentors enrich our capabilities and support offering; those are the experts that we don’t have 
internally. For example, we don’t have an investment banker as part of the core team, so this 
is something we can tap into through mentors. We reach out to our mentor networks that can 
then really give startups honest feedback and field insights on a voluntary basis; we don’t 
have any paid partnerships with mentors” (EC-12). 
For the fifth category, horizontal networks, our evidence uncovered how ecosystem actors 
interact through a variety of events and channels. All interviewees applauded the efforts of 
the government and MAS in making Singapore’s financial market a global networking hub, 
with the SFF cited as an inclusive arena for connecting key stakeholders. Although this may 
be true, our interviewees also indicated the presence of abundant amateur actors and 
scammers in the ecosystem. In addition to the SFF, some interviewees reported that 
hackathons were a good avenue to meet VCs, accelerators, and like-minded entrepreneurs, 
while others said they connected with non-local clients through events held outside 
Singapore. One interviewee said, “I started building the InsurTech community here in 
Singapore and, with a few other people, founded and ran some of the earlier conferences in 
2016 and 2017. I am also the founder and general secretary of an insurance association that 
has around 2,000 insurance buyers across Asia. Through that, I’m well networked into the 
community of insurers, brokers, and other technology firms” (Ent-6). As to virtual 





one founder: “LinkedIn is essentially my CRM [customer relationship management] system 
and one of my key tools for building my network. I currently have more than 10,000 global 
contacts that have been built up over my entire career, all of which would be financial 
services folks. If I need to reach out to a company, I’ll search the name of the company and 
there’s a very good chance that I already know someone at the management level, either 
directly or one degree away, which allows me to have the right conversations with the right 
people” (Ent-7). As evidence of how entrepreneurs leverage multiple roles in the ecosystem, 
another interviewee had the advantage of accessing clients and achieving credibility through 
affiliation with a fintech network: “AFTA [Asia Fintech Angels] provide me with 
opportunities to meet vetted fintechs, which helps me cut through the noise and work out 
who I should be talking with to provide my services” (RP-15). We also found evidence 
indicating that a VC firm mobilizes its mentoring position and co-location in an 
entrepreneurial hub to select investees, giving it the opportunity to interact closely with 
startups and determine whether there is something unique that can be scaled up. This happens 
by first observing the startups at an early stage, while being screened to access an accelerator 
program, and then interacting with them as mentors throughout acceleration that spans across 
three months. 
4.1.2 Intermediation dynamics 
As for mediating access to networks and critical resources, three categories emerged from 
the analyzed data describing the role of a selected actor or channel in connecting 
entrepreneurs within local ecosystems. These include (1) incubation models, (2) government 
solutions, and (3) platforms. Another prominent category revealed how (4) cross-border 
connections mediate access to non-local ecosystems. 
For the first category, our findings showed that incubation models like business incubators 
and accelerators play an intermediary role among ecosystem actors and fintech 
entrepreneurs. Thus, directly connecting tenants to ecosystem actors, hosting networking 
events, or working with VCs that look for startups with a particular profile. A common view 
highlighted by incubation model actors was their ability to make the right connections, which 
saves entrepreneurs valuable time. One accelerator manager said, “being able to connect our 
tenants with the right person provides massive support, because nobody wants to take time 
off their busy schedule to find out who the right person is. We have corporate advisors 
working directly with startups to help with integration, because many corporates could be 
using legacy systems, providing technical support and industry insights. This saves a lot of 





of a use case reflecting this intermediary role: “We introduced one of our tenants to the 
government technical house GovTech, which helped solve bottlenecks in the technical 
process. Through our corporate networks, we have also connected that startup with multiple 
corporates, resulting in a six-digit deal. We also helped them raise $4–5 million by 
introducing them to our network of VCs” (EC-11). Hackathons emerged again as a 
networking mechanism, this time from the incubator perspective: “Our corporates demand 
hackathons because they give greater visibility to individuals or fintech startups unfamiliar 
to banks; they are a great way to recruit for the corporates” (EC-12). We also found, from the 
perspective of VCs, strong relations with incubation models to drive the top of the VC deal 
flow funnel, as one interviewee said: “We have built our own global networks of accelerators. 
We review many entrepreneurs from them and, when we like a very early-stage technology 
startup, we initiate direct discussions. And we now find it easy to do it without being present 
in that geography” (RP-17). Notably, this finding differs from our previously presented 
evidence showing how VCs benefit from their local presence in entrepreneurial hubs to 
interact with potential investees by highlighting how non-local ecosystem dynamics also 
allow VCs to exploit incubation model networks to find investees. 
As to government-led solutions, the data revealed the intermediary role played by MAS, 
GovTech, and Enterprise Singapore in the fintech EE. One of the MAS infrastructure 
solutions, APIX, was mentioned by several interviewees, with two divergent discourses 
emerging. The first expressed the importance of this solution: “APIX helps FIs and startups 
to connect. It solves the problem of the long PoC process and asymmetric information that a 
startup faces when engaging with FIs” (RP-18). Although this may be true for some actors, 
a second view reflected reservations about APIX, as one entrepreneur put it: “I don’t think 
that signing up to it [APIX] is incredibly valuable because the ecosystem is small right now. 
And what this platform solves is essentially a discoverability issue. It’s not difficult to find 
companies now because of digital networks. Another issue is the quality ranking of 
application programming interfaces (APIs); it’s kind of arbitrary and opaque” (Ent-7). Our 
findings also revealed the common use of MyInfo, a GovTech data sharing service that 
simplifies the onboarding of new users. One interviewee said, “we were one of the early 
adopters of MyInfo, which allows individuals to easily do cross-border payments as part of 
our KYC [know-your-customer] process; once they log in, they can authorize the disclosure 
of their personal information to us” (Ent-2). The intermediary role of another agency, 
Enterprise Singapore, the startup support arm of the government, also became clear. 





startup to local hospitals and healthcare providers and directed it to access public funding 
opportunities. 
Our evidence revealed the emergence of platforms as a third category that enables 
intermediation. Two main perspectives were expressed: the role of APIs as technology 
intermediary platforms and support organizations that provide a platform for networking. 
The proliferation of API technology arose in discussions of intermediary solutions, as one 
entrepreneur put it: “Previously, banks were one-stop shops providing various financial 
services through a special infrastructure including their own processors, data lakes, and 
servers. However, with the advent of API technology—which we call an un-bundling of the 
banks—what is now happening is the re-bundling of the banks through APIs; this way, we 
plug into a bank’s system to extract or access data through real-time algorithms. This can be 
achieved without having to build new infrastructures” (Ent-7). While the APIX platform 
presented in the above concept rests on the application of API technology to facilitate 
interaction among fintechs and FIs, it is also distinct by being a cross-border, government-
led solution. Moreover, our findings show evidence of support associations acting as 
platform leaders, facilitating collaboration among entrepreneurs and ecosystem resource 
providers through a variety of solutions that includes providing access to VC databases 
exclusive to its members. One manager said, “we have a non-public database of 150 VCs 
based in Singapore; we segregate them by preferred startup stage for investment to perform 
good matching” (RP-18). Some interviewees even shared positive experiences in co-working 
spaces, which could be a conducive platform for networking and resource sharing. While 
these platforms may have enabled most fintech segments, our findings revealed that other 
types such as cryptocurrencies have not benefited from advantages like access to finance 
because they operated in an unregulated environment. Relatedly, one of the entrepreneurs 
indicated that the advent of ICOs as an alternative finance source changed this situation, 
giving crypto fintechs the opportunity to access capital while bypassing traditional 
intermediaries like VCs, support organizations, and FIs. 
The fourth category, cross-border connections, reflects the mediating role of actors like 
VCs, Enterprise Singapore, and incubation models in connecting entrepreneurs to global 
networks. The most common view emerging from the data was that VCs play a substantial 
role in helping startups access networks and resources in other parts of the world, a theme 
expressed by both entrepreneurs and incubation model actors. For example, one entrepreneur 
said, “we are backed by Vertex Venture and Fullerton Financial holdings, who are well 
connected with the Ministry of Finance in Malaysia; they helped us access the regulatory 





cross-border payment fintechs” (Ent-2). The same founder also said that they were currently 
seeking VCs in Latin America to access regulatory and incumbent networks in that region. 
The government agency Enterprise Singapore was also commonly discussed among fintechs, 
with one entrepreneur noting that “we were able to obtain support from them [Enterprise 
Singapore], not just in the form of grants, but in the form of having physical people on the 
ground across the world, who guided us in terms of accounting access, legal support, office 
space; their support was there for us at a very early startup stage” (Ent-4). Another 
government initiative that arose was the SFF event, which serves as a channel to connect 
with non-local ecosystem networks like VCs and potential partners. We also found evidence 
indicating that incubation models leverage their global presence to provide local 
entrepreneurs with access to foreign networks. Along these lines, one VC shared his 
experience of using external networks to scout for investment projects: “There are two parts 
to this relationship: first, we access academics from the University of Waikato, University of 
Queensland, and La Trobe University for their cybersecurity expertise, to help us with 
technical due diligence. Second, 10% of our fund is allocated toward commercialization 
projects with university researchers who might be onto a good idea, which we identify 
through this relationship” (RP-16). 
4.2 Cultural perspective 
4.2.1 Ecosystem development dynamics 
Two categories emerged from the cultural perspective: (1) ecosystem readiness and (2) 
openness to support.  
For the first category, the empirical findings revealed two recurring views related to the 
preparedness of ecosystem actors. One perspective that emerged from entrepreneurs 
reflected the stage of fintech in retrospect, as one participant put it: “Early-stage conferences 
in 2014 and 2015 were very conceptual. There was a lot of talk on AI [artificial intelligence] 
with little to no action; nobody knew what we mean by this, what specific solution this is, 
what problem this is solving, and who the customers are. Fast forward to today; everyone 
feels a lot more confident that they could see where and how the innovation needs to happen 
and why it’s going to win or lose” (Ent-4). On the cryptocurrencies and blockchain side, it 
was reported that before 2017 only a few participants attended events and conferences; 
however, with rising bitcoin prices, that all changed. The presence of entrepreneurial role 
models as early drivers of the cryptocurrency and blockchain ecosystem is notable in this 
setting. Our findings indicate that only a handful of individuals were active in this segment 





and managing director of the cryptocurrency association in Singapore that has growing 
global importance. Further, we found evidence indicating that entrepreneurs played an 
important role in educating ecosystem actors including VCs, who at earlier stages were less 
convinced about the need for disruption, the identified problems and solutions, market size, 
and so on. This required layer of education was reported to be more crucial for fintechs 
operating in segments outside the digital payment space. Regarding this issue, one VC said, 
“many of the VC providers lack the necessary expertise in the cyber area to do a sufficiently 
thorough due diligence of the opportunities. They tend to be conservative and stay away. 
That’s a big factor in why there hasn’t been as much money flowing into cybersecurity 
startups” (RP-16). Beyond the problem of a potential lack of knowledge, another VC pointed 
out the issue of poor exit rates for over US$100 million in Singapore in comparison to 
established ecosystems like London or New York. According to the VC, not exiting at that 
threshold will make it difficult to justify an investment from an economic point of view. The 
second view, interestingly, draws on the experience of a non-local incubator who accessed 
the fintech ecosystem in Singapore to find that actual readiness deviates from external 
perceptions: “Before we decided to come to Singapore, we’d done our research and had built 
our network; Singapore looked more mature on the outside, but we soon learned that their 
digital infrastructure and mindset is not ready. Even though everybody speaks about fintech 
and they seem to know what they’re talking about, as soon as we have more in-depth 
discussions, we realize no, they are not at a point where we can apply our own model that 
we’ve created in Switzerland. A lot of the banks that we’ve encountered here still believe 
that they can pull it off on their own. If they have an innovation lab, they think that’s enough. 
The banks here have this very internal focus, which stops them from seeing the challenges 
that they are facing. Even when collaborating with startups, it’s on a very ad hoc basis and 
with an unstructured process” (EC-12). Importantly, this finding contrasts with the retrieved 
evidence from locally established incubation models who did not disclose similar concerns 
about the technical or cultural readiness of FIs. 
As for the second category, openness to support emerged from our data to indicate a 
vibrant scene with ecosystem actors open to connecting and sharing their experiences. These 
views arose in different perspectives, including VCs and support organizations. For example, 
one VC said, “on a voluntary basis we would help very early-stage startups; for instance, we 
provided a female founder of a technology business with mentorship: just acting as 
professional coaches, bouncing ideas back and forth, suggesting ways to go about things” 
(RP-16). Another aspect that was mentioned is the presence of government-backed 





perspective of entrepreneurial actors, we found evidence that may indicate an openness to 
engage: “In our view, everything is interconnected, and the solution has to be holistic, and 
you’re not going to get that on your own. We engage our solution with many other players, 
whether they’re disruptors or those that are to be disrupted” (Ent-4). That said, our findings 
also indicated banks’ reluctance to collaborate with fintechs, though this view varies from 
country to another. For example, one of the cross-border payment firms still face resistance 
from incumbents: “Some banks think that by supporting fintech its putting risk on their whole 
operations and on their compliance; we do come across banking or FI partners that would 
suddenly cease operations” (Ent-2). Relatedly, we found that some fintech segments like 
cryptocurrency providers are unable to access normal banking services. One of the 
interviewees operating this type of fintech said, “it’s impossible to open a bank account to 
cover the normal operation of a business because banks are still being threatened by 
cryptocurrency projects” (Ent-8). Moreover, our findings revealed a support orientation 
favoring business-to-business (B2B) fintechs, from the perspective of both support 
organizations and VCs. One interviewee said, “we prefer B2B fintechs because these 
founders would usually have worked in a FI, have identified a particular problem area and 
have the deep domain knowledge that’s required to successfully navigate the entire market” 
(EC-10). One VC added, “we find it easier to define the conditions for success in B2B 
providers because they tend not to be a winner-take-all approach” (RP-17). Along the lines 
of providing advantages to selected fintech businesses, our findings also reveal differential 
willingness to support fintechs practicing regulatory arbitrage, non-employment of local 
talent, or compliance with other policies, all of which limit opportunities to access local 
ecosystem resources. These findings are elaborated in our discussion of regulatory dynamics. 
4.2.2 Regulatory dynamics 
As to regulatory dynamics, our findings fell into two categories, predominantly capturing 
entrepreneurial actors’ perspectives: (1) attitude toward regulators and (2) regulatory 
contributions. 
For the first category, our empirical evidence revealed views about regulators that 
emerged largely from foreign entrepreneurs based in Singapore, one of whom said, “I am 
convinced that every fintech will say the same thing: the less interaction you have with the 
regulator, the better. It is unlikely they understand exactly what it is you’re doing. Startups 
are likely to be faced with a whole bunch of regulation, interpretation, and case law based on 
businesses that have existed a long time before theirs did and based on an ecosystem which 





via a platform like ours is not addressed in most financial regulation” (Ent-4). The absence 
of uniformity between regulators was a consistent pattern; these views concur with the 
highlighted evidence on the role of governmental actions in supporting fintech innovators, 
though from the relational perspective. For example, there is misalignment between the C-
level executives who strongly advocate for fintech and the other regulatory officers with 
whom startups will interact with once they approach MAS: “[The officers] don’t care about 
any of that stuff that those 20 people talk about. They’ve got a lot of paperwork to fill in, 
rules and regulations to follow, putting you in the wrong boxes, trying to make you apply for 
different things” (Ent-4). Talking about the same issue, another interviewee said, “it took me 
15 months to get into the regulatory sandbox. It was still a time-consuming process, and I 
know the senior management at MAS would like to make that faster” (Ent-6). Another 
important point is that certain areas are more regulated than others, which may create 
prohibitively high hurdles, as one interviewee put it: “If you move into areas like wealth or 
asset management, it becomes very expensive: one thing is paying the license fee, but you 
also need to have two employees who are Singaporean with at least five years of experience” 
(Ent-5). The same entrepreneur added that fundraising in these areas is difficult, as investors 
would normally want to see at least some revenues generated prior to making any 
investments, and it is impossible to generate revenues without a license. When asked about 
how to overcome regulatory barriers, entrepreneurs emphasized a pragmatic approach to 
dodge regulators, including the creation of safe regulatory covers and careful selection of the 
regulatory jurisdiction in which to operate. For example, one entrepreneur said, “we try to do 
international arbitrage; getting an asset management license in Switzerland is much easier 
than in Singapore, despite the fact that we are sitting here” (Ent-5). More interestingly, our 
findings indicate that foreigners establishing a business need to have an inside director who 
is a Singaporean citizen or permanent resident: “If you found a startup company and you 
tried to do it bootstrapped, you will not be able to get a work permit for yourself; this can be 
a showstopper for incorporating in Singapore. That’s why we incorporated it in London. 
Now, we are looking to enter an accelerator program to be in a better position to raise capital; 
however, we may not qualify as we are not incorporated here” (Ent-5). Another possible 
implication of this issue emerged from a VC: “We’ve not been able to access any of the 
support offered by the development arm for fund managers because we’re not Singaporean 
enough, even though we are incorporated here, which makes us ineligible for many other 
support programs” (RP-16). 
As for the second category, regulatory contributions were found to have a positive impact 





regulator said that MAS, unlike other regulatory authorities, has a market development 
objective and thus has a dual role focused on both regulation and innovation. Recent 
contributions such as the Payments Service Act surfaced among interviewees operating in 
the cryptocurrency space, as highlighted under resource recycling in regard to entrepreneur–
regulator collaboration during this process of regulatory change. This finding, however, 
indicates how such regulatory intervention is perceived by entrepreneurial actors; one 
entrepreneur said that “the new act is a big leap forward because new regulatory frameworks 
state what you can do under which circumstances” (Ent-5). Another recurring contribution 
was the regulatory sandbox; a primary benefit of this mechanism was allowing participants 
to waive a large investment in financial licenses until the end of their exemption periods (if 
they opt to proceed). One VC told us that “the sandbox provides a safe harbor to launch and 
allows us to de-risk some of the more innovative financial products and be able to launch 
them without necessarily fearing that the regulator will wake up one day and pull the plug” 
(RP-14). Relatedly, one of the entrepreneurs criticized the role of regulatory sandboxes in 
driving innovation, stating that regulators spontaneously launched sandboxes overlooking 
how they should operate: “I don't think they did it well enough. But then, I wouldn't expect a 
regulator to do that, because regulators aren't innovators. They're policy people” (Ent-7). That 
said, we found evidence of supportive top-level regulators demonstrating commitment to 
improving financial markets by confronting incumbents. One entrepreneur said, “a MAS 
fintech officer recently posted, ‘No more PoC for free,’ which reflects what startups very 
often have to deal with when engaging with banks” (Ent-5).  
5 Discussion and Implications 
In addition to the findings presented above, we discuss a few important observations from 
which our theoretical propositions are derived; we then devote a section to present the main 
barriers ecosystem actors face, followed by the implications of this study. 
Given that fintech is an emerging phenomenon, some unregulated segments like 
blockchain and cryptocurrencies face unequal acceptance from ecosystem actors like banks, 
VCs, and regulators. Under these ecosystem conditions, our empirical evidence indicates that 
these institutional voids give rise to the formation of a new ecosystem spearheaded by 
entrepreneurial role models. In turn, this enables novel fintech segments to grow, as indicated 
by one of the interviewed early affiliates in the blockchain and cryptocurrency community. 
In line with the previous EE literature (e.g., Goswami et al. 2018; Kuratko et al. 2017), it may 
be deduced that the entrepreneurial commitment of earlier fintech affiliates creates value in 





resources but also and more importantly by acting as catalysts to establish the key building 
blocks of an ecosystem. This may include a support association that provides mentorship and 
acts as an intermediary between ecosystem actors like regulators and FIs. Thus, allowing 
fintech entrants to exploit opportunities and contribute to system-level outcomes such as 
business model innovations (Autio et al. 2018; Cao and Shi 2020). We can further postulate 
that the presence of institutional voids causes early entrepreneurial affiliates in novel fintech 
segments to create a support ecosystem, thus accelerating entrepreneurial identification and 
exploitation of opportunities in fintech EEs. We therefore suggest that 
P1: Institutional voids precipitate first-comer members to create supportive ecosystems, 
facilitating efficient access to and exploitation of resources for forth comer startups. 
Another important observation is that entrepreneurs play a central role in shaping future 
fintech regulations through their interactions with regulators. For example, the Payment 
Services Act was reported to have been co-created with entrepreneurial actors. While we 
recognize that the important role of the government in Singapore’s fintech EE goes beyond 
traditional support like financing R&D and controlling market demand (Doblinger et al. 
2019), our findings lead us to postulate the existence of a relational rather than a hierarchical 
governance model (see Colombelli et al. 2019 for an overview). As such, entrepreneurs drive 
the interaction dynamics of collaboration. This view is also supported by the presence of 
different social clusters contingent on the fintech segment, with a specialized support 
infrastructure built around them. For example, we found that blockchain and cryptocurrency 
startups have support associations and incubation models offering specialized services, 
which confirms the fundamental feature of EEs as smaller ecosystems located inside larger 
ones (Brown and Mason 2017). While this finding is well supported in the literature, our 
study confirms the presence of nested geographies in digitalized industries. Our findings 
further demonstrate the hierarchical governance of the government through MAS, this time 
in regard to intermediary solutions; it functions as a centralized infrastructure solution 
provider to govern the intermediary dynamics of collaboration6 between fintechs and 
incumbents. While this may be expected, given the fundamental role of regulators in securing 
financial markets against systemic risks, our findings suggest that MAS has incentivized 
banks and FIs to open their own innovation labs in the past two years. Resultantly, indicating 
that almost all banks in Singapore now have their own labs. Similarly, intermediary platforms 
like APIX were established to promote collaboration among incumbents and newcomers. 
These efforts represent the dual role of this regulator, which is focused on both regulation 
 





and innovation. However, this orientation may disfavor business-to-consumer (B2C) fintechs 
in the EE and thus weaken competition in financial markets, which is currently an unexplored 
topic in the literature; recent contributions have focused on collaboration among—rather than 
competition between—banks and fintechs (Hornuf et al. 2020). Based on the above 
discussion, we suggest the following propositions 
P2a: Entrepreneurs drive the interaction dynamics of collaboration in fintech EEs, 
contributing positively to the co-creation of fintech-friendly regulations and support 
infrastructures. 
P2b: The dual role of the regulator ensures the governance of intermediary dynamics 
between ecosystem actors, affecting the development of fintech innovations. 
Another heavily debated aspect of EE research is spatial boundedness; common 
explanations of EEs propose the need for close geographic proximity with ecosystem actors 
to foster localized interactions and knowledge flow (Brown and Mason 2017). However, 
digitalization has been argued to reduce such spatial contingencies (Autio et al. 2018). Our 
findings confirm that founders are able to access new markets and opportunities remotely, 
though this is often found to be facilitated by intermediaries like VCs and government 
agencies or platforms like APIs. Similarly, our findings reveal that VCs not only play the role 
of financial and knowledge capital providers but also mediate access to non-local networks, 
including regulatory authorities. In so doing, they may help fintechs overcome a primary 
cause of failure by successfully deploying their solutions beyond national boundaries 
(Mention 2020). This latter function of VCs is merely explored in the existing management 
literature (Clayton et al. 2018) and merits much more detailed study. Notably, our findings 
also indicate that VCs discover potential investees without having to be present in the same 
geography, thanks to digitalization and connectedness to local actors like incubators and 
accelerators. On this basis, it may be deduced that 
P3: Digitalization and the presence of localized intermediary actors positively affect 
entrepreneurial actors’ accessibility to non-local ecosystems, which drives opportunity 
exploitation. 
Moreover, foreign entrepreneurs residing in Singapore shared their view of regulators, 
emphasizing a bureaucratic and entrepreneurial-unfriendly system, due to factors like 
unfavorable labor market regulations and fear of incurring high compliance costs, which may 
drive entrepreneurs to other jurisdictions. Such regulatory arbitrage emerged from our 
evidence and is consistent with the literature (Cumming and Schwienbacher 2018). These 





regulatory enforcement have lower VC investments in fintechs (e.g., Cumming and 
Schwienbacher 2018). While our findings cannot confirm a relationship between investment 
levels and regulatory enforcement in Singapore, they do indicate another reason for lower 
investments; namely, the lack of VCs’ technical and industry knowledge. As a result, VCs 
ability to conduct appropriate due diligence is affected, especially in novel fintech segments. 
This perspective may contradict earlier findings in the literature that acknowledge VCs for 
their investment decision-making abilities (e.g., Nahata 2008). However, a closer look at the 
literature (e.g., Cumming and Schwienbacher 2018) reveals that VCs operating in smaller 
financial centers with fewer exit opportunities are more likely to be inexperienced and as 
such may not be capable of conducting rigorous due diligence. We argue that this is not 
necessarily the case for Singapore, given its strong fintech presence.7 Other possible 
explanations are the existence of immature VCs during boom periods (Cumming and 
Schwienbacher 2018); however, this would explain higher investment rates rather than the 
contrary. Nevertheless, it is still unclear why VCs may lack the required knowledge to 
perform due diligence and then invest in novel fintech segments; this is a promising avenue 
for future research. More importantly, our findings also indicated the role of the fintech EE 
in moderating VCs’ possible lack of critical knowledge. Specifically, we found evidence of 
how a VC firm mobilizes their mentoring position and co-location in an accelerator to interact 
with potential investment candidates over a longer period of time to assess the characteristics 
and features of the entrepreneurial team, along with the solution. In this regard, the same VC 
also reported utilizing multiple non-local ecosystem university institutions to conduct 
technical due diligence. We therefore suggest that 
P4: VCs’ lack of industry and technical knowledge of novel fintech segments can be 
compensated for through co-location to enable interaction with potential investees and 
collaboration with ecosystem actors to assist with due diligence. 
In our proposed model of fintech EEs8 (Figure 4), we illustrate the interplay between 
ecosystem actors—entrepreneurial actors, resource providers, and connectors—and the 
identified types of dynamics—interaction, intermediation, ecosystem development, and 
regulatory—through the theoretical propositions depicted. For example, the arrow marked 
 
7 According to Startup Genome (2019), Singapore had a FinTech exit value growth of 127.7%, compared with a global average of 90.6% 
between 2013–2014 and 2017–2018. 
8 This model extends Brown and Mason’s (2017) framework by unpacking the underlying dynamics specific to fintech EEs. Since 
entrepreneurial culture was found to be a common attribute, it is distinctively categorized from the other ecosystem actors and positioned 
as an aggregate dimension encompassing ecosystem development and regulatory dynamics. Also note that the relational and cultural 





P1 in Figure 4 denotes the influence of entrepreneurial fintech affiliates on ecosystem 
development dynamics; the other propositions are indicated by the other arrows.  
 
Fig. 4 A model of ecosystem dynamics in fintech EEs 
5.1 Obstacles within the fintech EE 
We devote this section to discussing the obstacles that ecosystem actors face and how 
these may challenge the efforts of supporting new ventures in fintech EEs. Starting with the 
regulatory barriers that constituted an important part of our findings, we found that 
cumbersome regulatory processes could impede fintechs from gaining swift access to 
regulator-led support instruments like regulatory sandboxes and receiving regulatory 
clarification. These barriers may cause fintechs to lose first-mover advantages, become 
visible on the monitoring radar of regulators, or even be compelled to apply for a financial 
license. They may not only affect fintech newcomers but may also have negative 
repercussions on other market participants. For instance, VCs could be less willing to invest 
in fintechs as they are not capable of generating revenue or executing a PoC prior to obtaining 
a financial license. While this is understandable from an investor’s point of view, it may be 
fatal for fintechs because a financial license is a regulatory prerequisite for operating in the 
market. One may argue then that fintech firms can attempt to access regulatory sandboxes or 
cooperate with a financial license holder like a FI to comply with these requirements, which 
is certainly plausible. However, those who are not able to access support instruments or 
collaborate with FIs because they operate in unregulated environments may find themselves 
in a paradoxical situation. Our findings revealed that fintech market participants overcome 
such regulatory challenges by following the motto “keep one’s distance from regulators” and 






















novel fintech segments are using alternative funding approaches like ICOs or (equity-based) 
crowdfunding platforms to access critical capital. Other obstacles included retention of talent 
and presence of amateur actors and scammers in the fintech ecosystem, both of which may 
send negative signals to ecosystem actors indicating prematurity and longer time to market. 
Resultantly, making fintechs less attractive for supportive regulatory intervention, VC 
investment, or cooperation with FIs. 
5.2 Theoretical implications 
Our study has important implications for theory. We contribute to the literature by (1) 
facilitating the theorization of ecosystem dynamics and its influence on startups through 
theoretical propositions, (2) linking EEs to fintech research, and (3) promoting the use of 
theoretically grounded approaches when investigating EEs. Thus, we add to the growing 
debate in the EE research stream (Audretsch et al. 2018; Brown and Mason 2017; Ghio et al. 
2019; Motoyama and Knowlton 2017; Spigel 2017) and on fintechs (Gazel and 
Schwienbacher 2020; Hornuf et al. 2020; Svensson et al. 2019). 
While we acknowledge that our theoretical propositions are derived from idiosyncratic, 
single case findings of a unique jurisdictional and institutional context, we argue that 
common elements may be transferable, with appropriate caution, to other empirical contexts 
and theoretical domains. Characterized by digital and spatial affordances (Autio et al. 2018), 
the case of fintech EEs is particularly suited to explain how digitally enabled EEs overcome 
spatial barriers. For example, our findings reveal how alternative financing sources like ICOs 
assist blockchain and cryptocurrency fintech startups in accessing capital that is otherwise 
difficult to access due to the identified EE contingencies. Relatedly, digital technologies like 
APIs were found to have a central role in alleviating intermediation-related constraints. Other 
ecosystem actors like support organizations were also found to have a prominent role in 
connecting non-local VCs to promising candidates, which broadens funding possibilities for 
entrepreneurial ventures. Taken together, these findings may contribute to research 
investigating how other ecosystems with digital and spatial characteristics allow startups to 
benefit from the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities that occur beyond local 
ecosystems (Cavallo et al. 2018; Nambisan et al. 2019). Relatedly, these findings contribute 
to other literature streams, including entrepreneurial finance, that investigate alternative 
funding approaches like ICOs and equity-based crowdfunding (Block et al. 2018; Hornuf 
and Schwienbacher 2017; Vismara 2016) by explaining how underlying ecosystem 
mechanisms such as regulatory and intermediary constraints precipitate unregulated fintech 





This study also provides insightful lessons for scholars looking to investigate other fintech 
contexts in which regulatory contributions are critical to facilitate the creation and scaling of 
new ventures. That said, the role of regulators may vary greatly depending on the regulatory 
mandates adopted in each jurisdiction, as these may determine whether regulators have a 
market development objective to support innovation or simply a regulatory mandate to 
monitor market participants. In Singapore, despite regulators’ having the dual objective of 
regulating and supporting innovation, we found several barriers to innovation that lead 
ecosystem actors to adopt alternative approaches, such as international arbitrage, avoidance 
of regulators, and capital raising through ICOs. Relatedly, we found evidence indicating a 
support orientation favoring B2B fintech segments given the identified government support 
to FIs and establishment of digital platforms like APIX to enable cooperation. While not 
undermining the crucial role of regulators, these observations indicate that transferability to 
other fintech contexts with either a regulatory mandate or a dual role is uncertain and must 
be carefully investigated in future scholarship. 
5.3 Implications for practice 
For practitioners, this study is significant for a variety of ecosystem actors, including 
founders, investors, incubation model managers, regulators, and policymakers. For example, 
we inform entrepreneurs about using intermediaries to access financial and knowledge 
capital, which can enable opportunity discovery and resource acquisition in both local and 
non-local ecosystems. Entrepreneurs can also benefit from the pragmatic measures that 
entrepreneurial actors in certain fintech segments have employed to circumvent regulatory 
barriers or access capital from alternative funding sources. As for policymakers, our study 
provides a starting point for potential improvements in regulatory and incentive policies to 
promote a conducive environment for fintech and ensure more balanced resource allocation 
to support ecosystem actors. The high cost associated with financial licenses may inhibit 
fintech startups’ access to critical VC capital and drive newcomers to other jurisdictions. In 
addition, policymakers may want to reconsider existing support orientation policies favoring 
B2B fintech firms to promote more market competition.  
6 Conclusion 
The EE approach has recently emerged to investigate the influence of a geographically 
bounded context on entrepreneurial activity (Colombelli et al. 2019). Despite the extant 
literature providing certain contributions regarding the driving forces behind successful EEs 
(Cao and Shi 2020; Ghio et al. 2019; Spigel 2017), there is still little empirical evidence on 





opportunity recognition and resource acquisition may change (Autio et al. 2018); it is thus 
important to investigate how these changes impact newcomers. Our study aimed to fill this 
gap by exploring the influence of ecosystem dynamics on new ventures in the financial 
industry, guided by an EE framework (Brown and Mason 2017). Through this investigation, 
four distinctive categories emerged: interaction and intermediation dynamics from the 
relational perspective and ecosystem development and regulatory dynamics from the cultural 
perspective. Taken together, these dynamics explain how entrepreneurial opportunity 
identification and resource exploitation can be either accelerated or inhibited in fintech EEs. 
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Abstract 
Research on incubation models indicates that incubators and accelerators are crucial catalysts 
for the development of start-ups. To facilitate start-ups in financial markets, several 
regulatory authorities have adopted a new incubation model called a ‘regulatory sandbox’. 
Regulatory sandboxes enable eligible applicants to test their technology-enabled financial 
solutions for a certain period of time (subject to conditions the regulator imposes). As such, 
these instruments allow innovation while preventing severe instability in financial markets 
caused by systemic risk. Despite their importance, management research has devoted little 
attention to studying how sandboxes operate as a new incubation model. In our abductive 
study, we adopt the activity system framework and a qualitative analysis approach to 
investigate the activities of five leading sandboxes and compare them with the activities of 
other incubation models. The data analysis yielded an activity model with three design 
elements (achieving membership, participating and detaching) and one design theme 
(improving connectedness). Thus, sandboxes are characterized by providing regulatory 
guidance and facilitating access to testing across international jurisdictions, distinguishing 
them from both generic and specialized incubation models. Our primary contribution to the 
incubation literature is extending the knowledge of a unique incubation model through a set 
of theoretical propositions.  
Keywords: Financial technology (FinTech); Regulatory sandbox; Incubation models; 
Business incubators; Business accelerators; Activity system framework  
1 Introduction 
Business incubators (BIs) and accelerators can play a vital role in facilitating start-ups’ 
entrepreneurial activity, enterprises that often have constrained resources and a high failure 
rate (Peters et al., 2004). Certain industries, including financial markets, energy and 
pharmaceuticals, face additional barriers to innovation due to regulatory constraints that vary 
across jurisdictions, inhibiting entrepreneurial firms (Blind, 2012; Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2017). To overcome such barriers, governments offer sector-specific BIs 





time to market (see Doblinger et al., 2019; Grifantini, 2015; Michael and Pearce, 2009). For 
instance, the US government founded the National Incubator Initiative of Clean Energy 
(NIICE) to consolidate the efforts of cleantech BIs and accelerators through a knowledge 
exchange platform (DOE, 2018). In financial markets, regulatory authorities have set up 
several initiatives, including regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs, to engage and 
support financial technology (FinTech) start-ups (ESMA, 2019; UNSGSA et al., 2019). 
These examples illustrate an increasing focus on supporting sector-specific incubator 
organizations to foster novelty in regulated sectors. Scholars such as Stayton and 
Mangematin (2019) hold that individualized investigation of these industries is necessary due 
to their peculiarities (e.g., regulatory environment), making each relevant for dedicated 
research. Thus, we investigate regulatory sandboxes as important support instruments for 
FinTech start-ups in financial markets by following recent contributions investigating this 
sector (Gazel and Schwienbacher, 2020; Haddad and Hornuf, 2018; Laidroo and Avarmaa, 
2019). 
Using digital technologies such as artificial intelligence, blockchain and big data analytics, 
FinTech start-ups develop, test and deliver a wide range of innovative financial services (FS) 
like digital payment solutions, securing them new opportunities and disrupting the course of 
traditional banking (Lee and Shin, 2018). However, FinTech start-ups face barriers to 
development due to the high cost of compliance and a lack of regulatory knowledge (Arner 
et al., 2015; Haddad and Hornuf, 2018; IOSCO, 2017; UNSGSA et al., 2019), potentially 
leading to firm failure and disruption in financial markets (Pai, 2017). In response, regulatory 
authorities from numerous countries including the US, the UK, Singapore and Australia have 
taken an active stance to find appropriate regulatory solutions that stimulate innovation, 
improve market competition and ensure financial market stability (Arner et al., 2016; Fan, 
2017; Jenik and Lauer, 2017). One of the first, in 2016, the UK’s Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) established a regulatory sandbox to achieve these objectives (Fan, 2017; 
Zetzsche et al., 2017). These are environments free from legal consequences in which 
FinTech firms can test and validate their business models without draining their resources by 
attempting to obtain traditional financial licenses (Teigland et al., 2018). Following the UK’s 
lead, other governments have hurried to design and establish sandboxes. On a global basis, 
recent reports indicate that over 50 jurisdictions have either announced or already operate a 
sandbox (see UNSGSA et al., 2019 for an overview). 
With the rapid increase in the number of FinTech market participants, regulators face 
challenges in designing and operating regulatory instruments in a context conventionally 





and operating sandboxes is crucial from the perspective of regulators, given their role in 
stimulating financial innovations and reducing disruptions in financial markets. That said, 
there remains a lack of academic research shedding empirical light on how regulatory 
sandboxes operate from a management perspective, with most research addressing 
exclusively legal issues (Arner et al., 2017; Bromberg et al., 2017; Zetzsche et al., 2017). We 
fill this gap by exploring the activities of this novel support instrument to establish a 
knowledge-based foundation that will foster advancements in regulatory sandboxes. An 
activity refers to involved actors’ engagement to achieve an overarching objective (Zott and 
Amit, 2010). When adapted to the incubation setting, this represents activities such as training 
conducted during selection, business support and mediation (Bergek and Norrman, 2008). 
Following Pauwels et al.’s (2016) investigation of accelerators, we explore activities instead 
of other dimensions as a foundation that must precede future investigations dealing with 
performance. 
Viewed broadly, BIs, accelerators and regulatory sandboxes all reduce the high failure 
rates associated with new venture creation (Aerts et al., 2007). However, BIs provide a wider 
range of services to support firm entry into different industries than sandboxes, which have 
thus far focused on FS in selected categories like banking, insurance and investment 
management (ESMA, 2019). In addition, regulatory sandboxes have certain distinctive 
characteristics: the prominent role of regulators, being led by public institutions, providing 
licensing exemptions and regulatory support services that pilot novel innovations without 
systemic risk (Arner et al., 2017; Magnuson, 2018; UNSGSA et al., 2019; Zetzsche et al., 
2017). We thus argue that, due to the specific characteristics of regulatory sandboxes, one 
cannot blithely assume that the knowledge from the incubation literature necessarily applies 
to regulatory sandboxes.  
The study aims, by exploring and identifying the activities that characterize the incubation 
model of regulatory sandboxes, to find out ‘How are the activities of regulatory sandboxes 
different compared with the activities of BIs and accelerators?’ To answer this research 
question (RQ), we first analyze the secondary data of archival documents (e.g., regulatory 
guides, consultation papers) from five regulatory sandboxes in leading financial centres using 
the activity system framework (Zott and Amit, 2010). We then discuss the differences of 
sandboxes in relation to the incubation literature, guided by the incubation model activities 
of generic (Bergek and Norrman, 2008) and specialized (Schwartz and Hornych, 2008) BIs 
and accelerators. We thus contribute to both the incubation literature and to practice by 
exploring a new incubation model that has gained the attention of stakeholders in the FinTech 





insufficiently theorized and lacks the needed scholarly and practitioner attention (Gazel and 
Schwienbacher, 2020; Gimpel et al., 2018; Puschmann, 2017). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we begin with a theoretical 
background reviewing the literature on incubation models and present the research 
framework. We outline the research process in the methods section and explore the empirical 
results from the cases in the findings section. The discussion section offers propositions and 
addresses theoretical and practical implications. We close with concluding remarks and 
future research avenues. 
2 Theoretical Background 
In this section, we first offer an overview of the characteristics of FinTech ventures. We 
then review incubator configuration studies that focus on the activities of BIs and 
accelerators, followed by a review of regulatory sandboxes and their relevance for FinTech 
start-ups. We further justify why this study is needed by conceptualizing the case of 
regulatory sandboxes in contrast to BIs and accelerators. Finally, we present the activity 
system framework guiding our empirical investigation. 
2.1 Characteristics of FinTechs 
FinTech has been broadly defined as ‘technology-enabled innovation in financial services 
that could result in new business models, applications, processes or products with an 
associated material effect on the provision of financial services’ (FSB, 2017, p. 7). The 
emergence of FinTech is traceable to the aftermath of the 2008–2009 financial crisis; it was 
led by start-ups and technology firms delivering FS using digital technologies and data-
driven solutions (Arner et al., 2017; Jenik and Lauer, 2017; Lee and Shin, 2018). The 
FinTech movement is characterized by digital infrastructures and interfaces, unlike 
traditional financial institutions that still operate legacy IT systems that, in some cases, are 
more than 38 years old (CBInsights, 2018; Gozman et al., 2018). That said, incumbents 
benefit from access to large customer bases, the ability to predict changes in markets based 
on extensive industry experience and knowledge of banking regulations; by contrast, 
FinTech newcomers have the advantage of building efficient systems from the beginning 
(Philippon, 2016). 
We focus on FinTech start-ups that, in addition to being constrained in terms of resources, 
may lack sufficient knowledge of the relevant regulatory frameworks (e.g., Arner et al., 2015; 
IOSCO, 2017; Peters et al., 2004). FinTech start-ups target specific market segments by 





2018). Haddad and Hornuf (2018) demonstrate that determinants like technological 
infrastructure, talent pool, venture capital and supportive regulatory initiatives have positive 
impacts on the formation of FinTech start-ups. 
The lack of legacy systems and relatively lower level of organizational complexity enable 
FinTech start-ups to be more responsive and radically innovate FS (Hornuf et al., 2020). 
However, the novel application of enabling technologies to deliver FS presents compliance-
specific challenges that are different than those incumbents face. For instance, activities on 
crowdfunding platforms (i.e., getting funds from the crowd based on big data analytics rather 
than long-term relationships, like in the banking sector) require different banking regulations 
to be enforced (Navaretti et al., 2017). Taken together, these factors indicate an urgent need 
to support FinTech start-ups in financial markets; however, there is scarce scientific research 
on how support instruments foster FinTech novelties. 
2.2 Incubation models 
An incubation model is a support institution that enables the survival and development of 
new ventures through the provision of entrepreneurial support services (Pauwels et al., 2016). 
Such support services (i.e., activities) are further identified as one of the main components in 
incubation research capturing incubators’ operations (Baraldi and Havenvid, 2016). 
However, the incubation literature (e.g., Bergek and Norrman, 2008) denotes that identifying 
how and in what ways incubator support activities are provided has received little academic 
attention.  
2.2.1 Business incubators 
In a generic sense, technology BIs represent support organizations like accelerators, 
science parks, innovation offices and industrial parks (Bøllingtoft, 2012; Cohen, 2013; 
Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002; Mian et al., 2016). BIs first became popular in the 1980s; their 
offerings have been evolving ever since (Bruneel et al., 2012). According to Hackett and 
Dilts (2004, p. 57), a BI is a ‘shared office-space facility that seeks to provide its incubatees 
with a strategic, value-adding intervention system of monitoring and business assistance. 
This system controls and links resources with the objective of facilitating the successful new 
venture development of the incubatees while simultaneously containing the cost of their 
potential failure’. More precisely, BIs facilitate entrepreneurial ventures by providing 






Campbell et al. (1985) made the first attempt to conceptualize how incubators operate to 
illuminate their internal activities. They delineate four such activities: identification of 
business needs, selection and monitoring, access to capital investment and network access. 
Through these activities, incubation models create value for their tenants (Campbell et al., 
1985). Bergek and Norrman (2008) examine how incubator practices differ from one another 
and propose an incubator model framework including selection, business support and 
mediation as the most distinctive activities. Selection concerns the assessment criteria 
employed when evaluating a start-up’s entry into the incubator. Business support refers to 
services like start-up development training, mentorship, legal and patent services, financial 
services and marketing and advertising services provided during the incubation process. 
Mediation refers tenants’ ability to access external resources to facilitate development, 
especially when the incubator lacks the required expertise (Bergek and Norrman, 2008; 
Hausberg and Korreck, 2018).  
2.2.2 Business accelerators 
Business accelerators are commonly characterized as short-term and cohort-based 
programs (Cohen, 2013; Hausberg and Korreck, 2018). In a study exploring accelerators, 
Pauwels et al. (2016) argue that accelerators have four distinct features: 1) not being designed 
for the long-term provision of support services and physical facilities, 2) generally offering 
pre-seed funding in return for ownership shares, 3) geared toward angel investors rather than 
venture capitalists and 4) providing intensive short-term training and business development 
support to prepare start-ups for investment. 
To explore the incubation model of accelerators, Pauwels et al. (2016) adopt the activity 
system framework to identify design elements that characterize the activities of accelerators 
on the one hand and design themes that emerge from particular types of accelerators on the 
other. The design elements include 1) a ‘program package’ that consists of offered services 
(mentoring, training, investment opportunities, physical facilities); 2) a ‘strategic focus’ that 
highlights whether accelerators are focused on a specific industry or geographical location; 
3) a ‘selection process’ that represents screening activities like in-person presentations and 
third-party screening services; 4) a ‘funding structure’ that considers revenue streams 
supporting the accelerator operation, which can be private, public or self-generated and 5) 
‘alumni relations’, which represent networking activities with graduated participants and a 
post-accelerator program. They also identified three distinct themes that characterize 
accelerator models: the ecosystem builder, the deal-flow maker and the welfare stimulator 





2.2.3 Regulatory sandboxes: A new incubation model for FinTech start-ups  
Regulatory sandboxes grant time-limited licensing exemptions to eligible FinTechs to test 
their solutions, as subject to imposed regulatory conditions in each jurisdiction (Arner et al., 
2016; Zetzsche et al., 2017). These instruments are initiated by public-based institutions with 
a regulatory or monetary function (Bromberg et al., 2017) and commonly established 
following public consultation processes in which ecosystem stakeholders are engaged to help 
shape sandbox activities (CCAF, 2018). Fan (2017) stresses that sandboxes do not eliminate 
the risk of business failure – a determinant of innovation – rather, they reduce the 
consequences of testing on consumers and financial market stability. Hence, sandboxes 
reduce systemic risk9 (Magnuson, 2018).  
2.2.4 Complementing existing knowledge: Regulatory sandboxes vs incubation models? 
While incubation studies have reported positive implications of BIs and accelerators for 
start-ups in a variety of sectors, it is less clear whether emerging FinTech start-ups can benefit 
from incubation models in the same way. This is due to generic and diffuse investigations 
that either overlook specialized incubators, study a broad sample of incubation models and 
start-ups or capture a time period irrelevant to the FinTech phenomenon. For instance, Aerts 
et al.’s (2007) investigation of European incubators’ screening practices showed that 44% 
(sample N = 107) of the incubators specialized in the financial sector, but their sample was 
collected in 2003, long before the rise of FinTechs. Among recent studies confirming that 
incubation models significantly lower FinTechs’ risk of failure, Gazel and Schwienbacher 
(2020) examine a sample of BIs and accelerators; however, they do so without explicitly 
targeting the impact of support activities. Regarding accelerators, while Pauwels et al. (2016) 
indeed study one FinTech accelerator, their findings are combined with other sector-specific 
accelerators, making it difficult to distinguish how the FinTech accelerator operates. That 
said, it is important to acknowledge that prior investigations, although not specific to 
incubation activities conducted to enable FinTech start-ups, do provide relevant insights for 
our study, including common activities. However, we argue that the differences in this 
relatively young context (including high compliance costs and regulatory challenges) 
intertwined with regulators’ and FinTechs’ characteristics call for different types of incubation 
activities to support innovation. This is in line with previous arguments in incubation research 
promoting incubator specialization and providing sector-specific support services (Grimaldi 
 
9According to Magnuson (2018), scholarship on financial stability has traditionally assumed that large financial institutions 
are the primary source of systemic risk and threat to the overall economy. In this study, we adopt Magnuson’s view, arguing 
that smaller financial actors like FinTechs enabled by certain abilities (e.g., digital technologies) may constitute systemic 





and Grandi, 2005; Schwartz and Hornych, 2008; Vanderstraeten and Matthyssens, 2012). 
Some of the advantages of sector-specific BIs that Schwartz and Hornych (2008) highlight 
are 1) specialized facilities, 2) sector-specific know-how and networks, 3) a collaborative co-
working environment and 4) intangible image effects. 
Regarding the literature on sandboxes, we deduce that certain characteristics distinguish 
regulatory sandboxes from existing BIs and accelerators: regulatory authorities’ uncommon 
intervention of supporting innovation, periodic licensing exemptions allowing FinTech 
novelty-testing and regulators’ roles in providing knowledge about regulatory frameworks. 
Thus, on the one hand, due to these specific characteristics, evidence on incubation activities 
that is not industry-specific may not be entirely transferable to the study of regulatory 
sandboxes. On the other hand, sector-specific knowledge falls short in terms of investigating 
the unique incubation activities of FinTech start-ups, with the exception of some studies 
investigating how FinTechs benefit from corporate BIs or accelerators in terms of access to 
customer base, knowledge of banking regulations and access to financial licenses (e.g., 
Hornuf et al., 2020). While these benefits can certainly encourage FinTechs to cooperate with 
or even be acquired by incumbents, they disadvantage other start-ups and limit market 
competition, as newcomers may not find support instruments that are independent from 
incumbents. It is thus crucial to illuminate the role of regulatory sandboxes in promoting 
start-ups in financial markets. On this basis, we investigate the incubation activities of 
sandboxes and provide an evidence-based comparison of the activities of sandboxes to both 
generic and sector-specific BIs and accelerators. To guide this comparison, we use the 
generic incubation activities of selection, business support and mediation (Bergek and 
Norrman, 2008) and the sector-specific incubation activities of specialized facilities and 
sector-specific know-how and networks (Schwartz and Hornych, 2008). 
2.3 The activity system: A framework to study incubation activities  
Like Pauwels et al. (2016), we argue that the activity system model Zott and Amit (2010) 
suggest is – through identifying its main design elements and themes – an appropriate 
framework to study how incubation models operate and differ from other existing models. 
Introduced to assist firms in designing their business models, the framework encourages the 
focal organization to adopt a holistic approach rather than partial optimization when 
designing the system of activities required to create, deliver and capture value by the focal 
organization and its stakeholders. It also suggests how the focal organization is embedded in 





The activity theory championed by Vygotsky (1978) attempts to explain the connections 
among individual actions in society; here, any activity includes human action and interaction 
toward achieving a specific goal (Zott and Amit, 2010). From that starting point, the authors 
conceptualize organizational activity ‘as the engagement of human, physical and/or capital 
resources of any party to the business model (the focal organization, end customers, etc.) to 
serve a specific purpose toward the fulfilment of the overall objective’ (Zott and Amit, 2010, 
p. 217).  
The activity system framework is divided into two design parameters (see Table 1). First, 
design elements describe the architecture of an activity system featuring activities carried out 
to create value, how these activities are connected and by whom they are performed. The 
second parameter represents design themes that describe the sources of value creation in the 
activity system, distinguished by the extent to which an activity system is coordinated and 
connected through certain themes like novelty, lock-in, complementarities and efficiency. 
Apple’s introduction of iPod and iTunes is a good example of a design theme reflecting 
novelty in content, structure and governance (Zott and Amit, 2010). While both design 
parameters fundamentally describe activities, the design elements are concerned with how 
value-adding activities are conducted, whereas design themes focus on identifying the key 
sources of value creation.  
We adapt the activity system framework to our study to facilitate data analysis when 
exploring the design parameters that characterize regulatory sandboxes and subsequently 
understand how value is created and captured for sandboxes as focal organizations.  
Table 1 
An activity system design framework (adapted from Zott and Amit, 2010) 
Design Elements  
Content What activities should be performed? 
Structure How should they be linked and sequenced? 
Governance Who should perform them, and where? 
Design Themes  
Novelty Adopt innovative content, structure or governance 
Lock-in Build in elements to retain stakeholders like sandbox participants 
Complementarities Bundle activities to generate more value 
Efficiency Reorganize activities to reduce transaction costs 
3 Method 
We employ a qualitative research design to identify the activities that characterize 
sandboxes and to address the RQ ‘How are the activities of regulatory sandboxes different 
compared with the activities of BIs and accelerators?’; we use an abductive approach to 
explore and develop new explanations through systematic combining (Dubois and Gadde, 





sources, theoretical frameworks and existing knowledge to explain the phenomenon under 
study (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). We chose this approach because the regulatory sandbox 
model is in a nascent stage with limited academic evidence, necessitating an exploration of 
the empirical phenomenon, even while being informed about prior research. Our data 
collection included secondary data comprising archival documents retrieved from five 
leading regulatory sandbox webpages. This type of data has proven valuable in several 
studies of related phenomena in different sectors (e.g., Wang and Hajli, 2017), including 
FinTech (e.g., Gozman and Willcocks, 2019). Additionally, archival research provides 
accessibility to enough online documents from a range of sources to enable analysis of the 
phenomenon in multiple locations. 
3.1 Sampling 
We executed case selection using the following parameters: first, we focused on public-
led regulatory sandboxes because only regulatory and monetary authorities have the power 
to provide licensing exemptions, which is an integral characteristic of a regulatory sandbox. 
Second, given the novelty of the sandbox model – with only six founded in 2016 (Zetzsche 
et al., 2017) – we included only regulatory sandboxes that were operating by 2016 to capture 
information-rich cases featuring the most highly developed sandboxes10. This is particularly 
important because sandboxes serve as a testing arena for both regulators and innovators, 
enabling knowledge exchange and dissemination in the form of reports (FCA, 2017). Finally, 
the regulatory sandboxes had to have an adequate number of documents published online to 
enable our investigation of the activities they conducted.  
Using the above sampling procedure, five of the six sandboxes established in 2016 
qualified for selection; we excluded Bank Negara Malaysia due to a lack of online 
documents. Although limited in size, this sample represents the only active cases (operational 
with use cases) that provide sufficient variation and meaning to illuminate the studied 
incubation activities of sandboxes, thus ensuring an adequate qualitative sample (Cleary et 
al., 2014). However, a recent survey of innovation facilitators covering 28 countries reported 
that sandboxes were the most commonly adopted instrument by regulators worldwide (Jenik 
 
10 As of March 2018, 17 regulatory sandboxes were operating in the UK, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Abu Dhabi, 
Australia, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Thailand, Bahrain, Switzerland, Saudi 
Arabia, Denmark and the US state of Arizona (Ringe and Ruof, 2018). The majority of established regulatory sandboxes 






and Sharmista, 2019)11, indicating that sandboxes cover most of the world’s regulator-led 
initiatives in the field.  
3.2 Data collection 
The final sample consisted of 459 pages of secondary data from regulatory sandboxes in 
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UK and was 
collected between October 2018 and February 2019. As of April 2019, 204 FinTech firms 
(including start-ups, licensed financial institutions and technology providers) have been 
granted access to these sandboxes since their establishment in 2016. As an example of the 
proportion of start-ups, 80% of the first two cohorts in the FCA sandbox were FinTech start-
ups (FCA, 2017). Table 2 outlines the key characteristics of the selected cases; their timeline 
highlights are presented in Figure 1. In total, we retrieved 39 archival documents (see 
Appendix 1 for a full list) – including regulatory guides, consultation papers, reports, 
information sheets and press releases – to explore sandboxes’ design elements and themes.  
Table 2 
Descriptive data of selected sandboxes (compiled by the authors) 





Number of docs 
per sandbox 
Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) 
Dec. 2016 Rolling basis 6 12 months 9 























24 months 12 
UK Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) 
Apr. 2016 Cohort-based 
118 (5th 
cohort)  
3–6 months 6 
3.3 Data analysis 
We followed the Gioia methodology to achieve a qualitatively rigorous data analysis 
process, extracting aggregated dimensions from 1st-order coding and 2nd-order themes (Gioia 
et al., 2013). While this method of analysis typically follows an inductive approach, we rely 
on an abductive approach that informs us about prior research and enables our use of a 
theoretical framework to guide the analysis (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, 2014). Gioia et al. 
(2013, p. 21) support this approach: ‘[upon] consulting the literature, the research process 
might be viewed as transitioning from “inductive” to a form of “abductive” research’. 
 
11 Innovation facilitators overseen by regulators included (by percentage): regulatory sandboxes (35%), innovation hubs 
(26%), internal innovation facilitators (15%), accelerators (13%) and other facilitation (11%). The data presented are from 





Similarly, our process of systematic combining comprised a shifting back and forth between 
the secondary data, the activity system framework and the relevant literature. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of regulatory sandboxes (compiled by the authors using secondary data from regulators’ online 
content). 
Guided by the activity system framework (Zott and Amit, 2010), the coding process 
commenced with an initial coding scheme to explore categories describing the activities of 
design elements or design themes, as mentioned in Table 1. Like Zott and Amit (2010), we 
assume the design elements and themes to be independent, though they could be 
interdependent. Despite the coding process being highly iterative, design elements, including 
what activities create value, how activities are connected and who performs these activities, 
were identifiable in the earlier stages of coding. In contrast, we created design theme 
categories toward the end of this round of analysis, as we depended upon first achieving an 
overview of established design element activities. This enabled us to consider whether the 
created categories could instead be related to design themes representing the activity system’s 
main value creation drivers, characterized by novelty, lock-in, complementarities or 
efficiency. In the first round of coding, we labelled categories with terms based on phrases 
from analyzed documents. In the second round of coding, we created abstract themes that 
described activities of design elements and themes. Finally, we generated aggregated 
dimensions representing the design elements and themes of regulatory sandboxes based on 
patterns established in the previous round. We used NVivo to facilitate the analytical 
procedure (Gaur and Kumar, 2018). Figure 2 outlines the data structure (how we processed 
the raw data into codes, themes and aggregated dimensions). 
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Here, we report the key findings from our archival document analysis to explore the 
activities that characterize regulatory sandboxes, in which we captured four aggregated 
dimensions that represented their design elements and themes (Figure 2). Using regulatory 
sandboxes as the unit of analysis, the findings reflect regulators’ perspectives, including their 
feedback and observations about FinTechs. This section remains at the level of empirical 
evidence by introducing the aggregated dimensions of regulatory sandboxes, with the 
subsequent section discussing these findings in relation to the activity system framework and 
incubation literature. 
 
Figure 2: Activities of regulatory sandboxes (compiled by the authors). 
4.1 Design elements: How value-adding activities are conducted 
4.1.1 Achieving membership 
Our findings suggest that achieving membership consisted of early-stage activities 
through which regulatory sandbox staff interacted with potential participants to check 
eligibility, support applicants and evaluate and grant exemption requests.  
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The regulator s dedicated FinTech supervisory team will 
provide tailored guidance and support
If the applicant is able and willing to meet the proposed 
regulatory requirements and conditions, the applicant will 
be granted an FSP
To qualify for authorization under the RegLab framework, 
the applicant must demonstrate how it satisfies the 
following evaluation criteria
FCA closely oversee trials using a customised regulatory 
environment for each pilot - including safeguards for 
financial consumers
The sandbox will be discontinued when
MAS is not satisfied that the sandbox has achieved its 
intended purpose, based on the latest test scenarios
The firm submits a final report about the outcomes of 
testing and the FCA reviews the report
ADGM continues to reach out to all relevant stakeholders 
in the FinTech industry, both locally and globally, in 
pursuit of achieving its goals in building the industry
Key ASIC initiatives, including engagement with 
international regulators (through regular meetings and the 
signing of cooperation agreements) 
MAS is proposing the creation of Sandbox Express, which 
is comprised of a set of predefined sandboxes, to 
complement the existing approach of customised sandboxes
Support may include helping firms understand how the 
regulatory framework will apply to their innovative 








Checking the eligibility of those interested in FinTech solutions is among the first 
activities that most regulators conduct as a condition of offering further support and to 
establish eligibility for a formal application. If applicants meet the relevant criteria, a case 
officer is assigned to provide informal assistance as the start-up attempts to achieve 
membership. The sandbox in Hong Kong uses a different approach; here, interested parties 
can file their applications directly. In a departure from other sandbox activities, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has an automated licensing exemption for 
limited services, which allows eligible firms to rely on relief without having to complete a 
formal application. This approach is highlighted in ASIC’s RG257 document: ‘You [the 
market participant] do not need to apply to obtain the benefit of the fintech licensing 
exemption. If you meet the eligibility requirements and follow the conditions set out in the 
relevant instrument, you are legally entitled to rely on the exemption for 12 months’ (ASIC, 
2017c, p. 14). However, ASIC does require applicants to send a written notice and provide 
information about the business model and the background of the individuals involved (ASIC, 
2017c). Although regulators have different requirements, the eligibility criteria generally 
require applicants to 1) provide a product or service that fits into the FS industry, 2) offer an 
innovation that is either unique or solves an existing problem more effectively, 3) benefit 
consumers, 4) demonstrate a need for licensing relief and 5) show individual and firm 
readiness. 
In general, most regulators encourage all types of FinTech firms to apply to the sandbox, 
even if they already possess a financial license. For example, the first two cohorts the FCA 
hosted consisted of approximately 80% start-ups, 10% small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and 10% large firms, including HSBC and Lloyds Banking Group (FCA, 2017). By 
contrast, to be eligible for the financial exemption ASIC provides, participants may not 
already hold an Australian financial license (ASIC, 2017c). The Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA) began with the opposite approach – when it was established, only 
incumbents were eligible to access it, and required that technology firms, including new 
businesses, collaborate with financial institutions to enter the sandbox (HKMA, 2016). 
However, one year after its launch, the HKMA (2017) announced multiple initiatives to 
enhance its sandbox to which FinTech start-ups were permitted access. 
Supporting applicants is the next activity we identified in the regulatory sandboxes we 
assessed. Regulators describe this support as informal guidance provided through an assigned 
case officer to help applicants navigate the regulatory framework. During this activity, case 
officers also discuss any compliance issues that arise and may waive or modify the regulatory 





2016b). For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) reports that participants 
receive their first response within 21 days after submission. At this point, regulators and 
innovators exchange knowledge about the regulatory system and business model. This 
exchange is made possible through the tailoring approach, which begins early in the 
incubation model and continues through the completion of an innovator’s participation in the 
sandbox (MAS, 2016). Due to the uncertain nature of expected testing, which may 
necessitate modifying the sandbox parameters, the tailoring approach also reserves the 
regulator’s right to impose additional requirements (FCA, 2017): 
The Regulator will work with the applicant to determine the specific regulatory 
requirements and conditions (including test parameters and control boundaries) to be 
applied to the FinTech solution in question. The applicant will then assess if it is able to 
meet these requirements.… If the applicant is able and willing to meet the proposed 
regulatory requirements and conditions, the applicant will be granted an FSP [financial 
services permission] to carry on the Regulated Activity. (ADGM, 2016b, p. 8) 
Evaluating and granting exemptions is the final activity before participants can formally 
commence testing in the sandbox. Through previous interactions with FinTech service 
providers, regulators would already have collected the required documentation and could 
thus begin assessing applicants against a set of authorization requirements (such as testing 
plans with defined testing scenarios and outcomes) accompanied by risk mitigation and exit 
strategies (FCA, 2015): ‘sufficient safeguards are put in place to mitigate potential harm 
during and after testing’ (FCA, 2017, p. 5). Evaluation times were not reported due to the 
complexity of assessment (MAS, 2016). Examples of boundary conditions are number of 
clients, transaction amounts, testing periods and additional limitations specific to each 
regulatory framework (ADGM, 2016b). Finally, MAS (2016) indicates that applicants may 
also be rejected if they fail to meet sandbox objectives or assessment criteria.  
4.1.2 Participating 
Our findings further reveal that, while FinTechs were participating, regulators generally 
engaged in supervisory activities to ensure that participants operated within the set boundary 
conditions. However, some regulators do provide supporting activities in the form of 
regulatory guidance and support services to assist sandbox participants during the enrolment 
period (ADGM, 2016b; ASIC, 2017c; FCA, 2015). For example, the FCA uses case officers 
to provide guidance and support during the testing period to help innovators understand how 





Each firm’s case officer works with them [sandbox participants] to develop a test and 
facilitates engagement with subject matter experts from across the FCA. Direct feedback 
from [participating] firms… indicates that this aspect of the sandbox programme is 
valuable in helping them to understand how the regulatory framework applies to them, 
accelerating their route to market and reducing expenditure on external regulatory 
consultants. (FCA, 2017, p. 5) 
Other regulators provide additional support services. ADGM notes that sandbox 
participants can access physical facilities: ‘FinTech Participants can hold regular showcases 
and progress updates on their FinTech solutions to their target group of investors and clients. 
FinTech Participants may also make use of the auditorium facility in the ADGM Building 
(subject to availability) to conduct these presentations’ (ADGM, 2016a, p. 7). Additionally, 
ADGM arranges workshops and seminars to allow FinTech participants to present their 
services to a variety of stakeholders (ADGM, 2016a).  
Supervisory activities reflect the observational role of regulators, who employ monitoring 
activities to ensure that sandbox participants follow regulatory frameworks. For instance, 
regulators may engage with participants to ensure that testing remains within the initially 
established regulatory boundaries and conditions (ADGM, 2016b). Using supervisory 
technology like RegTech (i.e., enabling technology that enhances regulatory processes), 
regulators can supervise testing activities in real time (ADGM, 2018). Additionally, 
regulators reserve the right to redefine the testing environment’s boundary conditions based 
on observed risks, which may vary with external factors (MAS, 2016). 
4.1.3 Detaching 
Our findings suggest that detaching begins toward the end of exemption periods, and that 
certain policies apply. Exemption periods vary from three months to two years. In general, 
sandboxes allow participants to either extend validity for further testing, complete testing and 
apply for a full-fledged license or elect not to proceed upon completion of the exemption 
period. Additionally, MAS reports that participants can lose access if they fail to comply with 
the boundary conditions or mitigate risk exposure. For example, MAS may terminate testing 
if ‘a flaw has been discovered in the financial service under experimentation where the risks 
posed to customers or the financial system outweigh the benefits of the financial service 
under experimentation, and the sandbox entity acknowledges that the flaw cannot be resolved 
within the duration of the sandbox’ (MAS, 2016, p. 7). Optimally, regulators want sandbox 
participants to apply for financial licenses prior to completion in order to continue operating 





(ASIC, 2017c). Further, our findings reveal that regulators exercise a restricted extension 
policy and demand that participants terminate operation at the end of validity periods unless 
an extension or financial license is granted (ASIC, 2017c): ‘. . . the validity period of the 
authorisation granted . . . may be extended in exceptional circumstances only, determined at 
the Regulator’s discretion on a case‐by‐case basis’ (ADGM, 2016b, p. 6). Finally, as part of 
their exit policies, regulators require testing firms to submit a completion report summarizing 
the results they achieved and outlining further steps (FCA, 2015). 
4.2 Design theme: Key sources of value creation 
4.2.1 Improving connectedness 
Since the introduction of sandboxes in 2016, most regulatory authorities have followed in 
the FCA’s footsteps, adopting comparable activities with the mission of promoting market 
competition and innovation in the FS industry. However, our findings indicate that dominant 
value creation drivers have emerged from regulators with the objective of improving 
connectedness in FinTech ecosystems. 
Collaborating with regulators through cross-border cooperation agreements is carried out 
not only to enable knowledge exchange among regulators but also to facilitate testing across 
international jurisdictions and allow foreign FinTech firms to access domestic FS markets. 
For example, the FCA, ADGM and ASIC have all reported signing agreements with 
regulators across international jurisdictions:  
These [cross-border cooperation] agreements establish a framework for information 
sharing relating to innovation in financial services, including emerging market trends and 
regulatory issues arising from the growth in innovation. A number of these agreements 
also enable ASIC to refer Australian fintech businesses to other regulators’ fintech 
assistance programs-and vice versa. (ASIC, 2107a, p. 10) 
Along these lines, in February 2018, the FCA initiated a proposal to establish a Global 
Sandbox. The rationale was to create a community of regulators, promote collaboration and 
knowledge exchange among regulators and offer FinTech firms opportunities for testing 
across international jurisdictions, reducing their time to overseas markets. Shortly afterward, 
the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN, 2018) was established by 11 jurisdictions, 
including ADGM, ASIC, FCA, HKMA and MAS. As of February 2019, 25 regulatory 
jurisdictions and four observing organizations were part of the GFIN network (FCA, 2019).  
Engaging with the ecosystem is another activity regulators have adopted to interact with 





interaction varies from one jurisdiction to another. In some cases, like Singapore, these 
interactions have supported regulators’ efforts to set up a new model: ‘Through engagements 
with players in the FinTech ecosystem, MAS has identified certain regulated activities where 
pre-defined sandboxes could be reasonably constructed’ (MAS, 2018, p. 4). Although the 
tailoring approach regulators commonly adopt provides opportunities to promote testing and 
validating solutions, regulators in Singapore emphasize that this approach increases the time 
it takes to process applicants into the sandbox (MAS, 2018). Thus, MAS (2018) proposed 
eliminating the tailoring approach for certain types of FinTech firms – including insurance 
brokerage, recognized market operators and remittance – through the Sandbox Express. This 
initiative streamlined achieving membership by creating pre-defined sandboxes: ‘The current 
[sandbox] approach . . . requires an extensive review of each application as each sandbox is 
customised. . . . We have learned along the way that for certain types of regulated activity, 
the risks can potentially be well managed within certain specific boundaries’ (MAS, 2018, p. 
4). 
Developing capabilities is another activity that regulators adopt to enhance support 
services and the overall incubation model of their regulatory sandboxes. For instance, the 
ADGM announced its Digital Sandbox after observing the challenges FinTech newcomers 
faced (e.g., access to data and international markets) and experiencing the challenge of 
integrating innovative FinTech solutions into incumbents’ legacy systems (ADGM, 2018). 
On this basis, the Digital Sandbox was established to enable sandbox participants to connect 
with local and non-local financial institutions to digitally test their solutions in a collaborative 
environment using synthetic data hosted on cloud-based servers. Through this regulated 
collaborative space, regulators at ADGM (2018) postulate cost-efficiency and scalability 
benefits to both sandbox participants and traditional financial institutions. 
5 Discussion and implications 
An existing stream of incubation research has identified how incubation activities vary 
between different incubation models like accelerators (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2016) and 
technological BIs (e.g., Rubin et al., 2015). We extend this research stream by providing 
systematic empirical evidence on how the nascent sector-specific incubation model of 
regulatory sandboxes operates and is distinct from other incubation models. Specifically, we 
apply the activity system framework (Zott and Amit, 2010) to explore the activities of 
sandbox models. We then compare sandbox activities with generic and specialized 
incubation models (Bergek and Norrman, 2008; Schwartz and Hornych, 2008). In doing so, 





specific industries to promote innovation, thereby depicting the limitations of transferability 
and the need for dedicated research. Moreover, regulators currently operating or considering 
setting up sandboxes can benefit from our proposed findings to enhance or design appropriate 
activities for sandbox participants. FinTech start-ups can also determine whether the support 
services offered in sandboxes meet their needs. Given the exploratory nature of this study, 
we derive theoretical propositions as conclusions from the discussed findings to help drive 
future research. Further, we suggest both theoretical and practical implications for different 
stakeholders. 
5.1 Activities characterizing the incubation model of regulatory sandboxes 
We identify various activities that characterize regulatory sandboxes: proactively 
protecting financial systems, tailoring testing environments, granting exemptions, providing 
regulatory guidance and using a risk-based approach to evaluate FinTech participants. 
Additionally, value creation drivers that promote access to international jurisdictions, 
seamless entry to pre-defined sandboxes and collaboration with financial institutions 
emerged from the analyzed data. We discuss the main characteristics in detail throughout this 
section. 
5.1.1 Achieving membership 
The content of achieving membership constitutes the activities of checking eligibility, 
supporting applicants and evaluating and granting exemptions. We observe that these 
activities follow a specific sequence (structure): firstly, including an initial eligibility check, 
followed by assigning a case officer, suggesting sandbox boundaries and lastly offering 
access to testing. As for governance, while these activities are greatly dependent upon 
regulators managing them, sandbox applicants play an important role in performing these 
activities by approaching regulators, complying with the application requirements and co-
developing testing conditions by establishing sufficient protection mechanisms.  
The idea that regulators are offering proactive protection is due not only to engagement 
with FinTechs and monitoring participants but also to the tailoring approach (content) that 
regulators perform prior to achieving membership. In practice, this means that regulators 
work with applicants early on to tailor the best testing plan for each participant. Relatedly, 
our findings indicate that regulatory sandboxes have the necessary regulatory power to 
provide licensing reliefs and establish the boundary conditions of exemptions to fit the needs 
of each FinTech firm. Regulators may also use these significant powers to alter boundary 
conditions during participation or even to cease testing activities (such as when they observe 





manage and perform the identified activities in regulatory sandboxes. Taken together, a 
tailoring approach and regulatory powers allow regulatory sandboxes to build risk-
appropriate testing environments for FinTech participants and proactively safeguard 
financial systems. These activities can be attributed to the increasing number of market 
participants and the vital need for regulators to oversee financial markets. Theoretically, these 
findings are consistent with Magnuson’s (2018), who argues that FinTechs constitute greater 
systemic risk threats than established incumbents as they are ‘. . . more vulnerable to adverse 
economic shocks, less transparent to regulators, and more likely to encourage excessively 
risky behavior by market participants’ (Magnuson, 2018, p. 1167). In line with this 
discussion, we offer: 
P1a: Regulatory sandboxes proactively protect financial markets using a dynamic tailoring 
approach and by exerting regulatory powers. 
5.1.2 Participating 
The activities performed during participating consist of supporting and supervising 
participants (content) – unlike achieving membership, these are conducted in a parallel 
sequence (structure). Notably, the scope of performed activities may vary from one 
regulatory jurisdiction to another, possibly due to imposed mandates and availability of 
resources. In terms of governance, both activities are predominantly performed by assigned 
case officers (regulators) with the aim of supporting newcomers in their regulatory 
endeavours as well as monitoring them to ensure that potential risks remain contained. Thus, 
our findings imply that regulators inherently operate with two functions focusing on the 
regulation and innovation of FinTechs, with information being exchanged and access to 
internal regulatory expertise provided (as highlighted in the FCA example). These 
observations support and further explain studies (e.g., Zetzsche et al., 2017) that describe 
regulatory sandboxes as promoting bi-directional knowledge exchange between regulators 
and FinTech participants. Specifically, regulator–innovator engagement benefits regulators 
by providing insights into ‘innovations and the opportunities and risks they present’ while 
offering innovators a better ‘understanding of regulatory and supervisory expectations’ 
(ESMA, 2019, p. 5). 
On this basis, we postulate that knowledge-sharing within sandboxes increases regulators’ 
understanding of the application of novel technologies and participants’ knowledge of 
financial regulation, enabling them to create regulatory-compliant solutions. This bridges the 
lag between regulatory frameworks and new technologies in financial markets (IOSCO, 





P1b: Regulatory sandboxes enable the transfer of regulatory and technological knowledge 
between regulators and FinTech participants. 
5.1.3 Detaching 
The content of detaching represents two activities: suspending exemptions and enforcing 
exiting policies. Testing activities within regulatory sandboxes may cease either during 
participation or when the exemption granted expires; in either case, these are linked 
(structure) to prior or subsequent activities like providing regulators with a completion test 
report after termination and applying/receiving an extension or a financial license. Our 
findings also reveal that regulators closely monitor these activities, evaluating whether the 
unforeseen risks that emerge during testing can be mitigated and determining next steps if 
the participant fails to comply with the testing parameters. Although the data indicate that 
sandbox participants can apply to extend the exemption periods, regulators adopt a strict yet 
unclear extension policy. One possible explanation for these findings is that regulators are 
driven by a risk-based approach when evaluating participants’ testing outputs – to a great 
extent, this explanation is supported by their consistent actions to safeguard financial 
markets. However, this prompts the question of how regulatory sandboxes are changing the 
risk-averse and highly regulated climate in financial markets in ways that may inhibit 
FinTech novelties when a test-and-learn approach to innovation is not effectively supported. 
Allen (2019) provides an extended discussion on this issue, arguing that a strict trial 
termination policy is required in the context of regulatory sandboxes even if this impedes 
innovation. The author emphasizes sandboxes as a training ground primarily for regulators. 
Along these lines, we suggest that: 
P1c: Regulatory sandboxes adopt a consistent risk-based approach that can constrain 
FinTechs’ freedom to test solutions.  
5.1.4 Improving connectedness 
We further discuss a source of value creation in the activity system that emerged as a 
common design theme for all the investigated jurisdictions: improving connectedness. 
Unlike design elements in which activities encompass all three dimensions (content, structure 
and governance), the source of value creation in design themes could be described in either 
one or more of the following themes: novelty, lock-in, complementarities and efficiency 
(Zott and Amit, 2010). 
Our findings indicate that regulatory authorities have established cooperation agreements 





transfer among all the investigated jurisdictions and enable testing across international 
jurisdictions for market participants. This initiative is an example of regulators co-creating 
new activities and ways of linking and managing such activities (novelty). They are thus 
improving connectedness first among regulators and second among international regulators 
and foreign sandbox participants. This can further be associated with the theme of 
complementarities – they create value for FinTech participants by testing FS across multiple 
jurisdictions with possibly different frameworks and receive support from foreign regulators 
(instead of running independent sandbox processes). Similarly, regulators share best 
practices around emergent issues associated with monitoring FinTech participants and 
protecting financial markets. Singapore’s Sandbox Express initiative is novel in content, 
structure and governance, providing a different model to achieve membership and reducing 
time-to-testing for participants. We argue that this model reduces transaction costs for 
regulators because the activities are standardized (i.e., efficiency). Evidence from ADGM’s 
case features another initiative regulators have taken to improve connectedness, this time 
between FinTech participants and incumbents. The Digital Sandbox is the first to adopt such 
an activity, representing a novelty-centred theme. This latter finding presents an 
alternative platform for FinTechs to take advantage of banks’ financial licenses; thus, we 
view it in relation to recent studies that consider the role of FinTech corporate incubators 
in facilitating these collaborations (Block et al., 2018). For example, Hornuf et al. (2020) 
investigate various types of bank–FinTech alliances and find that they are most often based 
on product-related collaboration. 
These initiatives indicate different forms of improving connectedness in financial markets 
as a result of collaborating with regulators, engaging with the ecosystem and developing 
capabilities. For instance, cooperation among regulators in the Global Sandbox may indicate 
that legal authorities face common regulatory challenges from FinTech participants and 
would benefit from sharing experiences related to enabling technologies. There might be 
additional urgency to collaborate, as regulatory frameworks may vary from one jurisdiction 
to another, making emergent issues different in each context – at least to some extent. Given 
that financial trade is inherently global, another explanation could be that sandbox 
participants would likely express the need to extend their operations across different 
regulatory jurisdictions. Taken together, these cases show how regulators shape their activity 
system design in response to prevailing needs, thus creating new value for regulators and 
FinTech participants. We therefore offer the following proposition: 
P1d: The sources of regulatory sandboxes’ value creation can be associated with overriding 





5.2 Comparing regulatory sandboxes’ activities with other incubation models 
Generic incubation models like BIs and accelerators commonly provide programs that 
offer support services, access to physical facilities and networking opportunities, all under 
general selection and exit policies (Bøllingtoft, 2012; Bruneel, et al., 2012; Cohen, 2013; 
Hausberg and Korreck, 2018; Rubin et al., 2015). By contrast, specialized incubation models 
provide specifically designed services and access to sector-specific knowledge and networks 
(Schwartz and Hornych, 2008). Conversely, our findings indicate other service offerings, 
which leads us to argue that both generic and specialized BIs and accelerators are inherently 
different from regulatory sandboxes because of the specifics of the activities conducted. 
Identifying these differences provides important opportunities for research and practice to 
understand which specific incubation activities enable regulatory sandboxes to support 
FinTech start-ups. We now discuss these similarities and differences using the frameworks 
developed for generic (Bergek and Norrman, 2008) and specialized (Schwartz and Hornych, 
2008) incubator models. 
5.2.1 Activities of generic incubation models vs regulatory sandboxes 
Regarding the selection practices for BIs and accelerators, the incubator literature reports 
using different strategies that vary by incubator focus (industry), organization type (for-profit 
vs non-profit) and incubation model (such as incubators or accelerators) (Hausberg and 
Korreck, 2018). Bergek and Norrman (2008, p. 24) classify selection strategies of incubator 
models into a 2 x 2 matrix framework representing ‘idea-focused’ and ‘entrepreneur-
focused’ categories on one the hand and ‘picking-the-winners’ and ‘survival-of-the-fittest’ 
categories on the other hand. As for accelerators, selection is focused on finding 
entrepreneurial teams rather than individual founders (Pauwels et al., 2016). Similarly, our 
findings reveal that sandboxes check applicant’s eligibility at an early stage, considering 
aspects like individual characteristics, concept readiness and having an innovative solution. 
We thus argue that BIs and accelerators and regulatory sandboxes conduct similar selection 
activities. However, we identify important differences. For example, the firm type during 
tenant selection varies – innovative start-ups are often eligible to access incubator and 
accelerator programs (Hausberg and Korreck, 2018), whereas sandboxes often focus on 
selecting a diverse set of ventures including FinTech start-ups, corporates and technology 
firms. Moreover, we found regulators use a case-by-case tailoring approach, which contrasts 
with the more streamlined programs that accelerators provide (Hausberg and Korreck, 2018; 
Pauwels et al., 2016). Sandboxes often have the necessary regulatory power to adapt testing 





accelerators have the authority to grant exemptions or adjust regulatory framework 
conditions (one exception could be specialized BIs and accelerators led by regulatory 
authorities such as the Bank of England [Laidroo and Avarmaa, 2019]). 
Moving forward, we discuss business support during participation. In the case of 
sandboxes, FinTech participants are mainly offered regulatory guidance. For BIs and 
accelerators, regulatory support is primarily accomplished through legal advice services that 
an external network of law firms generally provide (Merrifield, 1987; Pauwels et al., 2016). 
Although specialized lawyers may well be familiar with regulatory frameworks, we argue 
that regulators are more competent regarding regulatory frameworks, possess legal authority 
and are more knowledgeable about technological developments, as they regularly interact 
with market participants. Thus, we assume that regulatory sandboxes have more competence 
in offering regulatory support than BIs and accelerators. 
Further, we observe similarities in both duration and program approach (cohort-based or 
on a rolling basis). Specifically, prior research shows that accelerators often have cohort-
based programs that last six months (Pauwels et al., 2016), whereas incubator programs offer 
ongoing support services for longer (ranging from three to five years) (Bergek and Norrman, 
2008; Hausberg and Korreck, 2018). Comparatively, sandboxes admit applicants using either 
a cohort-based approach or on a rolling basis; they provide validity periods lasting from three 
months to two years with the opportunity to extend. While there are similarities, our findings 
reveal that each incubation model has its own duration period that, we argue, is determined 
by its objective. Specifically, sandboxes encourage tenants to apply for financial licenses 
during the validity period in order to transition to full-fledged, real-world operations once 
their exemptions end. BIs have a similar purpose – they want tenants to become self-
sufficient so they can undertake business development activities after graduation (Rubin et 
al., 2015). However, an important factor that may determine validity periods in sandboxes is 
the discovery of risks during testing that, if not adequately mitigated, may lead to participant 
suspension. In contrast, the incubation literature does not report exit or discontinuation 
policies that focus on consumer risk exposure; the concern here is the risk of business failure 
(e.g., Schwartz, 2009). 
Beside the identified similarities and differences, business support like training, 
mentoring, supervising and access to funding networks are not distinctive features of 
regulatory sandboxes, although there are a few exceptions (e.g., ADGM’s sandbox). 
However, when looking at monitoring, our findings suggest that regulators supervise 





right to impose changes to the agreed-upon parameters due to unforeseen changes. By 
comparison, in BIs and accelerators, monitoring incubatees’ performance is undertaken to 
understand tenant needs in order to develop measures that will facilitate their growth (e.g., 
Hackett and Dilts, 2004). Along these lines, our findings reveal that sandbox models like the 
Global Sandbox, Sandbox Express and Digital Sandbox enable FinTech novelties in a 
distinctive manner (e.g., providing access to international jurisdictions). That said, caution 
must be applied in interpretation, given the lack of longitudinal investigation.   
Finally, we discuss differences in mediation. In this setting, an important role of incubators 
is to act as an intermediary that connects tenants to networks to access resources when they 
lack the required expertise (Bergek and Norrman, 2008). Our findings suggest that regulatory 
sandboxes play a mediating role; however, instead of mediating between sandbox 
participants and external actors to access resources like technical or industry knowledge, 
technology or capital, regulators facilitate access to other regulators either in the home 
country or internationally (FCA, 2019). By contrast, the extant incubation literature does not 
feature studies indicating whether BIs and accelerators collaborate with international 
regulatory authorities in a similar manner. Bergek and Norrman (2008) report that network 
mediation by BIs can either be limited to specific regions or expand to an international scope. 
Based on this discussion, we propose that: 
P2a: Regulatory sandboxes differ from generic BIs and accelerators by providing regulatory 
guidance and mediating access to international jurisdictions.  
5.2.2 Activities of specialized incubation models vs regulatory sandboxes 
Departing from the benefits of specialized incubators (Schwartz and Hornych, 2008), we 
compare our findings with the activities of FinTech-specialized incubation models discussed 
in the literature. 
Starting with specialized facilities, our findings generally do not indicate that sandboxes 
offer access to such facilities. This does not apply to ADGM’s sandbox, which provides 
participants with access to synthetic data for testing and physical facilities such as meeting 
rooms. In contrast, the limited literature discussing FinTech-specific incubation models 
indicates that FinTechs may benefit from mentorship, access to customer bases, knowledge 
of banking regulations and access to financial licenses when partnering with incumbents or 
achieving membership in a corporate BIs (e.g., Hornuf et al., 2020; Sinha, 2017). We further 
argue that neither regulators nor financial banking incubators have the knowledge needed to 
support FinTech participants in the face of complex technological and legal challenges. Put 





accelerators may fall short of regulatory knowledge – banking regulations may not always 
apply to FinTechs, whose novel application of enabling technologies may require different 
regulatory frameworks (Navaretti et al., 2017). In addition, when considering networks, 
regulators and corporate incubation models have access to dissimilar networks, each 
providing different advantages. For example, sandboxes provide access to regulators in 
international jurisdictions. Lastly, as to collaborative engagements among incubatees and 
image effects as additional benefits from sector-specific incubators, our findings regarding 
regulatory sandboxes do not illuminate these aspects; further empirical investigation is 
required to explore how these benefits unfold.  
Overall, when comparing regulatory sandboxes to specialized incubator models that 
largely represent corporate BIs and accelerators in the reviewed literature, our findings lead 
us to argue that FinTechs would benefit from the ability to operate freely in local and 
international jurisdictions independent of a parent company, as in the case with corporate BIs 
and accelerators. Hence, we offer the following proposition: 
P2b: Regulatory sandboxes differ from specialized BIs and accelerators by increasing 
FinTechs’ flexibility to operate and providing FinTech-specific regulatory knowledge. 
Table 3 summarizes the activities of BIs and accelerators and regulatory sandboxes. 
Table 3 
Summary of the compared activities between BIs and accelerators and regulatory sandboxes (compiled by the authors) 
Incubation Model Activities BIs and Accelerators  Regulatory Sandboxes 
Generic (Bergek and Norrman, 2008) 
Selection Selective, dependent on incubator 
focus, organization type and 
incubation model 
Selective, unified eligibility criteria, 
tailoring approach coupled with 
exertion of regulatory powers, 
Business support Training, mentoring, financial 
resources like seed-funding in 
accelerators, progress monitoring 
regulatory guidance and progress 
monitoring 
Mediation Access to networks (e.g., investors) Access to local and non-local 
regulatory networks  
Specialized (Schwartz and Hornych, 2008) 
Specialized facilities  Testing facilities (e.g., testing data)  Testing facilities rarely provided 
(except in ADGM’s case) 
Sector-specific know-how and network Technology and industry knowledge, 
access to industry networks 
Regulatory knowledge, access to 
local and non-local regulators 
5.3 Theoretical implications 
Our key contribution is to advance a novel debate on regulatory sandboxes as support 
organizations and establish an evidence-based foundation in the incubation literature by 
providing explanations in the form of theoretical propositions. Our investigation of 





a management perspective, with most research adopting a legal perspective (e.g., Arner et 
al., 2016; Zetzsche et al., 2017). We use an exploratory approach to understand the activities 
that characterize sandboxes and to explore how these activities differ from those associated 
with other incubation models; this is in line with studies exploring accelerators’ activities 
(e.g., Pauwels et al., 2016) and the benefits of sector-specific BIs on new venture creation 
(e.g., Gazel and Schwienbacher, 2020; Schwartz and Hornych, 2008).  
Our findings support the assumption that sandboxes provide contemporary regulatory 
guidance and facilitate access to testing across international jurisdictions – such activities are 
rare or non-existent in generic and specialized BIs and accelerators (Bergek and Norrman, 
2008; Schwartz and Hornych, 2008). Additionally, we found that the tailoring approach and 
regulatory powers were central prior to participation, supporting regulators in their efforts to 
proactively protect financial markets against systemic risks. Once granted access to license-
free testing (participating), ongoing conversations among regulators and sandbox 
participants were depicted as conducive to exchanging regulatory and technological 
knowledge. Moreover, our findings related to detaching reflected a risk-based rather than 
innovation-based approach; although this might be imperative to contain risks, it could limit 
the testing bandwidth for FinTech innovations. Finally, a source of value creation, improving 
connectedness, resembled regulatory jurisdictions’ efforts in innovating sandbox models, 
either establishing new models like the Global Sandbox or improving existing ones. These 
findings are an impetus to more scientific research that investigates regulatory sandboxes’ 
impact on fostering novelties.  
Beyond the incubation literature, this study contributes to the entrepreneurial finance 
literature that has recently begun debating the role of new players, such as incubation models, 
in assisting FinTechs raise capital (Block et al., 2018). Within this literature stream, 
regulatory sandboxes have a positive influence on sandbox participants’ ability to access 
capital, as regulatory costs and uncertainty are reduced (compared to FinTechs that do not 
access sandboxes) (Alaassar et al., 2020; Cornelli et al., 2020; Goo and Heo, 2020). We thus 
contribute to this growing stream of studies by elucidating how regulatory sandboxes 
fundamentally operate and provide regulatory guidance. Similarly, implications can be 
drawn for research discussing the influence of sandboxes on FinTech ecosystems (e.g., 
Buckley et al., 2020; Mention 2019). Our study provides insights relevant to the spatial 






Other important contributions we make include using the activity system framework (Zott 
and Amit, 2010) to explore novel incubation models, following seminal investigations by 
Pauwels et al. (2016). In doing so, we respond to calls by incubation scholars to employ 
theoretically based approaches when investigating incubation models’ activities (Bruneel et 
al., 2012). We employed the activity system framework to investigate the value-creating 
activities of regulatory sandboxes and to identify value-creation drivers that emerge from the 
studied cases. By using this theoretical framework, we also contribute to the broader FinTech 
phenomenon that remains under-theorized and lacking in sufficient scholarly attention 
(Gimpel et al., 2018; Puschmann, 2017). Moreover, through this lens, we extend the scholarly 
understanding of regulatory intervention, building on recent FinTech studies that confirm 
supportive regulatory initiatives have a positive impact on firm formation (Haddad and 
Hornuf, 2019). 
5.4 Implications for practice 
Our research has important implications for different stakeholders on the FinTech scene, 
particularly regulators, policy-makers and innovators. Through this study, we inform 
regulators with established regulatory sandboxes about the similarities inherent in the 
activities of regulatory sandboxes, BIs and accelerators. This can help regulators develop 
more effective supervisory approaches by sourcing evidence-based knowledge from the 
established incubation literature stream. Additionally, we shed light on the presence of a 
predominant risk-based approach that may impede innovation testing – a more balanced 
approach could be devised to grant FinTechs flexible testing conditions. Active risk-gauging 
and innovation-friendlier thresholds would then be necessary. This is crucial to help 
regulators in their quest to offer effective support for novelties. As for regulatory authorities 
that are considering setting up a regulatory sandbox or improving established sandboxes, we 
provide a starting point that details the main activities undertaken by the world’s most 
developed sandboxes. We also present a value creation driver that regulators employ. 
Introducing regulatory sandboxes to these jurisdictions can reduce the technology–regulation 
(knowledge) lag and help regulators to safeguard their financial markets.  
From a policy perspective, this study is important, given the emergence of FinTechs and 
the need to find more effective regulatory approaches while ensuring the existence of 
business environments that are conducive to attracting FinTech ventures. Specifically, the 
identified differences in activities between sandboxes and incubation models (e.g., providing 
regulatory guidance, mediating access to international jurisdictions and increasing FinTechs’ 





environments for FinTechs. Our study informs policy-makers about the diversity in sandbox 
models arising from differences in their mandates and the need for this support instrument, 
with its unique service offering that contrasts with other incubation model services. Policy-
makers in jurisdictions with established sandboxes would also benefit from the provided 
insights, better equipping them to formulate or amend risk protection and innovation support 
policies.  
Finally, we inform FinTech innovators about the opportunities that sandboxes can offer, 
which include receiving regulatory guidance and access to testing opportunities across 
international jurisdictions. Additionally, regulatory sandboxes allow FinTech start-ups to 
avoid having to partner with banks simply to obtain financial licensing, as they can test and 
validate their solutions without a license and thus have a better chance of raising capital and 
attracting investors during the validity period. Hence, this study informs FinTechs about the 
flexibility of operating freely without committing to larger organizations when accessing 
regulatory sandboxes. More broadly, the design elements detail the activities conducted in 
sandboxes, giving FinTech newcomers an easy introduction to regulators’ requirements from 
initial conversations to final reporting. 
6 Conclusions 
Regulatory sandboxes play an important role in stimulating entrepreneurial and innovative 
activity among FinTechs. However, previous research on this novel support instrument 
provides limited insight into its activities. Hence, we explored the activities that characterize 
regulatory sandboxes in order to discuss how these instruments differ compared to generic 
and specialized BIs and accelerators. Initially, our findings suggested that regulatory 
sandboxes operated in a similar manner. However, when investigating the nature of sandbox 
activities, we found differences that resembled in providing regulatory guidance, facilitating 
testing across international jurisdictions and offering FinTechs flexibility to operate in 
financial markets. On this basis, we have derived a set of theoretical propositions to guide 
future research exploring incubation models, including regulatory sandboxes.  
6.1 Limitations and future research 
No research is without limitations. In this final section, we suggest a future research 
agenda to extend the scholarship on regulatory sandboxes. In addition to the following 
suggestions, the propositions we put forward serve as a promising basis for future research. 
First, the empirical part of this paper is based on archival data sourced from webpages. 
Although this approach offers advantages like accessibility to documents from multiple 





examples. This limitation provides opportunities for future scholarly work to collect primary 
data that is richer and focuses on practical experiences. Second, our sample was restricted to 
five leading regulatory sandboxes established in 2016. With the rapid increase in the number 
of sandboxes, we encourage future research to expand the sample size under investigation. 
Our findings revealed distinct regulatory sandbox models, allowing future investigations to 
focus on certain models rather than analyzing a heterogenous sample. Third, we explored 
sandboxes from the perspective of regulators, as the sample comprised documents issued by 
regulatory officials. To gain a deeper understanding of the incubation model of regulatory 
sandboxes, we urge future research to conduct a multi-perspective analysis, using our 
propositions as a starting point. Lastly, there is abundant room for future research to link the 
study of regulatory sandboxes to other streams beyond the incubation literature stream – for 
instance, to managing innovation collaborations or networks. 
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Exploring how social interactions influence regulators and innovators: The case of 
regulatory sandboxes 
Ahmad Alaassar, Anne-Laure Mention, Tor Helge Aas 
Abstract Like incubators, regulatory sandboxes constitute a prominent mechanism to enable 
entrepreneurial activities that guide financial technology (FinTech) firms through regulatory 
frameworks in the financial industry. Because they are new, there is a lack of research on 
regulatory sandboxes; most studies have investigated legal aspects while overlooking the 
management perspective. To address this gap, this paper builds on incubation research 
studies to explore how social interactions within regulatory sandboxes influence the practices 
of regulators and regulatees, using social capital theory. An exploratory-abductive approach 
is adopted, using data collected from 16 semi-structured interviews. The findings indicate 
that regulator-regulatee social interactions increase the legitimacy, risk management 
capabilities, and knowledge of regulatory frameworks among regulatees and, as to regulators, 
increase their understanding of regulatory constraints and potential risks in enabling 
technologies, better inform them of regulatees’ support needs, and offer them early access to 
regulatory innovations. The findings also reveal that the practices of regulators and regulatees 
may be negatively affected due to lowered trust and discrepancies in expectations and 
underlying goals. This research contributes to the incubation literature by focusing on the 
micro and meso levels of knowledge exchange and the entrepreneurial finance literature by 
promoting the role of incubation models. 
Keywords Financial technology (FinTech); Regulatory sandbox; Regulator-regulatee social 
interaction; Incubation model; Entrepreneurial finance 
1 Introduction 
As enabling technologies like artificial intelligence, blockchain, and Big Data analytics 
have revolutionized industries including financial markets (e.g., Diaz-Rainey et al., 2015; 
Palmié et al., 2019), debates on the role of new players in supporting entrepreneurial financial 
technology (FinTech) firms in raising capital have emerged (Block et al., 2018). For instance, 
one stream of research has focused on investigating the influence of regulation on both 
traditional (e.g., Cumming and Schwienbacher, 2018) and non-traditional funding forms 
(e.g., Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017). Notably, non-traditional financing alternatives like 





existing banking regulations (Navaretti et al., 2017), giving rise to legal issues and the need 
for regulatory change (Cumming, Johan, & Pant, 2019). In addition, attributable regulatory 
challenges appear to be barriers for FinTech firms due to the high cost of compliance and the 
consequences of non-compliance, a lack of regulatory knowledge, and legal uncertainty 
(Arner et al., 2015; Appaya and Jenik, 2019; Haddad and Hornuf, 2019; IOSCO, 2017; 
UNSGSA et al., 2019; Zilgalvis, 2014). As a result of these challenges, regulators have noted 
the urgent need to find new approaches to regulate financial markets and promote innovation 
(Jenik and Lauer, 2017). Among different safeguards, this study focuses on regulatory 
sandboxes as both a support and a policy instrument (Borrás and Edquist, 2013) adopted by 
regulators to stimulate innovation and competition while achieving broader goals like the 
stability of financial markets. Fundamentally, regulatory sandboxes grant licensing 
exemptions to participants so that they can test their solutions for a set period of time, subject 
to conditions imposed by regulators in each jurisdiction (Arner et al., 2016; Zetzsche et al., 
2017). 
Zetzsche et al. (2017) claim that regulatory sandboxes promote bi-directional knowledge 
exchange between regulators and market participants; it is through interactions with 
innovators that regulatory frameworks become more resilient and informed about financial 
market dynamics (Bromberg et al., 2017). In the present study, social interaction is described 
as a required mechanism for resource and knowledge transfer (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). 
From a regulator’s perspective, sandboxes provide an opportunity to test and learn how 
different regulatory practices influence participants (Arner et al., 2017), while participating 
innovators gain a greater “understanding of regulatory and supervisory expectations” (ESA, 
2019, p. 5). These findings indicate that regulatory sandboxes influence both regulation and 
innovation. However, considering the novel nature of this instrument, there is lack of in-depth 
academic and non-academic management research on policy instruments (Martin, 2016), 
which may be due to the ad hoc nature of policy intervention (Patanakul and Pinto, 2014). 
Innovation management research has rarely investigated aspects of technological 
transformation in capital markets (Diaz-Rainey et al., 2015). We thus know little about how 
social interactions among regulators and innovators participating in regulatory sandboxes 
influence practices of regulators or regulatees. Accordingly, we still lack evidence regarding 
how sandboxes may enable FinTech firms in the entrepreneurial finance setting. To help 
address these gaps, we focus our research on the incubation stage—defined as a validation 
process to test developed ideas in the marketplace—instead of idea generation or scaling 
(O’Reilly and Binns, 2019) to conduct a qualitative study that systematically explores 





This problem is important to investigate for the following reasons. First, fundraising for 
entrepreneurial ventures is gaining greater attention among policymakers at different levels 
(Block et al., 2018). Internationally, bans on novel fundraising forms like initial coin 
offerings (ICOs) cause spillover effects that hamper the diffusion of ICOs across countries, 
as financial trade inherently crosses borders, thus requiring an orchestrated regulatory 
approach (Bellavatis et al., 2019). Second, the economic impact of the FinTech phenomenon 
is growing significantly, with FinTech providers already having seized one-third of total 
banking revenues globally (Accenture, 2018). Third, FinTech initiatives and opportunities 
are continuously growing, and there is a pressing need for regulators to develop effective 
approaches like regulatory sandboxes to stimulate innovation while still ensuring financial 
market stability. Over 50 regulatory authorities worldwide have either established or 
announced a regulatory sandbox (see the overview in UNSGSA et al., 2019). Along these 
lines, regulators have started to modify current sandbox models, offering additional programs 
or changing current practices. For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has 
recently launched Sandbox Express, while the Global Sandbox initiative is undergoing a 
cross-border pilot phase with eight FinTech participants (FCA, 2019a; MAS, 2019). Finally, 
neither regulators nor innovators necessarily know how FinTech innovations can comply 
with regulations in a heavily regulated industry; there is thus a need for a collaborative 
platform that facilitates experimentation and knowledge exchange regarding new solutions 
that comply with regulatory frameworks. We ground the importance of this study in these 
reasons, emphasizing the lack of knowledge on how regulatory sandboxes function in 
different contexts, how the relevant actors interact, how such social interactions influence 
innovation and regulation, and whether sandboxes deliver on the promise of fostering 
innovation.  
Regulatory sandboxes as support instruments share similar objectives with incubation 
models like business incubators and accelerators, such as promoting innovative businesses 
through the provision of support services, and are currently being debated as new players in 
the entrepreneurial finance literature (Block et al., 2018). This study builds on the extant 
incubation literature, an emerging stream that investigates the role of support institutions and 
individual actors in the technology transfer process at the micro and meso levels 
(Cunningham and O'Reilly, 2018; Tsai et al., 2009). Specifically, we connect this research to 
conversations investigating the outcome of different interaction activities on enabling 
successful incubation (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi, 2005; Díez-Vial and Montoro-Sánchez, 2016; 
Patton, 2014; Peters et al., 2004; Rice, 2002; Rubin et al., 2015; Scillitoe and Chakrabarti, 





examine the influence of interactions among start-ups and incubator managers that enable 
knowledge sharing on business and technical support for new ventures. Similarly, Rubin et 
al. (2015) explore knowledge sharing among different incubator stakeholders, while Peters 
et al. (2004) investigate the impact of interactions on the incubation process from the 
perspective of incubator managers. These studies all find that incubator-incubatee 
interactions have a profound impact on the success of the incubation process by improving 
incubator practices and tenants’ knowledge or capabilities. However, findings from 
incubation studies may not be readily transferable to the sandbox context due to its distinctive 
characteristics, including the fundamental role of regulators in protecting the stability of 
financial markets. The underlying question in the present study is thus whether regulator-
regulatee social interactions can yield similar impacts in the context of regulatory sandboxes.  
The objective of this study is to explore the following research question: How can 
regulator-regulatee social interactions influence practices of regulators and regulatees? To 
answer it, we use social capital theory (SCT) as a lens to understand regulator-regulatee 
interactions, mainly because knowledge transfer requires social interaction (Inkpen and 
Tsang, 2005; Zahra et al., 2000). With this study, we contribute to the incubation research 
stream by extending existing conversations on the influence of social interactions on 
entrepreneurial and innovative activities through theoretical propositions, offering 
opportunities for future research and implications for regulators and practitioners. Moreover, 
this study contributes to our understanding of novel technology transfer mechanisms such as 
regulatory sandboxes and the role of individual actors like regulators in facilitating those 
processes (Cunningham and O'Reilly, 2018). We thus extend contributions to recent studies 
in the entrepreneurial finance literature (e.g., Block et al., 2018; Cumming, Deloof et al., 
2019) that highlight the growing importance of incubation models in bridging start-ups with 
funding sources. We also contribute to the FinTech literature, which has been criticized for 
being under-theorized, by discussing our findings in relation to SCT (Gai et al., 2018; Gimpel 
et al., 2018; Puschmann, 2017). 
The paper begins by defining the FinTech phenomenon and regulatory sandboxes, 
followed by reviewing the relationship between regulation and innovation. We then review 
the literature on interaction activities in incubation studies and justify the use of our 
theoretical lens. A description of the qualitative research method is provided before we 
present the empirical findings and discuss them in relation to the theoretical lens. Finally, 
concluding remarks are presented, along with the main implications for research and practice, 





2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 The FinTech phenomenon and regulatory sandboxes 
The present study understands FinTech as “technology-enabled innovation in financial 
services that could result in new business models, applications, processes or products with 
an associated material effect on the provision of financial services” (FSB, 2017, p. 7). While 
the use of technologies to provide financial services is hardly new, recent FinTech 
developments after the global financial crisis in 2008 are characterized by the use of enabling 
technologies by newcomers and by new services offered in both developed and developing 
markets (see an overview by Arner et al., 2017; Palmié et al., 2019). Gomber et al. (2017) 
propose a three-dimensional framework for synthesizing the FinTech literature. The first 
dimension represents business functions that include business-to-business and business-to-
consumer models offering financial services across industries such as financing and 
insurance. FinTech firms can be divided into six solution areas: payment, wealth 
management, crowdfunding, lending, capital market, and insurance (Lee and Shin, 2018). 
The second dimension refers to enabling technologies like blockchain and artificial 
intelligence that support operational elements. The third dimension highlights firm types and 
encompasses start-ups, technology firms, and traditional banking institutions (Gomber et al., 
2017). 
Prior research has discussed the emergence of the financial service sector as resulting from 
the integration of disruptive technologies, indicating a more proactive role for regulators due 
to the increase in market participants and the need to find more effective regulatory 
approaches (Arner et al., 2017). Among the approaches commonly adopted by regulatory 
authorities, regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs have gained the most attention 
(Appaya and Jenik, 2019; Arner et al., 2017; ESA, 2019). This engagement challenges the 
conventional role of government in fostering entrepreneurial activity (Doblinger et al., 2019). 
We narrow this study to focus on regulatory sandboxes, given the attention they have 
received and their rapid growth from their establishment in the UK in 2016 to more than 50 
regulatory authorities that either operate or have announced a regulatory sandbox (FCA, 
2017; UNSGSA et al., 2019). Regulatory sandboxes are novel types of customized support 
and policy instruments that provide eligible FinTech market participants, including start-ups, 
technology firms, and incumbents, with licensing exemptions to allow business model 
experimentation without exhausting firm resources (Teigland et al., 2018). These instruments 
are often initiated and operated by a government’s executive branch, with a regulatory or 





public consultation to engage ecosystem stakeholders, with regulators welcoming feedback 
from the public (FCA, 2015). The literature distinguishes between three types of innovation 
policy instruments: regulatory, economic and financial, and soft instruments (see the 
overview by Borrás and Edquist, 2013). Thus, we may claim that regulatory sandboxes are 
purposive regulatory instruments that have the ultimate purpose of protecting consumers 
from potential risks and financial markets from systemic risks (Borrás and Edquist, 2013; 
Magnuson, 2018) while protecting sandbox participants against financial losses arising from 
violating protections laws (Lee and Shin, 2018).  
Although regulatory sandboxes have gained attention among financial market 
participants, what a regulatory sandbox is and what can be achieved during participation are 
open questions. In a recent report, after three years of operating a regulatory sandbox, De 
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) state 
that participants might have the misconception that regulatory sandboxes offer a legal free 
experimental space, which may cause confusion among market participants (DNB and AFM, 
2019). Additionally, a survey by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the 
World Bank Group report that a lack of human resources and technical knowledge were the 
greatest constraining factors preventing regulators from promoting innovation in financial 
markets, even as some jurisdictions had committed substantial human resources to operate 
regulatory sandboxes (Appaya and Jenik, 2019). Furthermore, when enabling technologies 
are applied in novel ways like cryptocurrency payments, regulators openly state that 
supervisory rules can be unclear for both participants and regulators (DNB and AFM, 2019). 
These limitations may explain why jurisdictions like Singapore (three sandbox participants) 
and Australia (seven) have lower numbers. Notably, despite low participation and 
acknowledged drawbacks, regulatory authorities in developed economies have not given up; 
rather, they have made improvements to attract more applicants. For instance, MAS launched 
the Sandbox Express to streamline the application process. An estimate of 522 market 
participants applied to sandboxes around the globe, with 200 being accepted (Appaya and 
Jenik, 2019). Despite the increasing importance of these instruments from the perspective of 
regulators and market participants, this phenomenon has remained largely ignored among 
researchers, particularly in management research. 
2.2 Relationship between regulation and innovation 
This section reviews what we know about the relationship between regulation and the 
management of innovation in financial services. This is important to consider because 





financial institutions through the innovative application of enabling technologies. However, 
as financial markets are highly regulated, the role of regulators is more prominent than in 
other sectors, requiring regulatory authorities to strengthen their understanding of FinTech-
related technologies to facilitate innovation instead of impeding it (Mention, 2019). In 
addition to having regulators reconsider their governing mechanisms, market participants 
need to operate and comply with regulatory frameworks in novel ways (Milian et al., 2019). 
Hence, technological transformation cannot be viewed in isolation from regulation, which 
can either enable or impede change in capital markets (Diaz-Rainey et al., 2015). 
Several studies have focused on regulatory changes in financial markets due to increased 
FinTech participation (Mazzucato, 2013; Ng and Tang, 2016; Tapiero, 2014; Weihuan et al., 
2015). For example, Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) explore the impact of securities 
regulation on crowdfunding in different jurisdictions, arguing that leaner and better tailored 
regulations are required to support equity crowdfunding, which affects the creation and 
growth of small businesses. All these studies attest to the positive influence of regulatory 
practices on innovative activities (Patanakul and Pinto, 2014). Haddad and Hornuf (2019), 
for example, confirm that regulations in the form of compliance and administrative burdens 
have a significant impact on the growth of entrepreneurial FinTech firms. However, 
regulatory intervention can have a negative impact on innovation by inhibiting productivity 
or market entry (Cumming and Schwienbacher, 2018; Patanakul and Pinto, 2014).  
In the same manner that regulatory intervention influences innovative activity, the 
potential influence of FinTech innovators on regulators has also been discussed (Arner et al., 
2017; Zetzsche et al., 2017). Specifically, regulators can acquire knowledge of different 
business models and gain a better understanding of technological elements (Zetzsche et al., 
2017). This knowledge can facilitate changes to regulatory policies (FCA, 2017). Regulators’ 
engagement with FinTech innovators provides insights into the complex risks, key 
opportunities, and current and future challenges associated with FinTech innovations (ESA, 
2019). These findings imply that innovators influence regulators, which in turn leads to 
changes in regulatory mechanisms. The main barriers hindering regulators from offering 
sufficient support to innovation were identified as a lack of human resources, regulatory 
constraints, and gaps in technical knowledge (Appaya and Jenik, 2019). We thus argue that 
innovators can influence regulators’ technical knowledge and improve their ability to 
respond to innovation. However, there is currently no systematic evidence in the literature 
that provides detailed insight into how regulatory practices change as a result of social 
interactions with FinTech innovators—or vice versa—which is what we explore in this 





2.3 Interaction in incubation studies 
Business incubators commonly share the purpose of promoting new firm creation, 
entrepreneurship, and innovation (Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Theodoraki et al., 2018). They 
“have become a popular policy option and economic development intervention tool” 
(Lasrado et al., 2016, p. 205) and have recently been recognized as new players in the 
entrepreneurial finance arena, apart from venture capitalists or business angles, by providing 
support in the form of access to networks or other value-added services (e.g., Block et al., 
2018; Cumming, Werth, & Zhang, 2019). Prior incubation literature emphasizes the 
prominent role of social interaction to promote successful incubation (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi, 
2005; Díez-Vial and Montoro-Sánchez, 2016; Patton, 2014; Rice, 2002; Rubin et al., 2015; 
Scillitoe and Chakrabarti, 2010).  
Incubation studies have not only investigated interactions among incubator staff and 
tenants but have also extended the discussion to include a diverse set of stakeholders in 
different networks, including interactions between universities and industry (Alexander et 
al., 2018; Santoro and Chakrabarti, 2002), universities and start-ups (van Stijn et al., 2018), 
and universities and spinoffs (Soetanto and van Geenhuizen, 2019). Such interactions 
provide access to tangible and intangible resources like physical, social, and financial capital, 
knowledge, and legitimacy (van Weele et al., 2017). Along similar lines, studies have 
employed the construct of engagement to represent access to resources in dyadic settings 
(Perkmann et al., 2013).  
The extant literature provides evidence on the influence of interactions. For instance, using 
the theoretical lens of absorptive capacity and a social network approach, Díez-Vial and 
Montoro-Sánchez (2016) examine how ties among research centers and co-located firms 
influence innovative activity in science parks and confirm that knowledge sharing among 
these actors significantly promotes firms’ innovative capability. Specifically, they find that 
formal and informal interactions contribute to creating a trust-based environment in which 
partnerships evolve to foster knowledge sharing. In a similar study using absorptive capacity 
theory to look at university incubators, Patton (2014) explores incubator-incubatee 
interactions to assess their influence on founders’ knowledge acquisition; his findings 
confirm that such interactions enable iterative dialogue which subsequently stimulates 
absorptive capacity. In another stream of research that employs SCT, Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi 
(2005) explore mechanisms that facilitate networking in “network incubators” as novel 





is an underlying mechanism between individuals and agents in network incubators in 
enabling networking and cooperative interactions (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi, 2005).  
We thus find in the literature widespread agreement on the influence of interaction among 
incubators and tenants in different incubation models. The construct of social interaction is 
selected as an appropriate lens to explore activities that occur in regulatory sandboxes on the 
basis of findings that propose sandboxes as a testing arena for regulators and innovators 
(Arner et al., 2017) that allows those involved to exchange knowledge (Zetzsche et al., 2017). 
Other fields of study, such as organizational learning, also confirm the positive influence of 
regulator-regulatee interactions, suggesting that they allow “regulators and organizations to 
exchange knowledge and information regarding best practices within the industry, discuss 
potential refinements to operating procedures, and collectively diagnose and troubleshoot 
problems within organizational routines” (Desai, 2016, p. 639). Specific to incubation 
studies, Peters et al. (2004) investigate tenants’ influence on the incubation process, reporting 
that incubator managers learn about the needs of their tenants through interaction, enabling 
them to redesign their processes and incubation services appropriately. 
In the incubation literature, despite some research that examines industry-specific business 
accelerators focused on financial markets (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2016), there is a lack of 
management research that explores social interactions with actors like public agencies, 
investors, and larger organizations (Baraldi and Havenvid, 2016). Pauwels et al.'s (2016) 
investigation of the incubation model of accelerators in Europe includes a single FinTech 
support instrument (the FinTech Innovation Lab) in its sample of 13 accelerators. However, 
that accelerator is driven by an industry actor and is thus a poor comparison for publicly led 
regulatory sandboxes. On this basis, we argue that existing evidence on interaction activities 
in incubation studies provides only limited insights due to the distinctive characteristics of 
regulatory sandboxes, such as the role of regulators to monitor and enable innovation, being 
governed by regulatory authorities, offering licensing reliefs, and regulatory support, and 
other contextual factors that have different levels of influence on regulator-regulatee social 
interactions.  
2.4 Regulator-regulatee social interactions  
For this study, we conceptualize regulator-regulatee social interactions as an enabling 
activity among regulators and sandbox participants that affects both groups and their 
practices (Nonaka, 1994; Zott and Amit, 2010). Regulators’ practices include the assessing, 
monitoring, and supervising that are undertaken during social interactions with regulatees or 





knowledge and understanding of enabling technologies. To support this view, we find 
evidence that a lack of technical knowledge is a barrier for regulators in effectively 
supporting innovation (Appaya and Jenik, 2019). In addition, we have found that regulatory 
sandbox initiatives have evolved since their establishment as a result of lessons learned 
(FCA, 2017), which has led to the enhancement of regulatory sandboxes in several 
jurisdictions including Abu Dhabi’s Digital Sandbox and Singapore’s Sandbox Express 
(Duff, 2019). We may argue that these changes have occurred due to regulator-regulatee 
social interactions that have improved regulators’ practices. For the second construct, we 
define practices of regulatees as testing and validation activities of financial solutions in 
which FinTech innovators engage with domestic or international regulators to develop 
innovative and legally compliant solutions in the context of regulatory sandboxes. As a result 
of regulator-regulatee social interactions, we may argue that sandbox participants develop 
their knowledge and capability base. 
2.5 Theoretical lens for understanding regulator-regulatee interactions 
To gain a deeper understanding of regulator-regulatee social interactions and support our 
discussion section, this paper employs SCT. This theoretical lens is selected given that social 
capital, understood as a set of relationships for a network actor, “plays a critical role in the 
transfer and exchange of network knowledge” (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005, p. 154) across 
different analytical levels, including the individual, the organization, and the broader society 
(Eveleens et al., 2017). More importantly, empirical evidence suggests that knowledge 
transfer is facilitated by social interaction (e.g., Zahra et al., 2000). Another reason for 
selecting this lens is that social capital has been identified in incubation studies as an 
important intangible form of capital that gives access to knowledge sources; however, there 
is limited knowledge of the social aspects of incubation (Scillitoe and Chakrabarti, 2010; 
Tötterman and Sten, 2005). Nonetheless, SCT is commonly applied to investigate the impact 
of social capital dimensions in other relevant settings like university-industry collaboration 
(Al-Tabbaa and Ankrah, 2016; Grzegorczyk, 2019) and enablers of innovation capabilities 
(Camps and Marques, 2014). 
The underlying assumption in SCT is that network connections provide access to 
resources encompassing three main dimensions: structural, relational, and cognitive (Inkpen 
and Tsang, 2005; Lee, 2009; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), thus contributing to the actor’s 
knowledge, value creation, and performance (Eveleens et al., 2017; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). 
The structural dimension refers to the position of an actor in a network characterized by 





contact, and hierarchy. The relational dimension reflects normative behaviors and includes 
aspects like trust, norms, obligations, and expectations to guide network connections. 
Establishing norms and building trust-based relationships are important factors in creating a 
conducive environment for collaboration and knowledge exchange. Finally, the cognitive 
dimension relates to the communication context and includes shared goals, culture, language, 
and codes. This includes having a common understanding of desired outcomes, beliefs, and 
narratives of best practices, along with sharing knowledge through common language and 
codes (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Lee, 2009; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The cognitive 
dimension thus promotes value creation by enhancing knowledge transfer and firm 
capabilities among network actors (Theodoraki et al., 2018).  
Building on Inkpen and Tsang's (2005) conceptualization of social interactions as a locus 
for knowledge exchange, this study empirically explores the underlying role of network 
knowledge transfer in changing the practices of regulators and regulatees as outcomes. To 
achieve this, we employ the three dimensions of SCT: structural, relational, and cognitive. 
Figure 1 outlines our preliminary analytical framework that guides this study. 
 
Figure 1: Preliminary analytical framework.  
3 Research Design 
We adopted a qualitative research design in the form of an exploratory-abductive 
approach (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Dubois and Gadde 2014) to develop new explanations 
through theoretical propositions. This approach was selected as it is well-suited to study a 
new phenomenon with limited academic knowledge and to discover new theoretical 
relationships (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
3.1 Sampling  
A purposive sampling procedure was applied to recruit participants associated with 
regulatory sandboxes in different locations (Patton, 1990). We aimed to sample (1) 
regulatory sandboxes that were operating and had at least one participant, whether currently 
enrolled or graduated, and (2) sandbox participants that were either engaged in a sandbox 





criteria were used to determine the suitability of regulatory sandboxes, regulators, and 
sandbox participants based on information provided on regulatory sandbox webpages. A 
total of 15 regulatory sandboxes were identified as relevant, including the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), MAS, Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority (HKMA), and Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). All the regulators 
identified were contacted using the email addresses provided on their websites. Of the 
regulatory authorities we contacted, nine responded to seek additional information. 
Following several email correspondences and in some cases multiple phone calls, six 
regulators from five jurisdictions agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, one financial 
specialist from a global observer organization actively involved in the regulatory sandbox 
scene agreed to participate. In general, the interviewees were proposed by the regulatory 
authorities and had different roles; Table 1 outlines the interviewed regulators. 
 Role of Informant  Participant Code Regulatory Jurisdiction Launch Year of 
Sandbox 
1 Financial Specialist R-1 North America -* 
2 Regulator R-2 North America 2017 
3 Senior Regulator R-3 Europe 2017 
4 Senior Regulator R-4 Oceania 2016 
5 Executive Director R-5 Europe 2018 
6 Senior Manager R-6 Asia (MENA) 2017 
7 FinTech Specialist  R-7 Asia (MENA) 2017 
*Global observatory organization; MENA: Middle East and North Africa 
Table 1: Description of Regulators. 
As for sandbox participants, most regulators provide the names of participating firms on 
their websites. Using this as a starting point, LinkedIn searches and profile screening were 
undertaken to identify and contact informants who met the selection criteria. Additionally, 
we manually searched for informants with roles like (co-)founders, CEOs, and compliance 
managers of firms participating in sandboxes: start-ups, technology firms, and financial 
institutions. A total of 87 sandbox participants were contacted through LinkedIn’s mailing 
feature; further communication was made through personal email with 22 sandbox 
participants who expressed interest and requested additional details. Eventually, nine 
informants agreed to participate, with the remainder either declining due to limited capacity 
or failing to reply further. In sum, the selection approach led to interviews between November 
2018 and September 2019 with 16 participants (9 regulates, 6 regulators, and a single 
financial specialist) residing on 4 continents and associated with 11 regulatory jurisdictions. 












Phase in Sandbox 
1 Founder and Policy Manager SP-1 Insurance   Europe Operation 
2 CEO and Co-founder SP-2 Payment Europe Graduated 
3 Executive Manager SP-3 Payment Asia (MENA) Operation 
4 CEO and Founder SP-4 Insurance Europe Graduated 
5 CEO and Founder SP-5 Insurance Asia Operation 
6 Director of Regulatory and Policy SP-6 Other – identity Europe Graduated 
7 CEO SP-7 Lending  Europe Operation 
8 Head of Compliance SP-8 Payment Asia Graduated 
9 Vice President Operations SP-9 Capital market North America Operation 
Table 2: Description of Regulatees (sandbox participants).  
3.2 Data Collection 
For data collection, the interviews followed a semi-structured format, conducted via 
Skype calls (6 of 16 were video calls) that lasted approximately 40–60 minutes each and 
were recorded. All interviews were conducted in English, with transcripts developed from 
the recordings. Since different stakeholders were involved, the pre-defined set of open-ended 
questions was adapted to explore experiences from the perspectives of both regulators and 
regulatees. In general, the questions focused on understanding the nature, purpose, and 
frequency of the social interactions that occur at different stages and how such interactions 
have influenced practices of either regulators or regulatees or both. These stages begin with 
social interactions prior to testing, interactions during testing, and interactions after 
graduation from the sandbox. The interview guides for both regulators and sandbox 
participants are attached in Appendix B.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
For data analysis, we followed the Gioia method in part; in its original form, it provides a 
two-step process of systematic reduction of categories with 1st order concepts and 2nd order 
themes that are more abstract, followed by aggregated dimensions (Gioia et al., 2013). 
However, since this study adopts an abductive rather than an inductive approach—informing 
us about prior research while relying on a theoretical framework to guide further analysis—
we inverted the data analysis procedure described by Gioia et al. (2013) to begin with the 
SCT dimensions. However, the abductive approach, unlike deductive and inductive 
reasoning, facilitates the process of systematic combining that requires the researcher to 
alternate between the empirical reality, literature, and theoretical framework (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002; Dubois and Gadde, 2014). Thus, using the SCT as a lens for analysis, we began 
by considering whether relevant theoretical concepts commonly related to the structural, 





the coded data to provide a certain level of understanding. This represents the first round of 
coding (1st order concepts), a continuous process that varied throughout data analysis. For 
the second round of coding that resulted in 2nd order themes, we coded emergent themes from 
the interview data to create new categories, while shifting between the data, theoretical 
framework, and analysis (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). As we progressed through the data, 
more patterns were identified, and categories were distilled. Further, we refined the last set 
of categories, labelling them with terms based primarily on theoretical constructs from SCT. 
Accordingly, we continually evaluated whether the categories acquired could be related to 
theoretical concepts that are either nascent or well-established in the SCT literature. In a final 
procedure, we cross-referenced the theoretical concepts against the SCT dimensions, which 
were also labelled aggregate dimensions (Gioia et al., 2013). Triangulation was achieved by 
analyzing multiple perspectives (Patton, 1990). NVivo 12 was used to facilitate the analytical 
procedure (Gaur and Kumar, 2018).  
4 Findings and Discussion 
In this section, we present the key findings that emerged from the analyzed data in the 
context of regulatory sandboxes. We further discuss the research question—How can 
regulator-regulatee social interactions influence practices of regulators and regulatees?—with 
respect to the SCT dimensions. Based on this discussion, theoretical propositions are offered 
as suggestions for future research. Figure 2 illustrates the data structure that was established 
from the analysis. Also attached in Appendix A is a table that outlines the concepts and 
themes, supported by illustrative quotes that emerged from the data analysis.  
4.1 Structural Dimension 
4.1.1 Network ties 
In regard to how actors are related in the networks explored, two categories emerged from 
the interview data: i) regulatees’ and regulators’ partnerships and ii) regulator-regulatees’ 
follow-up post sandbox exit.  
For the first category, our findings indicated that regulatees have access to either formal 
or informal networks to obtain information or access to specific resources. These networks 
are established for a variety of purposes, including partnering to strengthen operational 
aspects or service base, community engagement, and establishing ties with the regulators. 
We also found evidence that regulators can either directly or indirectly influence regulatees’ 
network ties. Directly, this is reported to happen through email introductions to cross-border 





releases or when regulators showcase a sandbox participant as a case study during 
presentations to external audiences, all of which attracts more investors and facilitates access 
to other network ties. The following quote supports this finding: “By being in a sandbox, 
investors look at us in a friendlier way as it provides some assurance and guidance which 
helps with the fundraising process and reassures customers of the quality of our offering, 
hence having the ‘stamp of approval,’ from the regulator” (Sandbox participant [SP]-4). 
Theoretically, these findings reflect how social capital established in the regulatory sandbox 
context can help regulatees access external networks because they appear more trustworthy, 
thus reducing network entry barriers and influencing the order of social exchange (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). These findings accord with those observed in the existing incubation 
literature, which indicate that incubators provide intangible resources like added legitimacy 
(Bruneel et al., 2012; Tötterman and Sten, 2005). Hence, with respect to the regulatory 
sandbox context, these findings deepen our understanding of how regulators support sandbox 
participants in their validation efforts as they gain legitimacy and acceptance, making them 
more attractive for both investors and consumers. This is particularly important for certain 
types of FinTech firms such as blockchain-based crypto funds because they are generally less 
trusted by regulators and thus less appealing to investors. 
 
Figure 2: Data structure.  
  
st
  Order Concepts   
nd























1. Shared language and 
codes
2. Shared goals and 
vision
1. Trustful climate
2. Regulators  ability to 
support and share 
knowledge
3. Cooperative climate
1. Frequency of contact 
and stakeholders 
involved
2. Access to regulators 






Regulators also reported diverse formal ties with other regulators operating internally in 
different departments within the broader regulatory jurisdiction to discuss existing rules as a 
result of issues arising during their interactions with regulatees. This is reflected in the 
following: “We [regulators] involve the ministry of finance, and we also contact the 
European Commission, European Banking Authority, or European Securities and Markets 
Authority, to highlight if certain technologies used in a certain way that some type of rules 
might not be sufficient or that they did not fit very well to these new situations, that they 
might not be proportionate in certain ways” (Regulator [R]-3). These findings are significant 
to the overall study because they describe how regulators exchange knowledge about new 
technologies.  
The second category, regulator-regulatees’ follow-up post-exit, represent an ongoing 
relationship in which regulatees benefit from access to regulatory advice and networking 
opportunities with both domestic and international regulators through cross-border 
collaboration agreements, allowing regulators to refer sandbox participants to other 
regulatory jurisdictions. From the regulatee perspective, this is reflected in the following: 
“Upon approving us with the full licensing, they [regulators] have been very cooperative 
assisting us with diverse reporting. They assisted us in a very positive manner, answering 
emails or phone calls in a timely manner. This also applies to all the regulatory departments 
that we dealt with. Also, along the way, we are required to report any incidents that happened 
in the company” (SP-8). At first, this finding seemed to contradict the suggestion in previous 
studies (e.g., Tötterman and Sten, 2005) that social relationships post-incubation gradually 
disappear, which is clearly not the case in the regulatory sandbox setting, where the longest 
relationship was reported to have lasted more than two years after exiting the sandbox. That 
said, one possible explanation for this finding is that relationships continue due to perceived 
mutual benefits and responsibilities. For instance, regulators might want to keep an eye on 
the activities of nascent market participants, as regulators are fundamentally responsible for 
the stability of financial markets. We found support for this explanation in the analyzed data, 
which indicated the importance of regulators’ continuing their engagement to monitor 
regulatee activities. One interviewed regulator put it as follows: “What we’re trying to do is, 
because during the testing period, we have continuous relationship, and during that period, 
the firm is restricted for example with the number of clients, number of transactions, and 
value of transactions that they can take. Once we give them the unrestricted license, they’re 
open to do everything else, we don’t just let them go without any supervision. We try to still 





scaling up in their business” (R-6). Based on the above discussion, we suggest these two 
propositions: 
P1a: Regulator-regulatee social interactions increase regulatees’ legitimacy among investors 
and consumers, thus positively affecting their validation practices. 
P1b: Knowledge exchanged during regulator-regulatee interactions increases regulators’ 
understanding of the legal constraints and risks arising from enabling technologies, 
resultantly improving monitoring practices. 
4.1.2 Network configuration 
As to interaction patterns between network actors, two categories emerged from the data: 
i) frequency of contact and stakeholders involved and ii) access to regulators in financial 
markets. 
In general, as a means of communication, most regulator-regulatee social interactions 
occur remotely, via email and the telephone, although some participants reported that 
regulators host face-to-face meetings or visit market participants at their offices. These 
engagements are for reporting, monitoring, guidance, or follow-up purposes on a routine or 
ad hoc basis and vary from case to case, depending on the approaches adopted in a given 
regulatory jurisdiction. The multiple facets of engagement with diverse sets of regulators 
were also made clear, with one respondent stating that, “we were meeting with different 
people on the regulator side, the innovation team, and the AML [anti-money laundering] 
compliance team” (SP-2). 
In terms of frequency of contact and stakeholders involved, the analyzed data suggested 
that interaction frequency varied widely, depending on a regulatee’s testing progress, its 
FinTech classification, and—most importantly—which regulator was involved. For instance, 
we found evidence that proactive regulators would contact a regulatee on a weekly basis for 
follow-up conversations. In another case, conversations occurred once every quarter; there, 
the FinTech participant was testing a cryptocurrency fund. Interestingly, four regulators 
operating in other jurisdictions highlighted that they would normally closely monitor this 
type of FinTech due to the risks and consequences associated with cryptocurrency. 
Confirming that these interactions could vary in purpose as noted above, one regulatee 
reported the following: “Much of our engagements are for monitoring and following-up, and 
little or no guidance. We do bi-monthly reports on progress, on sales, on technology 
developments, etc. We give feedback to [the regulator] on how that’s gone. Then 





graduated sandbox participant reflects a more dynamic relationship with the regulator: “We 
submitted a very limited sheet of information … twice a month, and we also had 30 minutes 
call every two weeks just checking in on how things were going. However, towards the end 
we even moved these calls to a monthly catch up, because there was not that much happening 
in terms of customer traction” (SP-4). Building on this, from a regulatory perspective more 
clarity is provided about the frequency of social interaction and how it changes during the 
regulatory sandbox process: “Our interaction with the firm will be very high leading up to an 
issuance but might tailor off at the end of an issuance while they work on any findings from 
that activity, and then we'll ramp up again. So, the way in which we approach the testing 
period is not standardized. There are key components, for example around AML [anti-money 
laundering] requirements, KYC [know your customer] and everything related to financial 
crime compliance that we take very seriously and monitor throughout, and then there will be 
certain components that will be tailored throughout the period” (R-7). 
With reference to previous research, we now present a possible explanation for the above 
findings. From the SCT literature, we know that frequent and close interactions enable 
knowledge sharing and relationship building (e.g., Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). While this study 
is unable to clearly demonstrate whether trustworthiness between regulators and regulatees 
increases over time, we found from the analyzed data that, in cases with more frequent and 
direct interactions, regulatees perceived their engagements with regulators more positively 
than those who had fewer interactions. Frequent interactions may create stronger ties that 
allow regulators to understand regulatees’ needs and challenges and enable regulatees to 
learn more about regulation and possible pitfalls to be avoided. These findings confirm and 
extend prior incubation work (Rice, 2002; Scillitoe and Chakrabarti, 2010).  
For the second category of access to regulators in financial markets, we found that 
regulatees reported ease of contact with local regulators, whether prior to acceptance or after 
graduation. In the former case, regulatees reported positive reception and encouragement 
when they engaged with the regulator to understand the various regulations that they would 
need to observe and to understand the regulator’s appetite for engagement. In addition, 
regulatees reported meeting regulators at industry conferences or FinTech-related events. 
Interestingly, most regulators reported the existence of multiple points of engagement that 
market participants could use to interact with the regulator, emphasizing that regulatory 
sandboxes are only one part of the overall regime. For instance, one regulator stated, “we are 
the regulator, but there’s also [another] authority, and they run an accelerator program, and 
there’s one other accelerator program that operates out of that authority. We engage with 





we as a regulator can facilitate the wider ecosystem, not just by looking at regulated entities 
and not just through working as a sandbox” (R-7). Moreover, the empirical findings suggest 
that most participants at some point during the testing or immediately after graduation would 
initiate conversations with regulators in other countries. The findings presented here are 
consistent with seminal social capital research (e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) indicating 
that the number of channels determines the time and expenses associated with gathering 
information. Building on this, a possible explanation for these findings may be due to 
financial market innovators having high level of contact and access to these networks from 
diverse points, which means better accessibility and easier knowledge sharing. However, we 
further argue that, with the increase in market participants, resource constraints will limit the 
ability of regulators to provide timely support, which could encourage market participants to 
find more accessible networks elsewhere. We found support for this explanation in the data, 
as one regulatee put it: “At the end, we decided actually … [to] go through a regulatory 
partner to basically rent a license … helping us in terms of regulations, how to do 
compliance” (SP-7).  It can thus be suggested that: 
P2: The frequency of regulator-regulatee interactions positively affects regulators’ 
understanding of regulatees’ support needs and regulatees’ understanding of regulatory 
frameworks. 
4.1.3 Network stability 
With respect to changes in networks, the findings fell into a single category: the co-
evolution of financial markets. The findings suggest that regulator-regulatee social 
interactions contribute to regulators’ and regulatees’ understanding of how new technologies 
function and how they fit into or link with existing regulations. Additionally, engagement 
between regulators and ecosystem actors revealed the role of regulatory sandboxes in 
ecosystem building, which could result in broader changes to legal systems and financial 
market stability. Based on comments from a graduated FinTech start-up that shared its role 
in changing regulations, our findings suggest the transformation of existing regulatory 
frameworks and related policies. According to the informant, a change in regulation was 
required to overcome obstacles that arose when the firm wanted to extend its operations 
across multiple jurisdictions, including Vietnam and Japan: “In the case of Japan, we 
developed a new mechanism that is electronic for identity verification. We presented a 
proposal for them [the regulator], to consider it equivalent to the current method [prescription 
based, specifying ‘how’ regulations should be achieved rather than ‘what’ in the case of 





infusion of that new technique into the current setting, they [the regulator] created a 
regulatory sandbox to allow that to be tested. But the regulatory sandbox formation required 
a new law. That was prepared, and we were consulted several times on preparation of that 
new law. So, that required a different type of change; it required a new law” (SP-2). 
Conversely, we learned of cases in which the regulators were less willing to make regulatory 
changes. According to one regulatee, “there are a lot of regulatory rule books that were 
written decades ago, which are in part outdated and could use a refresh, but they [regulators] 
don’t do that easily … instead they [regulators] are writing up a report every now and then 
highlighting lessons learned” (SP-4). Notably, however, our findings suggest more powerful 
implications for regulators from sandbox participants: “We were telling them [the regulator], 
for us to be effective and for you to be effective in achieving your goals … we need you to 
talk to other regulators. Play cross-border scenarios. Because trade is cross border. So, we 
need to define the rules of engagement with other regulators. It took a while, but they set up 
a global sandbox; this is the example of how they [regulators] evolve based on the feedback 
they get from the industry” (SP-2). 
Moreover, all informants stated that they learn about technology, regulatory frameworks, 
and the risks involved, providing growth opportunities to financial markets. Specifically, 
these social interactions allow regulators that are not up to date on technological 
developments to understand the risks and opportunities associated with new technologies. 
For instance, one informant stated, “the officials on the regulator side are all experienced 
people … in the sense that they are quite old and very confined to the normal way of 
transferring money of what they have been auditing of all these bricks-and-mortar 
companies. When it comes to us being a sandbox player, they learned how we try to conduct 
a transaction without having to see the customer via face-to-face, and what departments and 
skillset we have in the company to make sure a seamless process can be done.… They [the 
regulators] can't see this in the bricks-and-mortar companies” (SP-8). Our findings show that 
regulators benefit from interactions in diverse ways: “We are able to see how this technology 
affects preexisting business models.… That allows us to become comfortable and to assess 
what risks are emerging and which are diminishing, because typically what we tend to find 
is that if you come out and you’re using smart contracts, that use of smart contracts means 
that maybe there’s less of a legal risk or an execution risk on certain activities, but equally, 
then there’s a new operational risk because you have to account for the smart contract 
technology and how that works. We look at how that shifts the risks that the market would 
be exposed to. This allows us to have firsthand knowledge that helps inform our policies 





Further, our evidence indicates that regulatory sandboxes operate as a catalyst for the 
development of both local and non-local ecosystems. Locally, regulators engage with 
ecosystem actors like academic institutions, industry partners, and FinTech hubs to design 
and develop new approaches that facilitate sandbox practices. An example of engagement 
with academic institutions is reflected by one regulator: “We have a strong relationship with 
the Technical University … to work on certain blockchain experiments … these experiments 
show how and what the technical barriers or the incapability of blockchains still are. So that 
helps us with our technical knowledge on these topics” (R-3). Notably, these engagements 
can also lead to the creation of regulatory roadmaps and legal requirements as a way to cope 
with the novel application of enabling technologies. For instance, one regulator from the 
MENA region said that crowdfunding regulation frameworks and requirements were 
recently developed for investment-, equity- and loan-based crowdfunding platforms, after 
engaging members of the FinTech ecosystem that operate in this niche area to understand 
their market needs and strive to meet them. Another regulator added that “what a lot of the 
time will happen is that we give additional guidance; let’s say I have 50 requests from market 
participants, and they all look very similar. What we will do is provide additional information 
sheets or develop policy in a particular area, for instance on cryptocurrencies. 
Simultaneously, we might update our existing public guidance based on advice questions 
received” (R-4). Our findings also reveal regulators’ engagement with non-local ecosystem 
actors, as is demonstrated in the following statement: “We are very active in the international 
regulatory sphere. We sit on the Coordination Group, which is the board of GFIN [a global 
sandbox initiative] ... and we are involved in cross-border testing. We also do bilateral work 
with developed and emerging economics to discuss how our regulatory sandbox experience 
has been and share thoughts on different challenges that we’re facing with FinTechs or 
solutions we’ve found” (R-7).  
In reviewing the social capital literature, little evidence was found on network stability. 
That said, prior research indicates that higher degrees of network instability (i.e., changes in 
membership) might constrain social capital creation opportunities (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). 
In regulatory jurisdictions that have established new regulations or initiatives like the Global 
Sandbox, we may argue that networks are highly stable because actors are joining the 
network, which increases rather than limits networking opportunities. For instance, when the 
Global Sandbox was proposed in mid-2018, 11 regulatory jurisdictions were involved. A few 
months later, after its establishment, the number of members in regulatory and observer roles 
had more than doubled; as of mid-2019, the network had 38 members. In addition, eight 





broadly, we may also argue based on the analyzed data that, given the level of regulators’ 
commitment to stimulate innovation, regulator-regulatee networks are stable, offering 
opportunities for social interaction, as barriers to network entry are lowered through 
supportive policies and regulatory instruments. In addition, our findings demonstrate how 
regulators’ engagement with ecosystem actors like sandbox participants, industry actors, and 
international regulators enables them to develop more effective approaches for the FinTech 
community, to become more informed about risks associated with new technologies, and to 
craft ways to change existing frameworks or create new ones. Regulatory sandboxes thus 
play an important role in nurturing local and non-local FinTech ecosystems. However, as the 
FinTech phenomenon remains in its nascent stages, there is insufficient evidence regarding 
how the stability of these networks will evolve, which provides opportunities for future 
research. Based on the discussion above, we offer the following proposition: 
P3a: Regulator-regulatee interactions positively affect regulators’ access to regulatory 
innovations. 
4.2 Relational Dimension 
4.2.1 Trust 
As to regulators’ and regulatees’ willingness to share knowledge during their interactions, 
three categories emerged from the analyzed data: i) trustful climate, ii) regulators’ ability to 
support, and iii) share knowledge and cooperative climate. 
For the first category, the empirical findings reveal that the regulator-regulatee relationship 
may be trust-based, allowing sandbox participants to test their business models without fear 
of sanction. We found support for this statement in the following: “We’re able to test out any 
kind of system, but we are not bound to be fined or imprisonment because we are meant to 
make mistakes” (SP-8). Building on this, we found another example in which regulators 
entrusted sandbox participants with freedom in testing and partner selection: “It’s more a 
sense of they’re saying, here’s the framework that you all should operate in, now get techy 
and get on with it, rather than specifically handholding to particular types of solutions, 
processes or encouraging certain collaborations” (SP-5). Surprisingly, another regulatee 
shared concerns about the regulator sharing knowledge with other sandbox participants: 
“They probably shared our advice with other asset managers who’ve come to them. We’ve 
been the longest in this field, so a lot of it is that they have gone through a whole bunch of 





Our findings do not consistently show support for trust among regulators and regulatees 
or a willingness among regulatees to share knowledge. One informant felt less encouraged 
to share information with regulators because they might pass it on to other sandbox 
participants. As it is important to bear in mind the possible bias in this response, we found 
other instances that indicated how regulators were able to pave new paths based on gained 
knowledge. For example, one participant said, “our case manager … got promoted as a result 
of successful testing with us. He then started a series of blockchain projects with other start-
ups.… He understood enough, he learned enough, he was trusted enough because we 
succeeded in creating a trusted process” (PS-2). Put differently, such evidence may suggest 
that regulators might share best practices with future sandbox participants. At first, these 
findings appeared to accord with McAdam and Marlow (2007), who found privacy issues 
like theft of intellectual property and consequent secretive behavior to emerge in business 
incubator networks. However, incubation studies (e.g., McAdam and Marlow, 2007; 
Tötterman and Sten, 2005) have not previously demonstrated that incubator staff are 
perceived as less trustworthy by incubatees; on the contrary, tenants are normally willing to 
share information with and receive support from incubators. Given this contrast, our 
empirical findings are unexpected and may have profound importance for the issue of trust 
among regulators and regulatees and its effect on knowledge sharing (e.g., Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005). Another possible explanation for these findings is that regulatees are more prone to 
become secretive and reluctant to share knowledge when they are unable to benefit from 
regulators. We thus suggest the following: 
P4a: Asymmetrical regulator-regulatee interactions negatively affect regulatees’ willingness 
to share best practices. 
For the second category of regulator support, the evidence reveals cases of the regulator’s 
ability to support market participants through legal or non-legal actions, which reflects the 
commitment of regulators. We first explore the role of the regulator from the perspective of 
sandbox participants. Our findings suggest that regulators employ a diverse set of tools to 
support market participants. For instance, one regulatee said, “they have a tool called 
informal student. As part of the sandbox, we can send them a copy of questions and request 
informal information, some guidance from an expert. And that’s really helpful because we 
didn’t know or didn’t consider a couple of things in our risk management on how to treat 
customers, which at the end really improved our technology” (SP-7). More interestingly, we 
found that, because regulators are experienced with regulating traditional financial market 
participants, they are able to support sandbox participants by identifying gaps and providing 





issues later on. According to a regulator, these interactions are win-win situations, as the 
regulatee is developing risk mitigation and the regulators are gaining learning experience. 
Financial benefits also emerged from the analyzed data; for instance, one regulatee said, “the 
sandbox period allows me to waive the full broking license investment until the end of the 
sandbox period when we can either put that money in by then, if I’ve got the right level 
investors” (SP-5). Along these lines, several regulators indicated that sandbox participants 
are also able to reduce current and future operational costs because more sustainable 
businesses are created thanks to the support provided by regulators and the ability to 
experiment in the sandbox.  
The social capital literature (e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) holds that network actors 
offer access to resources; our findings show that most regulatees have received legal and non-
legal support that assisted their FinTech firms, possibly giving them an advantage over actors 
in other networks. Specifically, we found support that regulators provide nudges on 
operational and compliance issues that improves participants’ risk management, which in 
turn allows regulatees to reduce their expenses and improve the sustainability of their 
businesses. However, it remains unclear how direct ties with regulators provide regulatees 
with unique resources that may not be accessible outside regulatory sandboxes, as we 
received contradictory accounts from two informants, who noted that the disadvantages in 
terms of longer time to market and lack of regulatory support outweighed the possible 
advantages from regulators in different jurisdictions. There may be several reasons for this 
difference in views, including variations in regulatory mandates in different jurisdictions, a 
lack of technical know-how among regulators, and regulatees’ differences in expectations 
and knowledge of regulations. Consistent with our findings, we offer the following 
proposition:  
P4b: Regulator-regulatee interactions positively affect regulatees’ risk management 
capabilities. 
As to the third category, a cooperative climate is found in regulator-regulatee networks. 
From the perspective of regulatees, our evidence reveals how sandbox participants promote 
collaboration among several stakeholders: “We’ve been part of bringing together quite a few 
industry bodies to look at digital identity. We’ve encouraged the FinTech delivery panel, 
Open Identity Exchange, Department of Culture, Media and Sports, and government digital 
services to come together and collaborate” (SP-6). We also found evidence suggesting that 
sandbox participants are encouraged by regulators to collaborate and share knowledge: “We 





FinTech symposium, which was organized by the Central Bank. We were called upon to talk 
about how we graduated, what are the difficulties that we went through, how we mitigated 
all these issues, and how we graduated” (SP-8). Interestingly, the same participant shared the 
experience of bringing in two partners to support a technical solution; the regulators, based 
on this learning experience, became convinced that other market participants should consider 
these new cost-effective providers. Another aspect worth mentioning is regulatory 
engagement with the FinTech community, where regulators seek knowledge from market 
actors and other regulators, as an example of regulators’ collaborative approach to develop 
new policies: “When we started developing policy materials, we did have post interactions 
with members of the society, companies that were specifically dealing in this area, in order 
to ensure that what we’re developing is fit for that purpose. These companies had a say in 
how the regime can be created. Of course, we do our own benchmarking, we see what other 
regulators are doing, and we put certain rules in place, but we also take into consideration the 
market in our jurisdiction; what do they have to say about it, and then if necessary where we 
see it is suitable” (R-6).  
The above findings indicate that cooperative behavior emerge when trust exists, making 
network actors more willing to engage in social exchange (e.g., Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Specifically, our empirical findings reveal cooperative interactions between regulators and 
diverse stakeholders, which illustrates their willingness to engage in social exchange to learn 
about market needs. We believe that such cooperative behavior has profound meaning for 
the level of trustworthiness among regulators and network members. Previous studies also 
support this interpretation (e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The findings also show an 
association between the relational and cognitive dimensions; prior research reports a similar 
association, but it links having a shared vision and common values to the level of perceived 
trust (e.g., Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). In our scenario, by contrast, shared narratives are related 
to levels of trust and transparency, so our findings have discrepancies with the extant 
literature examining interactions between social capital dimensions (e.g., Al-Tabbaa and 
Ankrah, 2016). We thus suggest the following:  
P4c: Regulators’ encouragement of graduated sandbox participants to share narratives to 
current participants positively affects knowledge sharing among regulatees. 
4.2.2 Expectations  
Within the relational dimension, the analysis also shows evidence of expectations from 






Regulators expect that sandbox participants will conduct the tests they set out to do, 
indicating that regulators may have questions about the suitability of the sandbox for some 
participants. This is articulated in the following: “We had to quite hard-sell [the regulator] 
that we want to drive these things forward, but the reality has been that it’s quite hard for us 
to deliver these things. The [regulator] is scrutinizing us quite closely to see whether we can, 
whether we will … we need to be able to show that we’re doing some of these things. 
Otherwise it questions our suitability for the sandbox in the eyes of the [regulator]” (SP-5). 
We also found evidence suggesting that regulatees expect regulators to lack knowledge of 
the technologies they adopt: “The habits of the compliance officers don't change overnight, 
despite the regulator saying that they do adopt and review new technologies, they take a risk-
based approach. But it still takes time. That’s why for us the sandbox was a good value. 
Because it was part in education process towards the regulator” (SP-6). Notably, as one 
informant stated, during the testing period, “the regulators performed an audit on compliance 
to see how the process has been taken toward the customer, how does it process, what are the 
reports we’ve done, and how the risk assessment takes place. Post the audit, the regulators 
highlighted several gaps that needed to be addressed to be able to get the full-license 
bandwidth. The regulators also provided recommendations” (SP-8). Another important 
experience shared by a regulatee reflects a performance-driven culture among regulators: 
“You can feel that the underlying KPIs [key performance indicators] for the regulators are 
much more driven by how many companies can get through. They accepted us at the end, 
obviously, only because we do machine learning for credit risk assessments in a way that 
nobody had done it before. So, they just want to tick all these boxes and at the end have a big 
summary that can be press-released” (SP-7).  
Our findings consistently indicate that regulators’ expectations revolved around clarifying 
expectations, meeting time targets, and maintaining a regulatory focus. For instance, one 
regulator reported the following: “We commit the time and we do very extensive 
presentations for them that explain what it means to be regulated, how regulators work, what 
our objectives are, what we’re looking for, and to make it absolutely clear to them that our 
job is to make sure that their risks are accounted for and that we are meeting our regulatory 
objectives by allowing them to test” (R-7). The same regulator added: “We found that the 
cohort approach is not just about resourcing on our side, but it’s about setting expectations 
and timelines for the firms. It’s also partially about driving the firms. And that’s in 
recognition of the fact that the firms are typically start-ups that come in, they have a sort of 
dual purpose; they want to become regulated, but mainly they want to make money by getting 





out into the market and try to sell the product already—or the idea—and get investors, and 
they can sometimes not have as much focus on the regulatory side” (R-7). The analyzed data 
also reveal regulators’ expectations as to satisfying requirements, emphasizing that most 
entrepreneurs provide insufficient detail about what they are doing, in which case the 
regulator has to seek further clarification. 
The above findings indicate that both regulators and regulatees develop expectations 
during their social interactions that might affect their trust levels and consequent motivation 
to exchange knowledge, as has been reported in the literature (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). For instance, we found empirical evidence that regulators might conduct 
unplanned audits, which may support the view that regulators are less than fully confident 
that regulatees will act in accordance with regulators’ expectations and norms. While this 
could have negatively influenced the relationship between regulators and regulatees, the 
latter group did not perceive it as negative. On the contrary, they were satisfied to receive 
recommendations from regulators that helped them become more compliant with regulatory 
frameworks. In this case, it may thus be suggested that regulators and regulatees established 
stronger bonds that positively influenced the relational dimension. Furthermore, the 
empirical evidence describes how regulators define their expectations to ensure that future 
obligations are met, which is consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). However, we also found evidence that regulators are not necessarily motivated to 
understand regulatees’ needs and wants; rather, they seek to satisfy their own goals, which 
reveals an opportunistic attitude. Similarly, regulators reported opportunistic behavior by 
sandbox participants who may have been preoccupied by financial outcomes. We thus 
suggest the following: 
P5: The existence of tacit goals negatively affects knowledge sharing and practices for both 
regulators and regulatees. 
4.3 Cognitive Dimension 
4.3.1 Common goals and language 
 Lastly, the analyzed data revealed perceptions about how regulators and regulatees work 
towards shared goals with a common understanding. Specifically, two categories emerged: 
i) common goals and vision and ii) common language and codes. 
For the first category, our findings reveal that regulators in certain jurisdictions may share 
a similar vision with FinTech firms, whereas other regulators may be pressured to follow, 





arbitrage creates an interesting pressure on other countries. So, when smaller countries like 
Malta and others start thinking out of the box and creating regulatory frameworks suitable 
for crypto, it has a big change in a world of finance, operating now out of Malta and 
generating revenue in taxes and seemingly operating within the white side of the market, 
instead of pushing everything to the gray or dark in the market” (SP-2). Similarly, we found 
evidence of regulatees working with regulators and a diverse group of governmental bodies 
to achieve common goals like a better understanding of how digital identity can help in 
innovation. This is articulated in the following quote: “The interesting thing with the 
[regulator] was that they are fully aware that identity and digital identity goes across every 
sector of the economy. So, that they knew that a lot of their fellow regulators and other 
sectors—be that Information Commission, Bureau of Film Classification Department, 
Culture of Media and Sport, Competition and Markets Authority—had strands on identity. 
And digital identity was a fundamental game changer across many different sectors” (SP-6). 
We also found an example indicating regulators’ motivation to network with a sandbox 
participant sharing a vision of improving financial markets by disrupting the way traditional 
financial providers function: “They [the regulators] wanted to eliminate having many 
branches because it poses lots of risks in terms of exposure to fraud by employees (and 
robbery as well). So, the regulators were eager to get us to come up with this system to disrupt 
the money services business so that they will be able to operate without having branches. 
That was the fundamental wish by the regulator” (SP-8). Conversely, one sandbox participant 
stated that regulators provide “guidance not to violate existing legal framework and 
regulatory rules … regulators advised us to frame what we were going to test in a way that 
changes best practices but does not require changing the regulations, because we were 
supposed to work within the existing regulatory framework” (SP-2). 
The above findings may be argued to agree with previous research that found “shared 
goals represent the degree to which network members share a common understanding and 
approach to the achievement of network tasks and outcomes” (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005, p. 
153). However, our findings deepen the understanding of social aspects in the incubation 
literature, which remains limited (e.g., Scillitoe and Chakrabarti, 2010). The examples of 
regulators and regulatees working together on common goals like digital identity or 
eliminating branches in financial markets demonstrate how common goals can shape 
network interactions. Unexpectedly, however, we found evidence of regulators who were not 
willing to change and develop regulations; instead, they asked regulatees to frame their 
testing activities within existing regulations. This finding shows conflicting goals among 





market participants to test new business models that are not necessarily compliant with 
existing regulations. This raises a troubling question: if regulatees are not able to test 
innovative solutions that can later be employed in real-world financial markets, then how are 
regulators promoting innovation when they overlook lessons learned from regulatees’ testing 
experiences? This might signal an underlying lack of willingness among regulators to change 
the existing framework. Although this contradictory finding may result from differences in 
regulatory mandates or conflicting intentions of establishing regulatory sandboxes without 
forcing change upon regulatory systems, the same participant (SP-2) also reported that 
regulators in other jurisdictions like Vietnam and Japan had indeed made changes in existing 
regulations. As a result, we offer the following: 
P6a: Regulators’ unwillingness to make regulatory changes negatively affects regulatees’ 
testing maneuverability. 
As for the second category of common language and codes, our findings provide an 
example of how regulators support market participants by confirming and interpreting 
existing legal frameworks: “In Vietnam, we said to the regulator, ‘We will submit a number 
of questions on the way we understand your legal system, can you answer those questions 
for us? … They provided all the legal interpretation. Basically, legal opinion for us.… They 
said, ‘In this paragraph in this particular law we can do this but not this because of this legal 
statute, you can do this but not this’ and other things. That allowed us to understand the 
system, adjust our processes, submit a different proposal to them” (SP-2). Another example 
of how regulators ensure that sandbox participants understand them is by finding a common 
language: “We try to enter those conversations from a technical point of view, rather than 
just focusing on the legal aspects. If we just start with the legal aspect, the conversations will 
be quite complicated because the regulatory framework in certain ways is very restrictive and 
you don’t get them to the essence of how things technically work” (R-3). This approach is 
presented by regulators as an enabler of learning experiences for sandbox participants. The 
above findings extend evidence from other studies to the incubation literature stream in 
which shared language is described as an enabler for accessing information (e.g., Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). Specifically, the findings reveal the role of regulators in establishing a 
shared language. This has profound meaning in the context of regulatory sandboxes, as 
regulatees may not have a legal background or knowledge of regulatory frameworks, which 
might make it challenging for them to interact effectively with regulators. On this basis, we 





P6b: Regulators’ ability to create conversations that use a common language positively 
affects knowledge sharing between regulators and regulatees. 
5 Concluding Comments 
Regulatory sandboxes have a prominent role in supporting entrepreneurship and 
innovation in the FinTech context. However, given the novelty of the sandbox concept, there 
is a lack of research on the social aspects of regulators and regulatees. Through the theoretical 
lens of SCT and with reference to the prior incubation literature, this paper explores the 
influence of interactions among regulators and sandbox participants on the practices of both 
regulators and regulatees. On one hand, this study has shown that regulator-regulatee social 
interactions increase regulatees’ legitimacy, risk management capabilities, and familiarity 
with regulatory frameworks, all of which may positively influence regulatee practices. It was 
also shown that regulators benefit from these interactions by increasing their understanding 
of regulatory constraints and the potential risks from enabling technologies, better informing 
them of regulatees’ support needs, and by offering them early access to regulatory 
innovations. These advantages will in turn promote financial markets that welcome 
innovation while protecting stability. On the other hand, less positive discoveries were made 
in our empirical investigation. For example, we found that regulatees may anticipate 
regulators as less trustworthy, making them reluctant to share information. Additionally, 
regulatees might be discouraged from innovating if regulators limit their testing practices to 
the boundaries of existing regulatory systems. Taken together, these findings provide 
additional evidence with respect to importance of the social dimensions of incubation, 
illuminating social interactions among regulators and FinTech innovators in the context of 
financial markets, which is heavily regulated because financial stability is nothing less than 
crucial. Thus, providing interesting insights of a niche but worthwhile topic. 
5.1 Theoretical and practical implications  
Overall, this study provides important implications for both research and practice by 
exploring how regulators support FinTech innovators, particularly with respect to testing and 
validation practices that are essential at the incubation stage. Thus, we inform regulators and 
FinTech innovators about win-win situations. At the meso and micro levels, this study 
contributes to the growing debate in the incubation literature on the role of technology 
transfer instruments (e.g., Cunningham and O'Reilly, 2018; Grzegorczyk, 2019; Tsai et al., 
2009), including regulatory sandboxes, through which the role of individual actors like 
regulators is to support FinTech innovators while also paying close attention to their 





understanding of how knowledge exchange takes place among regulators and regulatees in 
regulatory sandboxes, a context characterized by escalating numbers of market participants 
and increasing focus on financial innovation and technological transformation (Diaz-Rainey 
et al., 2015; Palmié et al., 2019). These interactions inform regulators about the use of 
enabling technologies and new ways of complying with regulatory frameworks, both of 
which enable regulators and policymakers to develop financial markets that reflect the latest 
technological and economic developments. This study also builds on contributions in the 
extant incubation literature by advancing our understanding of the social capital dimensions 
that facilitate incubation efforts in the context of FinTech. We further contribute to recent 
management studies confirming that supportive regulatory initiatives have a positive impact 
on firm formation (Haddad and Hornuf, 2019), emphasizing the role of financial regulators 
(Lee and Shin, 2018). We also contribute to the emerging FinTech literature, which has been 
criticized for lacking a theoretical basis, by conceiving our study and discussing our findings 
through the lens of SCT (Gai et al., 2018; Gimpel et al., 2018; Puschmann, 2017). 
Additionally, we contribute to the growing academic debate about entrepreneurial finance 
(e.g., Block et al., 2018; Cumming, Deloof et al., 2019; Cumming, Johan et al., 2019; 
Cumming and Schwienbacher, 2018) by elucidating the potential of regulatory sandboxes to 
help innovative FinTech ventures raise capital in two important ways. First, social 
interactions in regulatory sandboxes enable the supply side of entrepreneurial finance by 
providing FinTech participants with regulatory knowledge and, in some instances, creating 
new regulatory frameworks and requirements to facilitate crowdfunding platforms. These 
regulatory changes may encourage greater access to capital through financing approaches 
like crowdfunding platforms and ICOs. Additionally, regulators can better protect market 
participants from problems like financial fraud. Second, our empirical investigation reveals 
how regulatory sandboxes provide intangible resources that have important financial 
implications. This includes providing regulatees with the following: 1) a quality seal, making 
them more attractive to investors and consumers; 2) hints on operational and compliance 
issues that support them in developing operationally and legally sustainable businesses; and 
3) enough time to postpone making a significant investment at an early stage, since regulatory 
sandboxes provide exemptions from financial licenses.  
5.2 Limitations and future research 
There is no research without limitations. In this last section, we suggest a future research 
agenda to extend the scholarship on regulatory sandboxes. As the current investigation was 





research can investigate to examine the significance of highlighted relationships and make 
generalizations that apply to the incubation and entrepreneurial finance literatures. 
Additionally, the increasing number of regulatory sandboxes around the globe raises the 
crucial question of how effective these instruments are, given the financial and human 
resources allocated to their operation. Hence, future studies can investigate whether the 
presence of regulatory sandboxes in a given jurisdiction (or group of jurisdictions) increases 
the amounts of risk and venture capital or other funding sources over jurisdictions without a 
regulatory sandbox. That said, this study only investigated social interactions that occur 
within established regulatory sandboxes, limiting the empirical investigation to one of many 
important regulatory change stages that typically unfold when setting up these instruments. 
These may include 1) calls for input (public consultations), 2) engagement with industry 
actors and/or international regulators through roundtable discussions, and 3) responses in the 
form of published regulatory guides. There is thus ample room for further research, 
particularly to investigate how social interactions differ across the regulatory change stages 
from a longitudinal perspective, both nationally and across jurisdictions, as advocated by 
Cumming, Johan, and Pant (2019). 
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“we partner with universities and with a regulatory partner apart from 





“in addition to having unofficial alumni calls every two months, there 
are also times when I need something from the regulators as we are 
being approached frequently by insurance companies across the globe 
asking if we could bring our services to country X or Y? And very often 
I would write the [home country] regulator to ask … can you please 
make the introduction?" And then comes a friendly warm introduction 













“We actually met a number of times with them [the regulator], where we 
presented progress on how testing was going on, what parameters we 
were testing, what were our preliminary results, we demonstrated the 
product to them as it was being used by the consumers. We were also 
meeting with different people on the regulator side, e.g., the innovation 
team, the AML compliance legal people.” (SP-2). 
  Access to 
regulators  
“What I find during our interaction with people who want to access the 
sandbox to do some sort of testing is that they may not be able to use the 
sandbox, however within the established or open relationship with them, 
we can give them some regulatory nudges, where they can potentially 







“In Vietnam, the legal framework that exists today requires paper-based 
signature, which is done remotely. So, we have to adjust our innovation 
in a way that would allow finger-based signature on screen, 
accompanied with a paper-based signature in the branch. This 
certification of identity then creates a significant enough record that 
would allow it to be used later on in engagement with the same financial 
institution or others. For that, the Vietnamese Central Bank needed to 
issue a circular, not a change in the regulation, but change in the 





“the most fruitful advantage for a sandbox license was that we're able to 
test out any kind of system, we are not bound to be fined or 
imprisonment because we are meant to mistake. Along the way, there's a 
lot of mistakes that have happened, but we are not being fined because 
of that.” (SP-8). 





“the firms that come into the sandbox will have less mature risk 
management systems, and we do provide them with waivers and 
modifications to the preexisting rules, that allow firms flexibility in how 
they mitigate the risk. For example, they can outsource certain things, or 
combine certain functions into one in recognition of the fact that they are 




“We managed to collaborate with a system provider from the UK to do 
electronic KYC through the system. To get Central Bank regulators 
convinced … we had a few rounds of tests and then they requested to 
come with a full-fledged presentation of how that provider is working in 








“we often have to go back and ask for some clarity. An example might 
be providing financial advice, but we can’t work out their system, is it 
general or personal advice or the other alternative which is more 
common in the advice space or is that they are collecting a lot of 
information? they [regulatee] say they are only providing general advice, 
but it's clearly not general advice. There's a bit of an expectations gap, 
and sometimes it takes a bit longer to bring them across the line and say, 
well, you collected a lot of information.” (R-4). 
“the habits of the compliance officers don't change overnight, despite the 
regulator saying that they do adopt and review new technologies, they 
take a risk-based approach. But, it still takes time. That’s was why for us 
the Sandbox was a good value. Because it was part in education process 









“we get firsthand sort of knowledge of exactly how that technology 
works. So typically, during the testing period, we work very closely with 





Sometimes we'll even go through the code and do audits. We will crawl 
all over the new technology. For us it's excellent because we get to 
understand what's coming out into our market.” (R-7). 
  Shared 
goals and 
vision 
“I don’t think the FCA was dramatically nervous about how the sandbox 
would work in practice, they had a rough idea and they decided to go for 
it and test it and tweak it. That’s were, I think, the most benefits of a 
sandbox are, just doing something, trying it, maybe failing but learning 
from the failure, and working towards the optimal framework.” (R-1). 
Table: Concepts and categories that emerged from the data analysis. 
Appendix B – Interview guides 
Interview guide: Regulators 
1. Please tell us about your background and current role. 
2. Please tell us about the recent changes in the regulatory sandbox practices. 
3. Based on examples, please tell us how regulators engage stakeholders from the fintech 
community to shape regulatory sandbox practices? Who are the main actors, what is their 
role, if there are any obstacles regulators face? 
4. Based on examples, please describe the interactions that occur in sandboxes with 
innovators prior to acceptance? What are the obstacles regulators face during such 
interactions? How long are the periods prior to acceptance? 
5. Once a fintech has started testing in the sandbox, please describe how and for what 
purpose do regulators interact with sandbox participants, using examples. 
6. Based on examples, please describe what knowledge/ideas are exchanged in the 
interactions between regulators and sandbox participants? 
7. Can you please, based on examples, describe instances of regulator-regulatee interactions 
that have influenced the way regulators work? 
8. Please describe instances of regulator-regulatee interactions that have possibly influenced 
sandbox participants directly or indirectly?  
9. After graduation/exit of participants, please describe the nature of interaction with 
graduated participants? 
10. According to your view, what are the advantages that sandbox participants may provide 
regulators? Similarly, what are the advantages that regulators provide to sandbox 
participants? 
Interview guide: Sandbox participants 
1. Please tell us briefly about your background and current role in your FinTech firm. 
2. Please tell us about your previous/current journey in/out of a regulatory sandbox (Why 
regulatory sandbox to begin with?) 
3. Can you, based on examples, describe interactions that occur with regulators, prior to 





4. Please describe how and for what purpose has your FinTech interacted with regulators, 
or vice versa, after accessing (i.e. during testing) the sandbox? 
5. Can you please describe an example in which knowledge/ideas were exchanged in the 
interactions with regulators and how was this of support in testing and validating your 
business model? 
6. After graduation/exit, please describe whether your FinTech interacts with regulators and 
for eventually what purpose? 
7. Lastly, according to your view, what are the advantages that sandbox participants may 
provide regulators? Similarly, what are the advantages that regulators provide to sandbox 
participants? 
8. If you think back at your experience: how has your knowledge developed? 
 
